Lufkin Judge awards judgment to United States; Petitioner files for temporary restraining order in District of Columbia

The Lufkin Judge on March 3, 2016, entered a memorandum order and final judgment (both hyperlinked below), denying Petitioner’s September 30, 2015, motion to dismiss with prejudice and granting United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, April 24, 2015, motion for summary judgement (11.5 MB).

There is, however, an automatic stay of 14 days before any execution may issue on a judgment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(a)).

On March 16, 2016, the 13th day following entry of the aforesaid memorandum order and final judgment, Petitioner filed, as plaintiff, against United States of America, as defendant, in United States District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 1:16-cv-00506 BAH, a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at equity (not law), under equity rules, in order obtain that court’s assistance in preventing an injustice to Petitioner.

In addition to the verified complaint, Petitioner also filed an application (motion) for a temporary restraining order and a memorandum in support of that application (each is hyperlinked below). A proposed temporary restraining order (for the judge to sign and issue) is attached to the memorandum in support.

To correct a technical error in the caption of the verified complaint, Petitioner on March 18, 2016, filed an Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (hyperlinked below).

Here is a brief introduction to the subject of equity:

“EQUITY. 1. In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men,—the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us ; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due.” Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jural,[1] and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals. It is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.
“2. In a more restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or claims are in conflict ; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except insofar as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies above mentioned, or apply it beyond the strict lines of positive law. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891 (“Black’s 1st), pp. 427–428.  

“EQUITY. . . .
“. . . Rules and maxims. In the administration of the jurisdiction, there are certain rules and maxims which are of special significance.
“First. Equity having once had jurisdiction of a subject-matter because there was no remedy at law, or because the remedy is inadequate, does not lose the jurisdiction merely because the courts of law afterwards give the same or a similar relief.
“Second. Equity follows the law. This is true as a general maxim. Equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief because the rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in the particular case.
“Third. Between equal equities the law must prevail. . . .
“Fourth. Equality is equity . . .
“Fifth.   He who seeks equity must do equity. A party cannot claim the interposition of the court for relief unless he will do what it is equitable should be done by him as a condition precedent to that relief. See the eleventh maxim, infra.
“Sixth. Equity considers that as done which ought to have been done. . . .
“Seventh. Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy.
“Eighth. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
“Ninth. Where equities are equal the first in time prevails—qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.
“Tenth. Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation.
“ Eleventh. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . .
“Twelfth. It is to the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights, that Equity leads assistance—vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subvenit. . . .
“Thirteenth. Equity acts in personam[2] and not in rem.[3] As a result of this principle, jurisdiction of the person gives power to affect by the decree property outside the jurisdiction
. . . .
“Fourteenth. Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.”  [Emphasis in original.]  John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), pp. 1057, 1062–1063.

“. . . In America, the federal courts have equity powers under the constitution, where an adequate remedy at law does not exist. . . . The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same as that of the former court of chancery in England, is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the states . . .
“In the administration of that jurisdiction the federal courts are not to ‘look only to the statutes of congress. The principles of equity exist independently of, and anterior to, all congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases ; U. S. v. Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 20 Sup. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499 . . .’”  Id., pp. 1064–1065.

Two of the remedies available at equity are injunction and declaratory judgment:

“injunction (in-jəngk-shən), n. A court order commanding or preventing an action. ● To get an injunction a complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. . . .”  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (“Black’s 7th), p. 788.

“DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.”  “Black’s 1st, p. 340.

Petitioner initially seeks a type of injunction called an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction.

“ex parte[4] injunction. A preliminary injunction issued after the court has heard from only the moving party.”  Black’s 7th, p. 788. 

“RESTRAINING ORDER. An order in the nature of an injunction. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1036.

“temporary restraining order. A court order preserving the status quo until a litigant’s application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard. ● A temporary restraining order may sometimes be granted without notifying the opposing party in advance. — Abbr. TRO. — Often shortened to restraining order.”  Id. at 1477.   

“—Preliminary injunction. An injunction granted at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1910), p. 627.

