The origins of this case go back 20-plus years and involve an alleged tax liability of more than $3 million, factors that evince a significant investment of time, energy, and resources on the part of the Internal Revenue Service and government to acquire Petitioner’s property.
Only at the very end of the process, on June 8, 2015, when Petitioner first learns of the Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s April 29, 2015, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, does Petitioner find the last piece of the puzzle.
Said discovery merits a second petition, the June 30, 2015, Petition for Rehearing, which the law clerks and justices of the Supreme Court review and accept for consideration, a rarity, within one day of submission.
Although the Petition for Rehearing presents sufficient grounds for the justices to grant it, it is not surprising that they decline to do so, given what is at stake: willingness of the average American to continue participating in the “voluntary tax system” (only thing that allows principals of the Federal Reserve to maintain their private banking monopoly).
The Clerk of the Supreme Court notifies Petitioner of the disposition of the Petition for Rehearing in the Clerk’s August 10, 2015, notice of entry of order.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, at Rule 60, provide for relief in proceedings of the character of that of the district court of first instance; to wit, in pertinent part:
“(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
“. . . (4) the judgment is void;”
It is well settled that final judgments and orders entered in a manner inconsistent with due process of law—a Right guaranteed by the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution—are void; e.g.:
“The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144 [of Title 28 U.S.C.], but on the Due Process Clause. . . .” United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir., 1976).
“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982).” [Underline emphasis added.] Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (1985).
“[I]f a ‘judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment.’ United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if ‘the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ Id. at 1316 (citations omitted) . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).
“[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.” Burrell v. Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).
Whereas, the record of the district court of first instance is rife with violations of due process of law, Petitioner documents the same in Petitioner’s September 9, 2015, Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order (below) and moves the district court to vacate said court’s May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment and Order of Sale and Vacature.
Had Petitioner known at the beginning of this case what Petitioner knows now, it is unlikely that Petitioner would have needed to take the measures chronicled in this website.
Petitioner’s motion to vacate (1) condenses into 19 pages the fruits of the last 18 months of litigation, in both this and a sister case (USDC, E. Dist. Tex., Lufkin Div. No. 9:14-cv-00138, which, following Petitioner’s filings, stagnated and has gone nowhere since beginning 14 months ago), (2) reveals how Federal judges evade and defeat the jurisdictional limitations of the Constitution in every civil and criminal action brought throughout the Union, and (3) provides sufficient grounds for the judge in the district court of first instance to vacate the aforesaid May 23, 2014, judgment and order (basis of the Supreme Court appeal presented in this website), as mandated by law.
The contents of the below motion to vacate have direct and intimate bearing on the life of every American who resides without the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.
 “[T]he Supreme Court has admonished us [10th Circuit Court of Appeals] that ‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case . . .’ United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.Ed. 361 (1923) (emphasis added) . . .” Chaney v. Brown, 712 F.2d 441 (10th Cir., 1983).
 “The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.