DC Judge rubber-stamps Lufkin judgment; Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Petitioner requested of United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, among other things, a temporary restraining order on enforcement of the Lufkin Judge’s final judgment and presented the following controversy for resolution: “Whether the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress or extends to Tyler County, Texas.”

The correct answer to this question signals the end of the legislative tribunals known as United States District Courts—except for the only three de jure United States District Courts in existence: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

For Judge Howell to cop to the indisputable legislative fact that the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress (Federal territory only) and does not extend into the Union, would be to invalidate the Lufkin Judge’s decision—but more importantly, would undo over 150 years of legislative-branch mischief and lead, ultimately, to the demise of the most elaborately constructed monolith of institutionalized crime in world history: the contemporary so-called Federal Government, i.e., the terrain of the District of Columbia,[1] i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation,[2] i.e., the “United States,”[3] located in the District of Columbia[4] and doing business as “United States™”[5] and “United States®.”[6]

A weighty burden for Ms. Howell to bear, we all can agree.

Another sobering influence on Judge Howell’s handling of Petitioner’s filing would be the fate of the last bench officer to rule against the nature and interests of the private Federal Reserve,[7] Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney in the Credit River Township Case,[8] Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968: Mahoney was poisoned and thereafter died of a complication, aspiration of vomitus, August 22, 1969, at the age of 54.[9]

Since 1969, no more such adverse judgments.

It is easy to see that the Honorable Beryl A. Howell had ample motivation to deny Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, evade settling the controversy submitted by Petitioner, falsify the record, and dismiss Petitioner’s complaint (entries hyperlinked below).

Judge Howell must have been concerned about Petitioner, however—because she tipped her hand and divulged the ultimate-but-frivolous[10] rationalization used by the Federal judiciary and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice to justify usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction throughout the Union in their joint efforts to exact what is called “income tax” from the American People; a theory best described as “subject-matter jurisdiction conveys territorial jurisdiction.”

Judge Howell propounds on page 4, paragraph 2 of her Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (hyperlinked below) by way of circumlocution and inference, that the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, is Article 1 § 8(1).

If it were that simple, it seems like the Lufkin Judge and Lufkin Magistrate would have said the same thing instead of going silent and stonewalling the matter for six months.

For the benefit of anyone who might be duped into believing such a patently absurd argument, let us identify the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and the extent to which they obtain.

Jurisdiction 101

The American People on September 17, 1787, ordain and establish the Constitution and Congress on March 4, 1789, implement it.

The Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers of legislation in certain geographic areas.

Those powers of legislation give executive-branch and judicial-branch officers the capacity to take jurisdiction in those geographic areas and execute and declare, respectively, the laws enacted by Congress.

It is not too complicated.[11]

But the loyalty of congressmen goes to the highest bidder—and until arrival of the private Federal Reserve in 1913, the principals of its parent bank, the private Bank of England (inc. July 27, 1694; first government-sanctioned fractional-reserve-banking institution), circa mid-19th century secure controlling interest in Congress and begin dictating legislation, which is drafted in the City of London (municipal corporation after which the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation is modeled), and the nature of jurisdiction is cunningly perverted in form through stealth redefinition of a key common noun and proper noun in the Constitution, “State” and “United States,” so as to give each a constitutionally opposite statutory meaning.

The Federal Reserve Act (H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913) is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild[12] (1842–1918), director of the private Bank of England.

The Federal Reserve Act is implemented by Baron Rothschild’s straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg,[13] a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose (the New York Times dubs Warburg “Father of the Federal Reserve”[14]).

Each of the 12 private regional Federal Reserve banks is a private joint-stock company instituted under aegis of the novel District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, inc. February 21, 1871 (fns. 1 and 2), and patterned by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after its parent bank, the private Bank of England.[15]

The elephant in the room

  • “A tax is a demand of sovereignty . . . State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall (U. S.) 278, 21 L. Ed. 146.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 3220.

The sovereign authority throughout the Union is the American People[16]; the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress.[17]

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, is providing legislation for the laying and collection of tax (income tax) without the territory over which they are sovereign, in geographic area occupied by another sovereign, the American People.

That Congress appear to be demanding income tax of the American People, joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419, 472 (1793), residing throughout the Union means either that Congress is usurping exercise of territorial and personal legislation outside their territory or what we know as “income tax” is not actually a tax or both.

  • “A tax is not a debt . . . New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 ; and has none of the incidents of a debt ; 21 Harv L. Rev. 283 ; technically it is not a debt . . .” Id.

All alleged Federal income-tax liability is classified as debt, 28 U.S.C. 3002(3), and all Federal income-tax cases, civil and criminal, are prosecuted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

What is called “income tax” ultimately is not a tax per se but a commercial penalty for the use of private property of the Federal Reserve Bank known as Federal Reserve Notes[18] (“FRNs”).

