The case featured in this website appealed to the Supreme Court is Southern District of Texas, Houston Division No. 4:14-CV-0027.
There is another case against Petitioner being handled by the same Assistant U.S. Attorney, the sister case: Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division No. 9:14-CV-138 (the “Lufkin Case”).
Petitioner’s filings in the Lufkin Case have been fielded by multiple judges and magistrates from three different judicial districts. The government has made no progress in 14 months.
When Petitioner made a motion for the first judge in the Lufkin Case—Eastern District of Texas Chief Judge Ron Clark—to recuse (self-disqualify) himself for incompetence by reason of ignorance of law (and provided evidence proving the same), Judge Clark went silent and remained so. Six weeks later the case was removed to a different judicial district (Tyler Division) under a different judge. The case is now back in the Lufkin Division; Judge Clark is not involved.
For any court to exercise jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, there is a requirement that the Constitution must have given the court the capacity to take it; to wit:
“It remains rudimentary law that “[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal [United States Supreme Court], two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
That a lawsuit is authorized by the statutes of Congress, however, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to vest jurisdiction in any Federal court; to wit:
“So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).
Article III of the Constitution creates the Supreme Court and authorizes Congress to ordain and establish inferior trial courts of special (or limited) jurisdiction—with no authority to exercise general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject matter) anywhere in the Union.
Courtesy of Congress, however (since no later than June 25, 1948), every United States District Court is a court of general jurisdiction and hears and decides both civil and criminal cases, an implied power granted only in the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2), and only in Federal territory, such as the District of Columbia and the territories; to wit, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”
All Federal civil and criminal proceedings fall under Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
Congress define “judgment” in Title 28 U.S.C., Chapter 176, Section 3002(8) as follows:
“‘Judgment’ means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.”
On September 14, 2015, Petitioner files in the Lufkin Case, “Defendant’s Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure of the Constitutional Authority that Gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Tyler County, Texas” (the “Objection and Demand”) (hyperlinked below).
The statutory period for plaintiff United States to respond to the Objection and Demand is 14 days.
On September 29, 2015, 15 days after the filing of the Objection and Demand, the record in the Lufkin Case is devoid of response from either plaintiff or the Court—and Petitioner transmits to the clerk on that date, for filing September 30, 2015, “Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Alleged Case for Lack of Constitutional Authority that Gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Tyler County, Texas” (the “Demand for Dismissal”) (hyperlinked below).
The reason neither plaintiff nor the Lufkin Court could produce the constitutional authority that allows the Court to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas, is because there is no such constitutional authority.
For the Lufkin Court to reveal that it is using Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and extend its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for territorial courts of general jurisdiction into geographic area fixed by the Constitution exclusively for constitutional courts of special (or limited) jurisdiction, would be to confess to usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction and treason to the Constitution.
“How can this be?” or “How can they get away with this?” you may ask.
The answer is simple.
When Congress define a word or expression by legislative act, the ordinary and popular meaning (as found in the dictionary or encyclopedia) is stripped away and the new term means only what Congress define it to mean—and there is no discretion for anyone to take such term in any other way than provided in the statute.
In all civil and criminal proceedings in United States District Courts, “United States” is a term with a special definition and meaning.
In Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, in the chapter and section that defines “court,” “debt,” “judgment,” and “United States” (Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section 3002), “United States” means a Federal corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15)).
In the United States District Court conducting the Lufkin Case, “United States” means a Federal corporation—and the ultimate parent Federal corporation, over all other Federal entities of any kind—is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.
Every appearance of “United States” in anything and everything relating to Federal district courts means, literally, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation; e.g.:
- “Congress of the United States” means, literally, Congress of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.
- “Title 28 United States Code” means, literally, Title 28 District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Code.
- “United States District Court” means, literally, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation District Court.
- “United States District Judge” means, literally, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation District Judge.
- “United States Attorney” means, literally, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Attorney.
In Federal civil and criminal proceedings, there is no discretion for anyone to take “United States” any other way.
Actors in government rely on cognitive dissonance on the part of victims of the Federal word game to perpetrate the fraud, commit treason to the Constitution, and subject the American People to District of Columbia municipal law.
The hoax is protected by a culture of silence among all initiates in the Federal judiciary, Department of Justice, and other key positions in government.
And that is how they get away with it.
In summation: United States District Courts (i.e., Article 4 § 3(2) District of Columbia Municipal Corporation Courts) have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for territorial courts of general jurisdiction (District of Columbia and the territories only), into geographic area fixed by the Constitution exclusively for constitutional courts of special / limited jurisdiction (the Union).
There is no constitutional authority that gives any contemporary United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in any county in America—and no one can produce such authority.
Objection and Demand, September 14, 2015
Demand for Dismissal, September 30, 2015
 “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
 In general, people cannot reconcile the 75 absurd, convoluted definitions of “United States” scattered throughout the United States Code with what they believe is the United States. For those few souls who manage to figure it out and speak up about it, actors in government follow a culture-of-silence policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny.” Examples of this are (1) Chief Judge Ron Clark’s six weeks of silence following Petitioner’s motion for him to recuse himself for incompetence by reason of ignorance of law, and (2) ZERO government progress in the Lufkin Case in more than 14 months.
If a particular intended victim persists, government actors may mock / ridicule him by implication by quoting him, as if to say, “Can you believe how crazy this guy is? He thinks the United States is a Federal corporation!” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15)), knowing it will be next to impossible for the victim to secure general agreement in society as to the truth of the matter.
Petitioner obviates the cognitive-dissonance factor in the Lufkin Case by going straight to the supreme determinant, upon which the Lufkin Court’s very existence depends: the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in Tyler County, Texas. There is no such constitutional authority—and the Lufkin Court and every other United States District Court located throughout the Union is a kangaroo court with no lawful authority to do business in any county, borough, or parish in America.