“—Permanent injunction. One intended to remain in force until the final termination of the particular suit.”  Id.

“—Perpetual injunction. . . . An injunction which finally disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point in time.”  Id.  

As the reader will discover: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the only de jure[5] United States District Court in North America and the only one with the jurisdiction necessary to decide the controversy set forth in the amended complaint; every other purported United States District Court is a de facto[6]  “court” which has no lawful existence under the Constitution.

As of this post, March 18, 2016, a file-stamped copy of court filings is not available.

The legal and equitable process involved in this action at equity is as follows:

Lufkin Court’s Memorandum Order, March 3, 2016

Lufkin Court’s Final Judgment, March 3, 2016

Petitioner’s Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 18, 2016

Petitioner’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

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[1] JURAL. Founded in law ; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recognition and protection of rights. . . .  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 661.

[2] In personam (in pər-soh-nam), adj. [Latin “against a person”] Involving or determining the personal rights and interests of the parties. — Also termed personal. . . .  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 795.

[3] In rem (in rem), adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing. — Also termed impersonal. . . .  Id. at 797.

[4] ex parte [(eks pahr-tee)], adj. Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested <an ex parte hearing> <an ex parte injunction> .  Black’s 7th, p. 597.

[5] DE JURE.  Of right ; legitimate ; lawful.  In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . .  Black’s 1st, p. 328.

[6] DE FACTO.  In fact, in deed, actually.  This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate.  In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . .  Id. at 325.

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Lufkin Division DOJ attorneys reappear after 174 days, falsify the record; Federal-jurisdiction Achilles’ heel confirmed

After almost six months of silence (since September 2, 2015), counsel for plaintiff United States file on February 23, 2016, a response (hyperlinked below) to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection to the magistrate judge’s January 22, 2016, report and recommendation.

Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation because it omitted mention of Petitioner’s unresolved September 14, 2015, challenge of the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and September 30, 2015, demand for dismissal for lack of constitutional authority.

All United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges work for the same for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, a.k.a. “United States” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the Lufkin Court is just another legislative-branch corporate debt-collection forum (28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure) masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations are fatal to this and every other Federal lawsuit within the Union.

United States’ solution to the contents of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

Like the magistrate’s report and recommendation, United States’ February 23, 2016, response is devoid of mention of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Three stages of truth

“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.”[1]  Arthur Schopenhauer, 1818.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees have long since ceased ridiculing what Petitioner has to say.

They are too terrified of it to mention it.

By Schopenhauer’s standard, this matter is now at opposition-stage.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees are opposing the contents of Petitioner’s filings by refusing to admit of their existence and attempting to denigrate the source thereof, i.e., Petitioner, with ad hominem attacks consisting of falsehoods that paint Petitioner as a lunatic, in the hope that such “official” statements will dissuade the reader from choosing to investigate the matter personally and reconcile the condemnations of Petitioner with the actual record of the case.

Such fabrications are easily invalidated because they have no basis in fact.

Beginning of the end of the Hoax of Federal Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction

Sorry, but that crack they see there in the dam, is not going to go away by pretending it does not exist.

Whatever happens in this case will only accelerate the inevitable.

The genie is out of the bottle.

And he is not going back in.

It is only a matter of time.

Too bad none of the principals in the San Bernardino-Apple iPhone case know the right question[2] to ask.

Notwithstanding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a reply to United States’ February 23, 2016, response to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2) provides that the Lufkin Court must take judicial notice of certain facts if Petitioner requests it and supplies the necessary information—which Petitioner has done.

United States’ Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, February 23, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 24, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 25, 2016

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[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenry, The Harper Book of Quotations, 3rd ed. (HarperCollins Publishers: New York, 1993), p. 451, quoted in Garson O’Toole, PhD, Quote Investigator, “In a Time of Universal Deceit — Telling the Truth Is a Revolutionary Act,” www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/.

[2] “What is the constitutional authority that gives this Federal court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over property located in San Bernardino County, California?”

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