Motion denied; summons enforced; audit conducted; motion for immunity; no response, then lies; busted

Please note: For the sake of consistency, in this website, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is always the “Petitioner” (capital “P”), a practice first adopted when this webpage was opened after Petitioner’s filing of a petition in the Supreme Court in 2014.  In the current IRS summons case, however, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is the “respondent” (lower-case “r”) and IRS is the “petitioner” (lower-case “p”).

After the judge on September 13, 2017, enters his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, files a Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from said Order as void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Harris County, Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Despite no lawful authority to continue the charade, the judge the next day, September 26, 2017, declares the usual false generalities in his denial of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and subsequent Order compelling Petitioner’s appearance at the October 2, 2017, examination (the “Examination”).

Petitioner appears as appointed at the Examination accompanied by a Certified Shorthand Reporter (C.S.R.) (who produces a transcript of the Examination) and submits to questioning.

At the Examination, the United States Department of Justice attorney representing the IRS notifies Petitioner that if Petitioner does not cooperate and answer questions and produce documents that he will file a motion with the Court to have Petitioner held in contempt.

Petitioner answers certain of the IRS’s questions, but declines to answer others or produce any documents.

Knowing that the USDOJ attorney representing the (private-sector) IRS was not pleased with Petitioner’s aforementioned abstentions, Petitioner the following day, October 3, 2017, files in the Court Respondent’s Notice of Readiness to Comply with the Orders of the Court (Documents 11 and 13) and Request for Grant of Immunity against Potential Self-Incrimination (the “Notice and Request”).

Local Rule 7.4 gives the USDOJ attorney 21 days to file a response in opposition to the Notice and Request, but he neither files a response in opposition nor a motion to have Petitioner held in contempt; instead: Silence.

What this means is that the USDOJ attorney did not know what to do.

Why would the USDOJ attorney not know what to do?

It is a simple motion to oppose the Notice and Request or for an order holding Petitioner in contempt.

The reason Petitioner’s October 3, 2017, Notice and Request stultifies the USDOJ attorney is that the USDOJ attorney ultimately is not interested in answers to questions and production of documents which would allow the IRS to calculate Petitioner’s alleged tax liability (as falsely propounded by the USDOJ attorney at the Examination).

The USDOJ attorney wants to set the stage so Petitioner can be charged with “willful failure to file” and tried, convicted, and imprisoned—and a response in opposition or a motion to have Petitioner held in contempt would throw a wrinkle in that process (the USDOJ attorney wants Petitioner to volunteer testimony and records without a grant of immunity).

So, upon receipt of the October 3, 2017, Notice and Request the USDOJ attorney goes deer-in-the-headlights, freezes in his tracks, and misses the opportunity for a timely filing of a response in opposition.

Evidently, the next move comes from above (as does the intent to bring criminal charges against Petitioner), because the USDOJ attorney evidently is not crafty enough to figure out how to orchestrate the witch hunt within 21 days of the filing of the Notice and Request.

On the tenth day after lapse of the deadline, the USDOJ attorney files in the Court a motion to file, out of time, a response to Petitioner’s Notice and Request.

The reason, says the USDOJ attorney, as to why he failed to file a response within the 21 days, is that he was “confused” by the title of Petitioner’s Notice and Request: He thought it was only a “notice” and not a motion—even though a request and a motion are the same thing (a legal fact which is taught the first day of law school) and the clerk labeled the filing on the docket as a motion—and wants, therefore, to be granted relief, based on “excusable neglect,” to file, out-of-time (late), a response.

A sworn declaration as to the veracity of such factual contentions is an essential element of such filing, but the USDOJ attorney omits to include such evidence (declaration) or even an explanation as to an alleged sequence of events that would support his factual contentions and, apparently, just wants the Court to take his (unsworn) word for it and rubber-stamp his motion.

The language of the USDOJ attorney’s motion to file a response out-of-time is all “sweetness and light,” i.e., exudes utter innocence as to any wrongdoing and seemingly is written by a babe-in-the-woods attorney.

Accompanying the USDOJ attorney’s out-of-time motion is the object thereof, his proposed response to Petitioner’s Notice and Request, which is couched in terms, however, that are anything but innocent and evidently written by a seasoned government attorney, experienced in bringing down his prey.

