Houston Division case:
Not until shortly after Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court did Petitioner discover the obscure artifice used by the district judge to justify pretending that Petitioner is a resident of the geographic area in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division is authorized to exercise jurisdiction: the District of Columbia.
You did not misunderstand the previous sentence.
The only geographic area in which any contemporary United States District Court in America has jurisdiction is the District of Columbia.
The supreme political authority in America is the American People (Declaration of Independence, Conclusion; Constitution, Preamble), referred to by the Supreme Court as “joint tenants in the sovereignty”; to wit:
“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).
The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, however—as ordained by the American People (the “Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty”) in the Constitution (Article 1 § 8(17))—is Congress.
Whereas, there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to legislate rules or regulations (statutes) against Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty, this is not so with residents of the District of Columbia—who are subject to any legislation Congress may impose on them.
To ensnare Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty in the banker-contrived artifice of income tax in behalf of their banker creditor, Congress enacted recondite[1] legislation that would foreclose Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty from fully comprehending the law, by transmuting certain everyday words into statutory terms with a convoluted or constitutionally opposite definition and meaning, and formulating statutes (and statutory definitions) using obscure rules of statutory construction to guarantee maximum complexity—thereby allowing Federal executive and judicial officers to operate within the “letter of the law” and justify treating Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty as residents of the District of Columbia, but without having to explain what they are doing.
“Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow,”[2] and today we are dealing, literally, with an infinity of absurdities foisted upon us in the wake of the initial absurdity perpetrated by Congress June 30, 1864 (described in detail in both the Houston and Lufkin Record).
On that date, Congress quietly decreed that the word “state” (and shortly thereafter “State” and “United States”) means “the territories and the District of Columbia” (13 Stat. 223, 306, ch. 173, sec. 182, June 30, 1864 [Go to “Turn to image” 306])—but ultimately translates to the District of Columbia only and excludes by design all commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
Since June 30, 1864, any Joint Tenant in the Sovereignty (you) who innocently believes or admits that he resides in a state, State, or the United States, unwittingly confesses or concedes that he is a resident of the District of Columbia—and subject to the absolute, exclusive legislative power of Congress and jurisdiction of District of Columbia executive and bench officers (Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrates).
Congress incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation February 21, 1871,[3] and have ruled the District of Columbia under municipal (Roman civil) law ever since.
Petitioner had the Houston Division case won following Petitioner’s initial March 19, 2014, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Houston Docket #18)—because there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner was a resident of the only statutory “State” of the statutory “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C.: the District of Columbia.
The judge stacked the deck against Petitioner by commanding sua sponte[4] the DOJ attorney to file in the record what the judge would use sub silentio[5] to justify pretending that he was authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia: one of Petitioner’s tax returns.
Courtesy of Congress, the filing of a tax return is one of an indefinite number of undefined “acts or statements” that purportedly prove “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [statutory] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.
In combination with legally defective congressional legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) and (h), actors in government pretend that the filing of a tax return constitutes one’s voluntary election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia, and thereafter pretend that they are authorized to treat the filer as such without disclosing what they are doing.
The only flaw is that an alleged “definite intention to acquire residence” is insufficient legal ground in and of itself for someone to acquire or be granted residence or be treated by a government officer as a resident of a given place.
Under such logic, every non-American crossing the border into America without authorization could claim the right to be treated as a resident (Note: There is no substantial difference between being treated as a resident and being a resident).
Residence depends on facts and is established in one of two ways: through bodily presence as an inhabitant of, or realization of earnings in, a given place / geographic area.
The Supreme Court, whose opinions are not law per se, but have the effect of law, affirms that no one can elect (choose) to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:
“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
Exercise of jurisdiction (from the Latin jus right, dictio act of saying) always is confined to a specific geographic area.
In a judicial sense, “jurisdiction” means, essentially, the legal power, right, or authority to hear and determine causes and pronounce the sentence of the law within the exterior limits of a defined geographic area.
When the Houston Division judge ruled “This court has jurisdiction” (Houston Dkt. #42), he was pretending sub silentio that the alleged “quasi-contractual right to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia by reason of the Court’s unilateral application of the provisions of 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) or (h) against Petitioner” is the same thing as jurisdiction—which it is not.
