DC Judge rubber-stamps Lufkin judgment; Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Petitioner requested of United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, among other things, a temporary restraining order on enforcement of the Lufkin Judge’s final judgment and presented the following controversy for resolution: “Whether the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress or extends to Tyler County, Texas.”

The correct answer to this question signals the end of the legislative tribunals known as United States District Courts—except for the only three de jure United States District Courts in existence: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

For Judge Howell to cop to the indisputable legislative fact that the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress (Federal territory only) and does not extend into the Union, would be to invalidate the Lufkin Judge’s decision—but more importantly, would undo over 150 years of legislative-branch mischief and lead, ultimately, to the demise of the most elaborately constructed monolith of institutionalized crime in world history: the contemporary so-called Federal Government, i.e., the terrain of the District of Columbia,[1] i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation,[2] i.e., the “United States,”[3] located in the District of Columbia[4] and doing business as “United States™”[5] and “United States®.”[6]

A weighty burden for Ms. Howell to bear, we all can agree.

Another sobering influence on Judge Howell’s handling of Petitioner’s filing would be the fate of the last bench officer to rule against the nature and interests of the private Federal Reserve,[7] Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney in the Credit River Township Case,[8] Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968: Mahoney was poisoned and thereafter died of a complication, aspiration of vomitus, August 22, 1969, at the age of 54.[9]

Since 1969, no more such adverse judgments.

It is easy to see that the Honorable Beryl A. Howell had ample motivation to deny Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, evade settling the controversy submitted by Petitioner, falsify the record, and dismiss Petitioner’s complaint (entries hyperlinked below).

Judge Howell must have been concerned about Petitioner, however—because she tipped her hand and divulged the ultimate-but-frivolous[10] rationalization used by the Federal judiciary and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice to justify usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction throughout the Union in their joint efforts to exact what is called “income tax” from the American People; a theory best described as “subject-matter jurisdiction conveys territorial jurisdiction.”

Judge Howell propounds on page 4, paragraph 2 of her Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (hyperlinked below) by way of circumlocution and inference, that the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, is Article 1 § 8(1).

If it were that simple, it seems like the Lufkin Judge and Lufkin Magistrate would have said the same thing instead of going silent and stonewalling the matter for six months.

For the benefit of anyone who might be duped into believing such a patently absurd argument, let us identify the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and the extent to which they obtain.

Jurisdiction 101

The American People on September 17, 1787, ordain and establish the Constitution and Congress on March 4, 1789, implement it.

The Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers of legislation in certain geographic areas.

Those powers of legislation give executive-branch and judicial-branch officers the capacity to take jurisdiction in those geographic areas and execute and declare, respectively, the laws enacted by Congress.

It is not too complicated.[11]

But the loyalty of congressmen goes to the highest bidder—and until arrival of the private Federal Reserve in 1913, the principals of its parent bank, the private Bank of England (inc. July 27, 1694; first government-sanctioned fractional-reserve-banking institution), circa mid-19th century secure controlling interest in Congress and begin dictating legislation, which is drafted in the City of London (municipal corporation after which the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation is modeled), and the nature of jurisdiction is cunningly perverted in form through stealth redefinition of a key common noun and proper noun in the Constitution, “State” and “United States,” so as to give each a constitutionally opposite statutory meaning.

The Federal Reserve Act (H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913) is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild[12] (1842–1918), director of the private Bank of England.

The Federal Reserve Act is implemented by Baron Rothschild’s straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg,[13] a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose (the New York Times dubs Warburg “Father of the Federal Reserve”[14]).

Each of the 12 private regional Federal Reserve banks is a private joint-stock company instituted under aegis of the novel District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, inc. February 21, 1871 (fns. 1 and 2), and patterned by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after its parent bank, the private Bank of England.[15]

The elephant in the room

  • “A tax is a demand of sovereignty . . . State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall (U. S.) 278, 21 L. Ed. 146.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 3220.

The sovereign authority throughout the Union is the American People[16]; the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress.[17]

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, is providing legislation for the laying and collection of tax (income tax) without the territory over which they are sovereign, in geographic area occupied by another sovereign, the American People.

That Congress appear to be demanding income tax of the American People, joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419, 472 (1793), residing throughout the Union means either that Congress is usurping exercise of territorial and personal legislation outside their territory or what we know as “income tax” is not actually a tax or both.

  • “A tax is not a debt . . . New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 ; and has none of the incidents of a debt ; 21 Harv L. Rev. 283 ; technically it is not a debt . . .” Id.

