Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current form of government

Houston IRS summons case

There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.

A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider, retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.

Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for Michael H. Schneider’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.

Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the government’s opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.

Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate (Clark’s denial hyperlinked below).

Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioner’s motion to vacate

Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code and taken by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

Ҥ 453. Oaths of justices and judges
     “Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (“So help me God.”) required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the United States.

But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme Court justice) keeps rolling along—in blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

How do they justify this?

Congress create another kind of “United States” for use in the courts

The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are pretending that the new statutory “United States” displaces / supersedes the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States, Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. that “United States” means “a Federal corporation”; to wit:

Ҥ 3002. Definitions
     “As used in this chapter:
         “. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
         “(A) a Federal corporation;
         “(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal  corporation] the United States; or
         “(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”

This means that every appearance of “United States” in anything to do with any civil or criminal proceeding in any district court means “a Federal corporation.”

That the 28 U.S.C. § 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution—but said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker from holding a judicial office under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).

Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Fraud and treason to the Constitution

This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”—because no government official or officer is authorized to construe “United States” to mean anything other than what it means in the Constitution; to wit:

A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .

“Chief Justice Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.

“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:

“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . .’” [Underline emphasis added.]  Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).

The purported legislative act of Congress that says “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:

“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . . 

“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void

“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” [Underline emphasis added.] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).

A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government 

The 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States” also includes an agency, department, commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.

The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1]

The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419, was created by Congress under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution—but that is where the relationship between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.

The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said Municipal Corporation’s existence at 16 Stat. 419, i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.

Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:

“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].  Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .”  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of today’s “United States” district courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union on a daily basis.

There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such act—and every one of Petitioner’s demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.

Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress requires the same religious test, “So help me God,” as a qualification to his respective office or public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the purported statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.

By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. § 453 and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no such justice or judge is an officer under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only a municipal officer under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), the Federal corporation by the name District of Columbia.

Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.

How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioner’s motion to vacate

The substance of Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.

As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the “United States” (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the “United States'” (District of Columbia’s) position.

True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate.

Most of the content of Ron Clark’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.

The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioner’s motion is in the second paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase “So help me God” violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.

Inspection of Petitioner’s motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the word “violate” in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.

Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to assume or hold an office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, accede to “The judicial Power of the [organic] United States,” Constitution, Art. III, §1, or exercise the limited jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.

As stated in Petitioner’s motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal / constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark then summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion by slyly destructively declaring that “His arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.”

Institutionalized piracy

The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer and the fraudulent “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) for which they all work and to which they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court anywhere in the Union.

All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

They are usurpers.

They are incorrigible.

And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial, i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters arrive in the courts.

The American People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776: Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the Constitution.

[1] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

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DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate final judgment

Petitioner has frozen United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States district and magistrate judges in their tracks numerous times.

When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:

“Generally, a plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).

“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).

Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.

District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.

The M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.

This is called lying by omission.

It is also constructive fraud.

It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).

This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.

Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.

This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.

Only municipal judges in United States district courts

Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.

In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.

Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.

The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.

Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.

As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.

The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.

A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation

What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.

The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.

Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.

Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.

Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.

After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.

You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.

Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.     

Houston IRS summons case

Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of authority in simple terms.

Set 1:

Set 2:

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.

Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.

Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.

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