As expected, the judge on November 22, 2017, entered his Memorandum & Order denying Petitioner’s October 3, 2017, motion for a grant of immunity for testimony.
Notwithstanding that the USDOJ attorney is the point man in this proceeding, as in virtually every other so-called “federal” (municipal) case, the judge is running the show and in this one intends to see that Petitioner ends up behind bars; the USDOJ attorney is just along for the ride to provide what the judge needs to accomplish his objective.
When the USDOJ attorney failed to respond to Petitioner’s motion for a grant of immunity and give the judge the tool he needed to rule against and deny Petitioner’s motion for immunity, he threw a monkey wrench in the judge’s plans and—having demonstrated insufficient intellect to pull it off on his own—had to be bypassed and an alternative plan devised to reopen the matter, so the judge would have the justification he needed to deny Petitioner’s motion for immunity.
The process was effectuated by the judge who, by way of proxy, caused the USDOJ attorney to sign and file certain documents which opened the door for the judge to get involved again—based on a point so lame it would not support the weight of a dust mote: that the USDOJ attorney was unaware that a request is a motion, even though the clerk knew it and docketed it as the same (Document 24) and evidently knows more about the law than the USDOJ attorney, and “motion” is defined as a request and taught as such on the first day of law school.
The USDOJ attorney’s failure to respond to Petitioner’s motion for immunity is a major black mark on his record as a government lackey and he did exactly as he was told and filed the documents that were given to him; the judge thereafter, in his Memorandum & Order, denied Petitioner’s motion for immunity.
Following the judge’s November 22, 2017, denial of Petitioner’s motion for grant of immunity, Petitioner on November 29, 2017, filed Petitioner’s amended motion demanding disclosure of the taxing statute that makes Petitioner liable to tax, or dismissal with prejudice of the case.
Twenty-one days later, on December 20, 2017, the very last day in which to file a response to said motion, the USDOJ attorney filed his feeble Response in Opposition to the new demand (motion) for taxing statute (the USDOJ attorney is not doing so well since his flub).
A week later, on December 28, 2017, Petitioner filed his Reply to Response in Opposition to Motion—and 11 days after that, on January 8, 2018, his Amended Reply to Response in Opposition to Motion, which filing was necessitated upon discovery that the initial Reply on file in the Court was missing three of its 12 pages (8, 10, and 11)—easily crushing the two points raised by the USDOJ attorney in his Response in Opposition.
More importantly, however, said Amended Reply shows that no matter what statutes may authorize Internal Revenue Service to sue Petitioner, based on its own evil practice and wrongdoing in this case, it is disqualified from using the Court any further; specifically: It is deprived of any right to relief in a court of equity to which it previously may have been entitled—meaning the case is essentially done.
Petitioner is unaware of any previous case where the Internal Revenue Service was barred from using the court as a consequence of its evil practice toward its target.
This development does not fit into the judge’s plans.
We shall see what he decides to do about it.
supremecourtcase 