All alleged Federal income-tax liability is classified as debt, 28 U.S.C. 3002(3), and all Federal income-tax cases, civil and criminal, are prosecuted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

What is called “income tax” ultimately is not a tax per se but a commercial penalty for the use of private property of the Federal Reserve Bank known as Federal Reserve Notes[18] (“FRNs”).

The alleged income-tax liability generated from multiple transactions involving the same FRN (called velocity of money) will exceed the face value of the FRN after a few transactions.

  • “No tax is valid which is not laid for a public purpose ; Citizens’ S. & L. Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, where it was said that there are limitations on the power of the three branches of government which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist, and among these is that taxation must be for a public purpose ; such are (according to Cooley, Tax. 18) to preserve the public order ; to make compensation to public officers, etc. ; to erect, etc. public buildings ; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws, etc. ; also, to provide secular instruction ; Colley, Tax. 2d ed. 119–124 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 81, 26 L. Ed. 658 . . .” Id. at 3221.

No collection of what is called income tax goes toward a public purpose; all collections of income tax are used for a private purpose, i.e., to pay interest on the so-called national debt incurred by Congress and owed to a private bank, the Federal Reserve; to wit:

“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.

Banks do not pay income tax; to wit:

“Sec. 7. . . . Tax exemption. Federal reserve banks, including the capital stock and surplus therein, and the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate.”   Federal Reserve Act, H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913. 

All collections of income tax paid to the private Federal Reserve are retired from circulation the same way they are created by banks in the so-called loan process—by computer-keypad keystroke, in exchange for the borrower’s promise-to-pay; to wit:

“What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction [checking or credit-card] accounts.” Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994, pp. 3–6.

“If it [a bank] makes loans, it will simply credit the checking accounts of the borrowers. . . . [N]ew money, in the form of additional checkable deposits, will be “created.” The Federal Reserve Today: Fed Funds Rate, Discount Rate, 11th ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1994, p. 21.

“[M]oney exists simply as a bookkeeping entry at a bank . . .” The Story of Money, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p. 17.

“[W]hen a bank makes a loan, it simply adds to the borrower’s deposit account in the bank by the amount of the loan. This money is not taken from anyone else’s deposit; it was not previously paid in to the bank by anyone. It’s new money, created by the bank for the use of the borrower.” Robert B. Anderson, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, “How Much Will Your Dollar Buy – Interview with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson,” August 31, 1959, pp. 68–69.

The purpose of income tax is to remove from circulation a substantial portion of the digits of credit “loaned” into circulation by banks by bookkeeping entry in the so-called loan process.

“The Federal Reserve is a fount of credit, not of capital. . . .” New York Times, “Stabilizing Money Rates,” Section 3, Editorial Section, January 18, 1920, p. 33.

Unless a significant amount of the digits “loaned” into circulation by the banks are collected by the IRS in the form of FRNs from (1) payments of income tax, (2) seizure and sale of real and personal property, and (3) seizure of bank accounts and paychecks and thereafter gifted or bequeathed (31 U.S.C. 321(d)(1) and (2)) to a non-U.S. Government employee and proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury,[19] for transmittal to the private Federal Reserve as payments of interest on the national debt and thereupon retired from circulation, inflation skyrockets, prices go through the roof, and the fraudulent nature of the fractional-reserve banking system of the private Federal Reserve can be concealed no longer.[20]

Hence, the need to screen and select and vet and test and groom and own and control every single United States District Judge, Magistrate Judge, and Appeals Judge and Supreme Court Justice and United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney.

Only two kinds of taxes: direct and indirect

Article 1 § 8(1) of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”

This division of taxation into two classes, i.e., (1) direct taxes, called taxes, and (2) indirect taxes, called duties, imposts and excises, is recognized throughout the Constitution, Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481.

“Taxes are classified as direct, which includes ‘those which are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc. of those who pay them ; and indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity.’ Cooley, Tax. 61. The latter includes duties, imposts and excises ; Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3220, s.v. “Tax.”

There is nothing wrong with direct taxes per se, so long as they are apportioned, i.e., divided and assigned in proportion, as provided in pertinent part of Article 1 § 2(3) of the Constitution; to wit:

“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . .”

Income tax, which is not apportioned, to any reasonable man clearly is a direct tax on the supreme political authority in America, the American People (fn. 15), and therefore unconstitutional; yet today income tax is regarded by government as an excise, or indirect tax, without the need to be apportioned, and therefore constitutional.