To the USDOJ attorney’s two aforementioned filings, Petitioner responds with an exposé of the USDOJ attorney’s guile:

    1. A Response to IRS’s motion to be allowed to file, out of time, a response to the Notice and Request; and
    2. A Reply to IRS’s proposed response to the Notice and Request.

 

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Judge denies motion, orders enforcement of IRS summons; Petitioner moves for relief from Order, as Order is void

At the September 13, 2017, hearing of Petitioner’s July 17, 2017, motion to dismiss, the United States Department of Justice attorney opened with the usual perversion of the facts and falsification of the record after finding himself in checkmate.

The Internal Revenue Service’s case depends 100 percent on the presumption that Petitioner is a 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1) “person,” but presents no evidence of said presumption (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”[1]).

Rather than copping to failure and inability to produce such evidence upon challenge by Petitioner, said USDOJ attorney, as is typical, pretended Petitioner never raised the issue and went off on a tangent, accusing Petitioner of arguing that Petitioner was not a person—which Petitioner did not do.

The USDOJ attorney’s tag-team partner, the judge, then began accusing Petitioner of arguing things which Petitioner never did (nor are reflected in the record of the case) and asking for case citations in support of the false arguments he falsely attributed to Petitioner.

Thereafter, the judge entered his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons.

As the transcript of the September 13, 2017, hearing and record of the case evince, the court is a kangaroo court:

“kangaroo court.  1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible.  3. A sham legal proceeding.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p, 359.

There literally is nothing about what people believe is the federal judicial system throughout the Union that is legitimate; when exposed for fraud or treason, executive and judicial officers thereof pretend nothing was said, ignore material facts and failures harmful to their objective, and instead attribute to those proving the fraud and treason, events which said officers fabricate from whole cloth and never happened and of which there is no evidence.

This is possible—and their M.O.—only because they enjoy a monopoly over what appears to be the judicial system of the national government of the Republic but in actuality is the judicial system of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation,[2] usurping exercise of jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by its corporate charter, 16 Stat. 419, to the District of Columbia.

Achilles’ heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States

Except for the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1), the Achilles’ heel of every other executive and judicial officer of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States” (“a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) is that none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

The oath of office of the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1) is the only such oath or affirmation that is provided by the Constitution (see Article II, Section 8 thereof) and therefore not subject to alteration by Congress.

This is a critical defect for all other executive and judicial officers—as none have acceded to, or are authorized to exercise, the executive or judicial power of that certain “United States” of the Constitution (wherein “United States” is a proper noun and not a contrived statutory term with an opposite constitutional meaning) anywhere in the Union.

This is just more proof that all courts of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) throughout the Union are kangaroo courts.

The same deficiency is true for all Senators and Representatives of Congress—as none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution or acceded to the legislative power conferred in Article I of the Constitution.

Republican versus municipal form of government

Said congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the statutory “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have betrayed the trust vested in them by the American People and foisted on each member of the Union by way of stealth legislation, a municipal form of government and denied each such member of the Union a republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:

  1. commenced June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 306 (see 182), when Congress, with malice aforethought, transmuted the word “state” into a statutory term with a constitutionally opposite meaning that comprehends only the District of Columbia and the territories and excludes every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union;
  2. secured when Congress on June 16, 1866, proposed, 14 Stat. 358, and on July 9, 1868, ratified the political Trojan horse known as the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, whose primary purpose was to create an artificial class of Americans, municipal citizen-residents of the new “State” of the new “United States,” i.e., the District of Columbia, called “citizens of the United States”;
  3. augmented when Congress on February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation;
  4. facilitated by Congress’ creation August 14, 1935, of the Social Security retirement program (and Ponzi scheme) to provide justification for construing all participants thereof to be a resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia (see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(13)); and
  5. completed upon transmutation of every definition of the statutory terms “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law to include and mean the District of Columbia (a municipal corporation) and exclude every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.