The entire Houston Division evolution was necessitated by complicity on the part of the district judge, appeals court judges, and Supreme Court justices that (1) the tax return ordered entered in evidence by the district judge is “proof” of “a definite intention [on the part of Petitioner] to acquire residence” in the District of Columbia, (2) Petitioner elected (chose), under 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) or (h), to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia for purposes of tax under Chapters 1 and 24 of Title 26 U.S.C., and (3) the district judge is authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia and conceal from Petitioner the legal authority he is using to do it.
It took Petitioner over 19 months in the Houston Division, Fifth Circuit, Supreme Court, and Lufkin Division cases[6] to ascertain precisely what to say and do—no more, no less—to get the agreement of the judges, magistrates, and DOJ attorneys in the Lufkin Division case that (1) the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction is over, and (2) they are culpable for fraud and treason to the Constitution.
There is no reason why that particular filing (Lufkin Dkt. #58) will not work to bring any other Federal case, civil or criminal, anywhere in the Union, to a halt—because there is no constitutional authority that gives any contemporary United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and “enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt” (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)) in any county, parish, or borough in America—and no one can produce such authority.
Houston Division Docket Houston Division Record (17MB)
Fifth Circuit Docket Fifth Circuit Record (2.5MB)
Supreme Court Docket Supreme Court Record (14MB)
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Lufkin Division case:
The Houston Division case commenced January 7, 2014, the Lufkin Division case exactly six months later, July 7, 2014.
Using knowledge and experience gained in the Houston Division, Petitioner took a proactive stance in the Lufkin Division case and had things going backwards from the beginning: None of the two judges, three magistrates, or two DOJ attorneys made any progress in 14 months.
As in the Houston Division, the Lufkin Court was masquerading as a constitutional Article III judicial-branch court of limited jurisdiction.
No judge in a court of limited jurisdiction has authority to order any litigant to do anything—and when the Lufkin judge issued his September 17, 2014, “Order Governing Proceedings” commanding plaintiff and defendant to perform in accordance with his wishes and timetable, Petitioner made a motion that the Lufkin Court certify said Order and allow Petitioner to appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a ruling on its constitutionality (Lufkin Dkt. #21).
An “Order Governing Proceedings” (or similar title) is issued by every judge in every civil action in every United States District Court in America.
Whereas, Article III trial courts (which no longer exist) are judicial-branch courts of limited jurisdiction (subject-matter jurisdiction only) and the judge in such proceedings a mere referee, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prosecute the case or face dismissal of the complaint for failure to do so.
The only provision of the Constitution that gives Federal courts of law the power to exercise personal jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over litigants and order them to perform as commanded, is an implied authority, Article 4 § 3(2)—and all such courts are Article IV legislative-branch courts of general jurisdiction under the exclusive control of Congress.
That any United States District Judge in any civil action issues an order commanding the plaintiff or defendant to do anything, is incontrovertible evidence that (1) the judge is a legislative-branch officer exercising personal jurisdiction over the litigants and prosecuting the case sua sponte, and (2) the court is an Article IV legislative court of general jurisdiction—with authority only in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), such as the District of Columbia.
All motions are in the nature of a request—and the Lufkin Court denied Petitioner’s motion / request to certify the aforesaid Order Governing Proceedings for appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
Petitioner is a Joint Tenant in the Sovereignty (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793)).
The reason Petitioner’s last two Lufkin Division filings are demands (and not motions) is that there is no constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Division judges or magistrates capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas—making all of them outlaws usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area, Petitioner the ranking participant in the Lufkin Division Federal-jurisdiction charade, and a demand the proper form of address.
Lufkin Division Docket Lufkin Division Record (68MB)
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[1] recondite . . . adjective . . . very difficult to understand and beyond the reach of ordinary comprehension and knowledge : deep . . . Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, Incorporated Version 2.5 (Merriam-Webster, Inc.: Springfield, Mass., 2000), s.v. “Recondite.”
[2] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914), p. 2166.
[3] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419]; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
[4] SUA SPONTE. Lat. Of his or its own will or motion ; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion. Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul Minn., 1891), p. 1129.
[5] SUB SILENTIO. Under silence ; without any notice being taken. . . . Id.
[6] The record of these cases is a presentation of law, fact, and evidence not found anywhere else.
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