The only way such absurdities can come to pass is by ownership and control of those making, declaring, and executing the law.

All the chaos arrived with the Federal Reserve Act.

Congress transmute Americans into corporately colored franchisees

The only Americans who allegedly are liable to income tax are called individuals (26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals), a.k.a. taxpayers.

The statutory term “individual” is defined at 5 U.S.C. 552a Records maintained on individuals as follows:

“(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
“. . . (2) the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;”

The phrase “citizen of the United States” means resident of the District of Columbia (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45).

The phrase “alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means American non-resident of the District of Columbia who appears to have made an election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia (id. at 15–17, paragraphs 46–51).

The statutory so-called individual is an artificial person, a creature of the law in the nature of a corporation and, like a corporation, designated by a name written in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS (style of writing a proper noun for which the rules of English grammar make no provision).[21]

A corporation is a franchise; to wit:

“FRAN′CHISE, n. . . . A particular privilege or right granted by a prince or sovereign to an individual, or to a number of persons; as the right to be a body corporate with perpetual succession . . .” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (S. Converse: New York, 1828), Vol. I, s.v. “Franchise.”

“FRANCHISE. . . . A franchise is privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be exercised without legislative grant. To be a corporation is a franchise. The various powers conferred upon corporations are franchises.
“The word ‘franchise’ has various significations, both in a legal and popular sense. A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of a corporation, and the corporation, itself a franchise, may hold other franchises. So, also, the different powers of a corporation, such as the right to hold and dispose of property, are its franchises. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 515.

The right to receive Social Security retirement or survivor benefits and the right to vote for the president of the United States (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation) are political rights and franchises conferred by the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia: Congress, a.k.a. “Congress of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 3002(2), i.e., the Congress of a Federal corporation, id. at 3002(15), the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.

Nature of so-called individual income tax

“The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909) provided that every corporation for profit . . . engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying-on or doing business by such corporation . . . upon the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed in McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise on the doing of business and not a direct tax.
     “It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity throughout the United States . . . and that the tax is properly measured by the entire income of the companies subject to it . . .
     “. . . It [the corporation income tax] is an excise tax measured by the corporate income ; Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. —; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the corporation ; McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3229.

The only kind of income tax that is not a direct tax but an indirect tax and excise on the income, from whatever source derived, of a franchisee, is what modernly is known as “income tax.”

That the post-19th century Supreme Court has ruled that the personal income tax on American men and women is an excise is proof that Government treats of every American as an ALL-CAPITAL LETTER franchise, i.e., an individual: artificial person and creature of the law in the nature of a corporation who, like all franchises, exists by privilege conferred by the state (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation).

All so-called State (District of Columbia) tax codes draw substantially (almost exclusively) from the Internal Revenue Code for their respective provisions and deal strictly with franchisees, i.e. individuals (citizens of the United States, 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), i.e., residents of the District of Columbia, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45) and corporations.

For example, the California Revenue and Taxation Code provides, in pertinent part, that California is neither a statutory state nor part of the statutory geographical United States but a foreign country thereto—and the State of California Franchise Tax Board taxes only individuals who are residents of, or corporations who are organized or commercially domiciled in, “this state” (District of Columbia); to wit:

“17017. ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the states, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.  

“17018. ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.

“17019. ‘Foreign country’ means any jurisdiction other than one embraced within the United States.

“[Individuals] 17041. (a)(1) There shall be imposed for each taxable year upon the entire taxable income of every resident of this state . . .”

“[Corporations] 23101. (a) “Doing business” means actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit.
“(b) . . . a taxpayer is doing business in this state for a taxable year if . . . . [t]he taxpayer is organized or commercially domiciled in this state.”

For the meaning of the word “includes” in the above code citations, see Rule 6, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, of the rules of statutory construction, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6.

The 16th Amendment provides for an excise tax on franchisees

The Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of February 3, 1913, provides:

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

The 16th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to lay and collect an indirect tax, an excise, on incomes, from whatever source derived, of franchisees residing or doing business in one of the several statutory States of February 3, 1913: the District of Columbia, Porto Rico (changed to Puerto Rico in 1932), Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Midway Atoll, and the Panama Canal Zone and no other thing, id. at 8, paragraph 23.