During and following the above and other related events, among numerous other things:

  • Government began treating of the supreme political power and sovereign authority in the Republic, the American People, also known as the “join tenants in the sovereignty” (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793)), as political subjects of Congress and so-called persons with rights and duties;
  • The focus shifted away from unalienable rights, which every man holds inherently and are guaranteed in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, to civil rights, which are bestowed by Congress on the new “citizens of the United States” and alleged subjects of Congress, the American People; and
  • Government began requiring a permission, in the form of a license (because of the fraudulent statutory definitions of “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law, every license in America—even the driver’s license—is the requirement of the payment of a certain sum by an alleged “person” for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling for the general purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation), to exercise the unalienable and constitutional right to liberty and property and the inseparable right to contract derived therefrom.

The entire modern legal apparatus throughout the Union and the entire United States Code is municipal law of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation—with alleged political subjects and persons with rights and duties.

The only provision of the Constitution to which the current oath of office of Congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have a duty to honor is Art. I, § 8, cl. 17—all shows of apparent fidelity to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is time to abolish the current municipal form of government which has been implanted in every member of the Union and establish in each a republican form of government as intended by the Framers and guaranteed in the Constitution.

Courts of the “United States”: Enforcers of municipal law

The situation with the courts (and United States Department of Justice) is that they refuse to follow or adhere to the definition or meaning of their own fraudulent statutory terms—meaning there is no basis for agreement and therefore no due process of law or remedy, and the situation, ultimately, is not a legal one per se but a political in nature, a predicament succinctly encapsulated in the following maxims of law:

“A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words of the law there should be no departure.”  John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. (8th ed.), rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.

“Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.”  Id. at 2145.

“Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.”  Id. at 2165.

Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing “A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible” (see “kangaroo court,” supra): There being no other immediate remedy for the instant situation, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, filed Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(4) Motion for Relief from Order—as the said Order is void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to all provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

The contents of said motion are backed up with citations from Supreme Court cases and are conclusive and devastating and have direct application in every civil or criminal proceeding throughout the Union in every court of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”: “a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.

[1]This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[A] presumption is not evidence.”); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935) (“[A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant’s favor.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938) (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”). Although a decision of this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994), dealing with presumptions in VA law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide.”  Routen v. West, 142 F.3d. 1434, 1439 C.A.Fed. (1998).

[2] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

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Second IRS summons suit; Petitioner moves to dismiss; USDOJ goes silent; Petitioner moves for summary judgment

When the United States Department of Justice attorney at the May 30, 2017, hearing voluntarily dismissed the previous IRS summons case for an error in the name used in the IRS summons and USDOJ petition to enforce IRS summons, the IRS agent who issued that IRS summons was also in the courtroom at the time and served on Petitioner a second IRS summons with the name corrected.

Petitioner on June 5, 2017, responded commercially to the new IRS summons with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace to the IRS agent, IRS Group Manager, and Secretary of the Treasury and a courtesy copy to the USDOJ attorney who handled the aforementioned case.

Following Petitioner’s failure to appear at the time and place appointed in the IRS summons the same USDOJ attorney filed in the court and on June 26, 2017, served on Petitioner a fresh petition to enforce the new IRS summons and an Order to Show Cause from the Court with a hearing date set for July 17, 2017.

Petitioner on July 17 (the hearing date) filed in the court a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with an attached affidavit in support, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ attorney, but declined to attend the hearing.

At the July 17 hearing the judge set another hearing for August 8 and, evidently, ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve Petitioner with notice of the new hearing date.

Petitioner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss documents for the first time how executive and judicial officers of the “modern” (statutory / non-constitutional) “United States” justify extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter[1] of their corporate employer’s existence to the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) throughout the Union and around the globe.

Petitioner on August 3 (five days before the calendared hearing) received a phone call from the judge’s assistant inquiring of Petitioner if it would be OK to reschedule the hearing for a month later, to September 7.

Petitioner responded that Petitioner would be out of town on September 7; whereupon the judge’s assistant suggested September 13 and Petitioner accepted the offer.

Because Petitioner received from the USDOJ attorney representing the IRS, no response in opposition to Petitioner’s July 17, 2017, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Petitioner yesterday, August 21, 2017, filed in the court a 2 ½–page motion for entry of summary judgment—to which summary judgment Petitioner is entitled as a matter of law, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ attorney.

