All Federal civil and criminal proceedings are commercial debt-collection exercises conducted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
In Federal debt-collection proceedings, there is no geographical United States—only a corporate United States; to wit:
“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (15) “United States” means—
“(A) a Federal corporation;
“(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or
“(C) an instrumentality of the United States.” Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section 3002(15).
The meaning of the definition of “United States” in subsections (15)(B) and (C) of 28 U.S.C. 3002 being indeterminable without application thereto of the definition in subsection (15)(A): Subsection (15)(A) is the controlling definition of “United States” in Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure
—and in all Federal civil and criminal proceedings “United States” means a Federal corporation
; and the supreme parent Federal corporation, over all other Federal corporations and all other Federal entities of any kind, is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.
As demonstrated in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint), United States District Courts located throughout the Union are debt-collection mills, extorting those who come before them under false pretenses, in behalf of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and depriving them of the “unalienable Rights” (The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America
of July 4, 1776, Preamble) of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (id
.), i.e., life, liberty, and property,
without due process of law, i.e., process according to the law of the land,
Whereas: Judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts of limited jurisdiction no longer exist—only de facto legislative-branch Article IV District of Columbia Municipal Corporation territorial courts of general jurisdiction, called “United States District Courts,” specially created by Congress in name only at 28 U.S.C. 132(a), outside the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 451, which enumerates all de jure courts of the United States, such as the nonexistent Article III “district court” and “district court of the United States,” which courts are defined expressly but also deceitfully—as no such court has physical existence; and
Whereas: There is no constitutional authority that gives any United States District Court the capacity to hear and decide civil and criminal proceedings in any county, parish, or borough in America; and
Whereas: United States District Judges and United States Magistrate Judges operating in nominal so-called United States District Courts, as constituted at 28 U.S.C. 132(a) and located within the Union, are positions or offices which have no lawful existence under the Constitution; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court located within the Union is a pretended court whose United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges participate in a combination with other Federal actors from the United States Department of Justice, deprive every Union-member resident with whom they come in pretended official contact, of one or more of the rights to life, liberty, and property, and either conspire to commit or commit one or more of the following offenses in the course of performing their pretended official duties every time pretended official contact is made, including, without limitation: breach of the peace; false personation; simulating legal process; false search warrant; searches without warrant; transportation, sale, or receipt of stolen vehicles, vessels, livestock, goods, securities, or moneys; false arrest warrant; false arrest; false information and hoaxes; fraud and related activity in connection with obtaining confidential phone records information; harassment; stalking; conspiracy against unalienable rights; deprivation of unalienable rights under color of law; public disturbance involving acts of violence; solicitation to commit a crime of violence; carrying concealed firearm while personating a law enforcement officer; false imprisonment; impersonating public servant; abuse of official capacity; murder; capital murder; manslaughter; mayhem; extortion by officers or employees of the United States; robbery; aggravated robbery; unlawful discharge of firearm; burglary; embezzlement; unlawful request for subpoena of bank records; theft; kidnapping; aggravated kidnapping; assault; aggravated assault; mail fraud; perjury; aggravated perjury; racketeering; terrorism; torture; war crimes; unlawful interception, use, or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications; unlawful access to stored communications; illegal divulgence of public communications; and fraudulent use or possession of identifying information; and
Whereas: There exists no judicial-branch Article III constitutional court of limited jurisdiction, as contemplated by the Framers and provided in the Constitution, to which Petitioner can resort for redress or compensation for violations of Petitioner’s right to property and due process of law, committed by officers of the United States District Courts and United States Department of Justice; and
Whereas: Conclusive (indisputable) legal evidence of the offenses enumerated in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information lies in the purported record of the purported United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, purported Tyler and Lufkin Divisions; and
Whereas: Federal bench officers and courts that hear appeals of decisions in civil and criminal causes originating in a United States District Court, are aiding and abetting the Federal actors therein involved and augmenting organized criminal activity and therefore cannot be trusted; and
Whereas: As augured by Jefferson 195 years ago, supra, all “State” (District of Columbia) courts are District of Columbia Municipal Corporation legislative tribunals enforcing the rules and regulations of District of Columbia municipal law, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong, a power authorized by the Constitution only at Article 4 § 3(2) and only in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id.; and
Whereas: It is reasonable (and equitable) that Federal actors establishing, maintaining, and participating in organized criminal activity are personally liable for the same respective amount of debt associated with the same offenses for which individual Americans are held liable, under color of law, office, and authority, in purported civil and criminal proceedings in purported courts called “United States District Courts”; and
Whereas: It is unreasonable to believe that Petitioner can obtain remedy with the help of other members of the same organized criminal activity (United States Department of Justice and United States District Courts) as those who committed the offenses specified and sworn to in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information; and
Whereas: There exists no public forum to which Petitioner can repair for remedy of violations of Petitioner’s unalienable Right to “the pursuit of Happiness” (The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, Preamble), i.e., the right to property (see Slaughterhouse Cases, fn. 2, infra), and the right to due process of law (Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution), perpetrated in organized criminal activity by the aforesaid Federal actors,
Wherefore: Petitioner has no option but to pursue remedy privately.
Affidavit of Information, Pretended Lufkin Litigation, January 14, 2016
Demand for Payment, January 14, 2016
Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt, January 14, 2016
* * * *
 “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419]; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
 Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . . Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).
 Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . .
. . . Due process of law in the latter [the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . . Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
 DE FACTO. In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul Minn., 1890), p. 325.
 DE JURE. Of right ; legitimate ; lawful. In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . . Id. at 328.
 The same 65 senior military officers notified in the previous Affidavits of Information (post of December 30, 2015, infra), as well as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have been sent an original of the instant Affidavit of Information.