M.O. of all Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys

Using the absurd, constitutionally opposite meaning of the definition of the novel statutory terms “State” and “United States” legislated by Congress in the United States Code as complete justification: Every Federal bench officer and attorney of the United States Department of Justice follows the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny” when confronted with the actual-but-fraudulent definition and meaning of said statutory terms and pretend by inference that such meanings are nonsensical (“frivolous”) and that “State” and “United States” mean what essentially every non-insider believes they mean, i.e., the several commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union (numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959), and prattle on about all the other statutes that authorize them to do what they are doing, lack of constitutional authority notwithstanding.

Using their “secret clubhouse” knowledge of the actual statutory meaning of “State” and “United States,” they casually toss these terms around like any other American would, but silently weave a web of statutory deceit so incomprehensible to unwitting victims and so matter-of-fact to the perpetrators, to be able to justify, with confidence, that their prey will never be able to understand what is happening, much less convince anyone else of the injustice.

In the Lufkin Division Civil Action, Petitioner conceded everything except jurisdiction in Petitioner’s answer to the complaint at the outset of the proceedings; to wit:

“Defendant hereby confesses the truth of the facts recited in the instant Complaint and admits the apparent truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and right of action . . .” Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s Amended Answer, Dkt. #10, p. 1.  

From the beginning Petitioner has addressed only the issue of jurisdiction.

Every slur, allegation, and denigration of Petitioner by the Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is contrived and fabricated—but bystanders reading the words of these officers would not know this unless they were to do an exhaustive inspection of the record and realize that Petitioner never argues about anything or makes any claim—rather only recites the law, presents the facts, refers to the evidence, and demands proof of jurisdiction or constitutional authority—and that such snide remarks are falsehoods.

Institutionalized crime

Every writing filed by the DOJ attorneys or entered by the Lufkin Judge, Lufkin Magistrate, or District of Columbia Judge is devoid of mention of the following material facts and failures: (1) Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, (2) United States’ failure to produce such authority despite blackletter-law obligation to do so, (3) allegation of the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority in Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or (4) United States’ failure to oppose said motion to dismiss.

The District of Columbia Judge, Beryl A. Howell, falsely declared that the Lufkin Judge “considered and rejected” the above material facts and material failures in her ruling against Petitioner—despite no evidence of either in the Lufkin Record; to wit:

“[T]he plaintiff’s [Petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s] Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 . . . . because the plaintiff’s present claim that the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s real property was considered and rejected in the prior action between the parties, in which the defendant [United States] prevailed . . .” United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2016, p. 3 (hyperlinked below).  

People who lie as a way of life cannot be respected or trusted with anything; their word is like garbage.

Congress is the most despised class in America for good reason[22]—and the Federal judiciary and United States Department of Justice, in connivance therewith, are populated in the former exclusively, and the latter almost exclusively, by active or latent pathological liars and marauders.

The Houston and Lufkin Records prove it.

The nature of their job (debt collectors working to ensure the longevity of the fraudulent private Federal Reserve) requires it.

Statute law vs. commercial law

What is actually going on in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is not law per se but commerce.

It only appears to be a legal proceeding.

The Lufkin Court is a for-profit District of Columbia commercial debt-collection forum.

The real party of interest is the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Treasury (non-U.S. Government employee, [19]) is the proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, ultimate party of interest / beneficiary.

Commercial principles underlie everything that is happening in the Lufkin Division Civil Action.

Commerce and the common law afford more effective ways to deal with a Federal summons and complaint than the filing of an answer, but these remedies must be undertaken at the outset, without joining the action. 

Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Counsel for the United States in the Lufkin Division Civil Action on March 14, 2016 (two and a half weeks prior to this post), filed United States’ Motion for Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, but the Lufkin Judge has yet to rule on it or even acknowledge that it has been filed.

Petitioner on March 28, 2016, sued the Lufkin Judge, Michael H. Schneider, in the District Court of Tyler County, Texas, to quiet the title to Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, and on March 29, 2016, served Mr. Schneider with the summons and complaint therefor.

Mr. Schneider has till Monday next following expiration of 20 days after date of service to answer the complaint (April 25, 2016).

Documents from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and District Court of Tyler County, Texas, follow below.

District of Columbia Minute Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 17, 2016

District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint

Petitioner’s Complaint against Lufkin Judge to Quiet Title, March 28, 2016

Return of Service of Process on Lufkin Judge, March 29, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the “District of Columbia,” by which name it is hereby constituted a body-corporate for municipal purposes . . . “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419].

[2] Id.; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

[3] (15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States [a Federal corporation]; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States [a Federal corporation]. 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Sec. 3002 Definitions.