 

_____________________________________

[1] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (retroactive to December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

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USDOJ dismisses Houston IRS summons case; IRS agent issues new summons; Petitioner responds commercially

The previous post (May 28, 2017) mentions a hearing in the Houston IRS summons case scheduled for May 30, 2017, to hear Petitioner’s motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.

At the hearing on May 30, 2017, the judge immediately announced that the United States Department of Justice attorney for the IRS had, that very morning, submitted a motion to dismiss and that the motion was granted and the case dismissed.

The United States Department of Justice attorney’s motion to dismiss, only half a page in length, states that the reason for the dismissal is that the original IRS summons listed “John B. Trowbridge” as the target of the investigation and that the actual target is “John Parks Trowbridge” [sic] even though the Social Security Account Number included in the summons is that of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s.

In such governmental legal matters, errors in the name typically are glossed over if the intended party appears; to wit:

“Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis. The presence of the body cures the error in the name ; the truth of the name cures an error in the description.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.

A possible explanation is that neither the source of the summons, the Internal Revenue Service, nor its parent organization, the Department of the Treasury, are part of the government that filed the lawsuit.

The Department of the Treasury is a private organization, independent of government, 41 Stat. 654; to wit: Neither the senior executive of the Department of the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respectively) is required by law to take an oath of office (meaning they are non-governmental, private-sector workers) and the sole beneficiary of all their collections of income tax[1] is a private bank, the Federal Reserve.[2]

The IRS revenue agent who issued the summons that resulted in the lawsuit was present at the hearing and, following dismissal of the case, presented Petitioner with a new IRS administrative summons, dated that day, May 30, 2017, for an examination 15 days later, on June 14, 2017.

The United States Department of Justice attorney (who had just dismissed the case) informed Petitioner that he would be attending the June 14, 2017, examination personally.

Dismissal of the case and issuance and presentment of the new IRS summons means there is no court case and the entire cycle starts over from scratch.

Remedy

The previous post shows why there is no due process of law or remedy in any United States district court anywhere in the Union and that the immediate remedy[3] is not a legal one per se but commercial, under common-law rules, before the court gets involved.

In response to the new summons, Petitioner on June 5, 2017, sent the IRS revenue agent, IRS group manager, and Secretary of the Treasury a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace, and the United States Department of Justice attorney a courtesy copy thereof.

The Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace is four pages in length and self-explanatory; it is intended to resolve things without the need for a lawsuit.

That is not to say, however, that things will not end up in the courts again.

Attorneys of the United States Department of Justice and United States district and magistrate judges are concerned in the face of Petitioner’s demands for a constitutional authority (because there is none) and scrambling to protect the secrets of the cabal—but recipients of the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace may be inclined to move on to the next “customer” rather than seek the court’s assistance in enforcing the new summons, and thereby avoid non-judicial enforcement of the penalties in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace against them personally.

This type of response is proper for any type of situation where an officer of the U.S. Government seeks to take territorial jurisdiction over person or property and enforce some statute against a Union-member resident or his property—because there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes it.

The Constitution confers upon Congress only power of personal (regarding certain criminal offenses only) and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union at Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1-16; thus, these provisions of the Constitution give executive and judicial officers the capacity to take only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction throughout the Union, in respect of the statutes enacted by Congress regarding those things.

The Constitution grants Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union, thus depriving executive and judicial officers of the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union.

An IRS summons issued against a resident of any member of the Union and the lawsuit filed to enforce it are examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction against person and property by United States Department of Justice personnel and district and magistrate judges of the United States—because there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes it.

*  *  *  *

[1] 100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.

[2] “The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly.” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[3] The long-term remedy is to abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government as provided in the Constitution.

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Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current form of government

Houston IRS summons case

There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.

A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider, retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.

Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for Michael H. Schneider’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.

Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the government’s opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.

Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate (Clark’s denial hyperlinked below).

Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioner’s motion to vacate

Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code and taken by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

Ҥ 453. Oaths of justices and judges
     “Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (“So help me God.”) required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the United States.

But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme Court justice) keeps rolling along—in blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

How do they justify this?

