When IRS makes an assessment of tax allegedly due, such tax may be collected by levy or court proceeding, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun within 10 years after assessment of said tax liability, 26 U.S.C. § 6502.
If, however, a timely proceeding in court for the collection of said tax is commenced, the period during which such tax may be collected by levy is extended and does not expire until the liability for the tax—or judgment against the taxpayer arising from such liability—is satisfied, id.
Should an alleged taxpayer petition the U.S. Tax Court to challenge an assessment, all collection activity is suspended while the court proceeding is underway.
Should an alleged taxpayer lose in U.S. Tax Court, a new assessment is made and IRS and U.S. Department of Justice get a fresh 10-year period to levy or begin a court proceeding to collect.
Petitioner petitioned U.S. Tax Court re alleged tax liability for tax years 1994-1997, but shortly thereafter withdrew the petition; the USDOJ attorneys and judge, however, continued without Petitioner’s consent and spent some 18 months “holding a trial” with Petitioner in absentia, ultimately ruling for IRS (Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
After time was tacked on to the 26 U.S.C. § 6502 10-year collection period for “time spent” in U.S. Tax Court, the collection period was extended to January 16, 2014.
Nine days before expiration of said 10-year collection period, United States Department of Justice on January 7, 2014, began a court proceeding to enforce collection of the taxes allegedly due for tax years 1994-1997 in United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action 4:14-cv-0027 (the “Houston Division Civil Action”).
Because the collection lawsuit was begun within the 10-year collection period, and plaintiff United States of America prevailed, the period during which said alleged tax liability may be collected by levy does not expire until the judgment is satisfied.
This story, however, is not over.
Petitioner recently received in the mail four IRS Forms CP504, “Notice of Intent to seize (levy) your property or rights to property,” dated April 2, 2018 (the “CP504s”), for alleged tax periods ending December 31, 1994-1997.
The CP504s give Petitioner till May 1, 2018, to pay the amount demanded, make arrangements to pay in installments, or submit an IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request or face immediate seizure of property or rights to property.
The alleged authority for the CP504s, upon which they ultimately depend for their authority, legitimacy, and enforceability, is the aforementioned judgment in the Houston Division Civil Action.
As shown in Petitioner’s IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request (hyperlinked below), however, the alleged judge in the Houston Division Civil Action, Lynn Nettleton Hughes, had no authority to take jurisdiction, exercise “The judicial Power of the United States” (Constitution, Art. III, § 1), or enter a judgment in Harris County, Texas.
The foregoing is not an insignificant statement.
If true, it also means that every judgment in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States district court throughout the Union is void for the respective judge’s lack of authority to take cognizance of the matter in question, a condition known as coram non judice; to wit:
“coram non judice . . . [Latin ‘not before a judge’] 1. Outside the presence of a judge. 2. Before a judge or court that is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., Bryan A. Garner, ed. in chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 338.
Petitioner’s Response to CP504s.
Petitioner followed the instructions provided in the CP504s and on April 26, 2018, sent an IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request and attached to it a Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace and Affidavit of Mailing.
The Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace educates IRS as to the invalidity of the alleged judgment upon which the alleged CP504s depend and tells IRS what Petitioner will do if IRS undertakes any act in respect of the CP504s that results in damage to Petitioner or Petitioner’s property or rights to property.
Because neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a commissioned officer of the United States but a private-sector businessman: (a) Neither of the organizations over which they administer, i.e., Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service, respectively, is part of government but a private-sector business, (b) every employee thereof a private-sector worker, and (c) any criminal offense committed in Texas by any such private-sector employee properly a Texas, and not a Federal, matter.
Petitioner’s revised IRS Form 9423 and Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace spell out the penalties should IRS damage Petitioner via the alleged CP504s, as well as penalties for any retaliatory acts (e.g., criminal charges) taken against Petitioner should Petitioner enforce the penalties set forth therein against private-sector Department of the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service or their respective employees.
IRS summons-case update.
- New motion to dismiss
Petitioner on April 11, 2018, filed a motion to dismiss for United States of America’s lack of constitutional (Article III) standing to.
The US attorney had until May 2, 2018, to respond, but stood mute.
Petitioner on May 3, 2018, filed with the Court a Notice of United States of America’s representation of no opposition to respondent’s April 11, 2018, case-dispositive motion to dismiss with prejudice and Request for dismissal with prejudice of the case.
The US attorney failed to respond to any of Petitioner’s last four motions to dismiss—a representation that he does not oppose what is requested in any of said motions (dismissal with prejudice).
The last time the US attorney filed anything in the Court was December 20, 2017—four and half months ago.
Under the rules of equity, the US attorney’s failure to prosecute or participate in the suit operates to imply that the IRS summons case should be dismissed with prejudice immediately, as requested by Petitioner.
- “United States Treasury”
As you may know, the payee listed in every IRS request or demand for payment is “United States Treasury.”
Although Congress mention “United States Treasury” 14 times in Title 12 U.S.C. Banks and Banking, three times in Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code, and six times in Title 31 U.S.C. Money and Finance, there is no statute that expressly creates, establishes, or defines “United States Treasury.”
The closest thing to identifying how “United States Treasury” was created or what it is or means, is found in regulations written by non-officer of the United States, private-sector worker Secretary of the Treasury at 31 C.F.R. Money and Finance, Part 203 Payment of Federal Taxes and the Treasury Tax and Loan Program, Subpart A General Information, § 203.2 Definitions:
There being no congressional statute that creates, establishes, or defines it, “United States Treasury” appears to be a fictitious name created by Secretary of the Treasury, in which certain private business bank accounts are maintained for his personal use, either directly as a signatory or by proxy (junior employee in private-sector Department of the Treasury).
If this is true, it means that ultimately every penny collected in so-called income tax goes not to anyone in government but rather the exclusive, unilateral control of non-governmental, non-officer of the United States, private-sector worker Secretary of the Treasury (see 31 U.S.C. § 321(d)(1) and (2) for verification of this point).
It also would mean that governmental United States of America would have no constitutional standing to sue any alleged taxpayer in any United States District Court for alleged unpaid taxes for lack of a case or controversy between the litigants—because the actual party in interest is not governmental United States of America but private-sector businessman Secretary of the Treasury, via his DBA and alter ego “United States Treasury.”
And also that the instant civil action to compel Petitioner to produce books and records for the ultimate benefit of private-sector businessman Secretary of the Treasury, would have to be dismissed for United States of America’s lack of Article III standing (no case or controversy between the parties) to bring suit against Petitioner.
Presently, Petitioner is waiting for the Court to grant Petitioner’s motion for an order compelling the U.S. Secretary of State to produce for Petitioner’s inspection and copying, the commission, as an officer of the United States, of current Secretary of the Treasury Steven Terner Mnuchin (and former Commissioner of Internal Revenue John Andrew Koskinen).
When the U.S. Secretary of State is forced to comply with the subpoena (whether in the current IRS summons case or some other civil or criminal proceeding in the future) and has to produce the commission, as an officer of the United States, of the Secretary of the Treasury or, in the alternative, certify that there is no document in his custody responsive to the subpoena, there will be sufficient evidence on the table to resolve all disputes and rectify any discrepancy.
 This aligns with a previous official statement as to the nature of income tax; to wit:
“100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.