[4] (h) [Location of United States.]
The United States is located in the District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307 Location of debtor.

[5] “United States™ Census Bureau,” official logo of the Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/us-census-bureau.

[6] “United States® Census 2010,” title of official hardcopy form used to collect 2010 census data; also logo of official online form, Form D-61 (1-15-2009): http://www.censusquestions.com/2010-us-census-form.pdf.

[7] The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[8] First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Township of Credit River, Minnesota, Martin V. Mahoney, Justice, Judgment and Decree, December 9, 1968: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/CreditRiver/1968-12-09judgmentanddecree.pdf (Minnesota State Law Library).

[9] Federal Reserve operatives have expended extraordinary effort to obliterate the effects of the Montgomery v. Daly case, but have failed to do so. For more details and a colorful account of the proceedings in the courtroom from a witness who was there that day, Minnesota Associate Justice of the Peace William Drexler, visit http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm.

[10] frivolous, adj. Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful <a frivolous claim>.   Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 677.

[11] For a simple depiction of the legislative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the remainder of government, see this one-page tabular display: Extent of Federal and State Legislative Power and Federal and State Jurisdiction.

[12] Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization: Staunton, Va., 1992), p. 102.

[13] Id. at 128.

[14] “According to Chernow [infra], Paul Warburg was the only person in America who understood how a central bank works. In 1912 and 1913, he drew up the basic plan for the Federal Reserve banking system, and he drafted the Federal Reserve Act. In December 1913 President Wilson signed the Act establishing the new central bank. If anyone can be called the father of the Federal Reserve Bank, the New York Times has rightly noted, it is Paul Warburg.” John Weir, Institute for Historical Review, “Powerful Jewish Family Profiled,” Review of Ron Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family (Random House: New York, 1993), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n5p33_Weir.html.

[15] The private Bank of England (joint-stock company), prior to arrival of the private Federal Reserve indisputably the most powerful political force ever known, is nationalized March 1, 1946, shortly after a conference attended by representatives of 44 different governments in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, and the founding of the so-called International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later to be called the World Bank, both of which private banks became operational in the District of Columbia in 1958.
The change in character of the Bank of England in 1946 has no practical effect on the personal fortune and political power amassed by the principals thereof up to this time—who are the same principals of the private Federal Reserve.
An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own or control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the private Federal Reserve’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and, by virtue of private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.”   AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[16] Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. . . . Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).

[17] Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2).

[18] Federal Reserve Notes are not negotiable as they do not contain a promise-to-pay nor may title thereto be transferred by delivery or indorsement, essential properties of a negotiable instrument.

[19] The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (f.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of which are domiciled in the District of Columbia.
“No person shall be entitled to receive any salary or other compensation from the United States for services as a Governor, executive director, councilor, alternate, or associate [of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank]. 22 U.S.C. 286a(d)(1) (Bretton Woods Agreements Act, P.L. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660, October 19, 1976; amended December 18, 2015)).
“The second part of the amendments prohibits the . . . [Secretary of the Treasury] from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government. . . . The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury receives no compensation for representing the United States.” Senate Report No. 94-1148 of Oct. 1, 1976, re amendment of Bretton Woods Agreements Act, supra, re Sec. 2 of House Report 13955 [p. 8], p. 5942.

[20] There is no difference in the nature of the lending policy (fractional-reserve banking) of the private Federal Reserve and that of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, only the degree to which it is practiced.
When the rate of inflation in Zimbabwe in 2008 passed the quadrillions of percent the government ceased tracking it (it ended up hitting 89.7 sextillion percent, 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, in November of that year).
For absolutely mind-blowing photos that show what can happen in a fractional-reserve banking system when the tax agency does not extort from the populace and retire from circulation a sufficient amount of digits in income tax to keep up with the rate of lending: http://www.financialjesus.com/financial-crisis/inflation-in-zimbabwe-pictures-2/.
“In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.” Alf Field, “Zimbabwe: A Fresh Start,” November 11, 2009, http://www.321gold.com/editorials/field/field111109.html.

[21] Generally the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS individual initially is created by the United States Social Security Administration upon assignment of a Social Security Account Number, but not all Americans have such a number. Any application for anything from a bank, corporation, or government agency, if granted, will be issued in the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME of the statutory individual, the corporately colored version of the full true name of the particular boy / girl / man / woman written in proper English.

[22] “Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.
“In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.
“Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . .” Los Angeles Times, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3.”

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