Congress create another kind of “United States” for use in the courts

The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are pretending that the new statutory “United States” displaces / supersedes the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States, Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. that “United States” means “a Federal corporation”; to wit:

Ҥ 3002. Definitions
     “As used in this chapter:
         “. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
         “(A) a Federal corporation;
         “(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal  corporation] the United States; or
         “(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”

This means that every appearance of “United States” in anything to do with any civil or criminal proceeding in any district court means “a Federal corporation.”

That the 28 U.S.C. § 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution—but said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker from holding a judicial office under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).

Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Fraud and treason to the Constitution

This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”—because no government official or officer is authorized to construe “United States” to mean anything other than what it means in the Constitution; to wit:

A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .

“Chief Justice Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.

“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:

“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . .’” [Underline emphasis added.]  Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).

The purported legislative act of Congress that says “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:

“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . . 

“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void

“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” [Underline emphasis added.] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).

A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government 

The 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States” also includes an agency, department, commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.

The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1]

The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419, was created by Congress under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution—but that is where the relationship between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.

The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said Municipal Corporation’s existence at 16 Stat. 419, i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.

Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:

“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].  Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .”  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of today’s “United States” district courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union on a daily basis.

There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such act—and every one of Petitioner’s demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.

Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress requires the same religious test, “So help me God,” as a qualification to his respective office or public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the purported statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.

By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. § 453 and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no such justice or judge is an officer under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only a municipal officer under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), the Federal corporation by the name District of Columbia.

Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.

How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioner’s motion to vacate

The substance of Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.

As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the “United States” (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the “United States'” (District of Columbia’s) position.

True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate.

Most of the content of Ron Clark’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.

The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioner’s motion is in the second paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase “So help me God” violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.

Inspection of Petitioner’s motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the word “violate” in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.

Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to assume or hold an office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, accede to “The judicial Power of the [organic] United States,” Constitution, Art. III, §1, or exercise the limited jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.

As stated in Petitioner’s motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal / constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark then summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion by slyly destructively declaring that “His arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.”

Institutionalized piracy

The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer and the fraudulent “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) for which they all work and to which they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court anywhere in the Union.

All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

They are usurpers.

They are incorrigible.

And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial, i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters arrive in the courts.

The American People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776: Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the Constitution.

[1] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

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DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate final judgment

Petitioner has frozen United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States district and magistrate judges in their tracks numerous times.

When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:

“Generally, a plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).

“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).

Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.

District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.

The M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.

This is called lying by omission.

It is also constructive fraud.

It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).

This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.

Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.

This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.

Only municipal judges in United States district courts

Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.

In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.

Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.

The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.

Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.

As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.

The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.

A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation

What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.

The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.

Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.

Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.

Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.

After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.

You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.

Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.     

Houston IRS summons case

Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of authority in simple terms.

Set 1:

Set 2:

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.

Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.

Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.

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Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment update

Houston IRS summons case

In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9, 2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017, hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (click here for transcript of hearing).

Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents: (1) Response to Petition, (2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, and (3) Motion to Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause.

As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special statutory definition of “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.

Whereas, the “United States” of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court rather is “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).

The organic “United States” of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15).

Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).

Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (“So help me God.”) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none are officers under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia.

Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the District of Columbia.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of the Constitution, have the capacity to take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union (Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1–16).

The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have been because, in accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of them disqualifies him from holding an office under the “United States” of the Constitution.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419).

All of today’s executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) “United States” (the District of Columbia) impersonating federal officers under the “United States” of the Constitution—and rely on mass ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of “United States” to justify usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).

The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union—something about which we hear every day in the news for which there is no constitutional authority.

The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.

Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against Petitioner’s ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the “United States” of the Constitution or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1.

Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his response in opposition to Petitioner’s motion to vacate the final judgment, making various ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioner’s reply to counsel for plaintiff’s response in opposition, recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioner’s motion granted.

The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioner’s February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiff’s February 6, 2017, response to Petitioner’s January 23, 2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.

• Revision to previous post

Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items: the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five.

The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:

“The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:

  • “power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas at Art, I, § 8, cl. 1-16;
  • “power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, § 8, cl. 17; and
  • “constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the form of ‘Rules and Regulations,’ id., ‘respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,’ id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.

“Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union.”

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