The alleged income-tax liability generated from multiple transactions involving the same FRN (called velocity of money) will exceed the face value of the FRN after a few transactions.

  • “No tax is valid which is not laid for a public purpose ; Citizens’ S. & L. Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, where it was said that there are limitations on the power of the three branches of government which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist, and among these is that taxation must be for a public purpose ; such are (according to Cooley, Tax. 18) to preserve the public order ; to make compensation to public officers, etc. ; to erect, etc. public buildings ; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws, etc. ; also, to provide secular instruction ; Colley, Tax. 2d ed. 119–124 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 81, 26 L. Ed. 658 . . .” Id. at 3221.

No collection of what is called income tax goes toward a public purpose; all collections of income tax are used for a private purpose, i.e., to pay interest on the so-called national debt incurred by Congress and owed to a private bank, the Federal Reserve; to wit:

“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.

Banks do not pay income tax; to wit:

“Sec. 7. . . . Tax exemption. Federal reserve banks, including the capital stock and surplus therein, and the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate.”   Federal Reserve Act, H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913. 

All collections of income tax paid to the private Federal Reserve are retired from circulation the same way they are created by banks in the so-called loan process—by computer-keypad keystroke, in exchange for the borrower’s promise-to-pay; to wit:

“What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction [checking or credit-card] accounts.” Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994, pp. 3–6.

“If it [a bank] makes loans, it will simply credit the checking accounts of the borrowers. . . . [N]ew money, in the form of additional checkable deposits, will be “created.” The Federal Reserve Today: Fed Funds Rate, Discount Rate, 11th ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1994, p. 21.

“[M]oney exists simply as a bookkeeping entry at a bank . . .” The Story of Money, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p. 17.

“[W]hen a bank makes a loan, it simply adds to the borrower’s deposit account in the bank by the amount of the loan. This money is not taken from anyone else’s deposit; it was not previously paid in to the bank by anyone. It’s new money, created by the bank for the use of the borrower.” Robert B. Anderson, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, “How Much Will Your Dollar Buy – Interview with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson,” August 31, 1959, pp. 68–69.

The purpose of income tax is to remove from circulation a substantial portion of the digits of credit “loaned” into circulation by banks by bookkeeping entry in the so-called loan process.

“The Federal Reserve is a fount of credit, not of capital. . . .” New York Times, “Stabilizing Money Rates,” Section 3, Editorial Section, January 18, 1920, p. 33.

Unless a significant amount of the digits “loaned” into circulation by the banks are collected by the IRS in the form of FRNs from (1) payments of income tax, (2) seizure and sale of real and personal property, and (3) seizure of bank accounts and paychecks and thereafter gifted or bequeathed (31 U.S.C. 321(d)(1) and (2)) to a non-U.S. Government employee and proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury,[19] for transmittal to the private Federal Reserve as payments of interest on the national debt and thereupon retired from circulation, inflation skyrockets, prices go through the roof, and the fraudulent nature of the fractional-reserve banking system of the private Federal Reserve can be concealed no longer.[20]

Hence, the need to screen and select and vet and test and groom and own and control every single United States District Judge, Magistrate Judge, and Appeals Judge and Supreme Court Justice and United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney.

Only two kinds of taxes: direct and indirect

Article 1 § 8(1) of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”

This division of taxation into two classes, i.e., (1) direct taxes, called taxes, and (2) indirect taxes, called duties, imposts and excises, is recognized throughout the Constitution, Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481.

“Taxes are classified as direct, which includes ‘those which are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc. of those who pay them ; and indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity.’ Cooley, Tax. 61. The latter includes duties, imposts and excises ; Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3220, s.v. “Tax.”

There is nothing wrong with direct taxes per se, so long as they are apportioned, i.e., divided and assigned in proportion, as provided in pertinent part of Article 1 § 2(3) of the Constitution; to wit:

“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . .”

Income tax, which is not apportioned, to any reasonable man clearly is a direct tax on the supreme political authority in America, the American People (fn. 15), and therefore unconstitutional; yet today income tax is regarded by government as an excise, or indirect tax, without the need to be apportioned, and therefore constitutional.

The only way such absurdities can come to pass is by ownership and control of those making, declaring, and executing the law.

All the chaos arrived with the Federal Reserve Act.

Congress transmute Americans into corporately colored franchisees

The only Americans who allegedly are liable to income tax are called individuals (26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals), a.k.a. taxpayers.

The statutory term “individual” is defined at 5 U.S.C. 552a Records maintained on individuals as follows:

“(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
“. . . (2) the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;”

The phrase “citizen of the United States” means resident of the District of Columbia (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45).

The phrase “alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means American non-resident of the District of Columbia who appears to have made an election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia (id. at 15–17, paragraphs 46–51).

The statutory so-called individual is an artificial person, a creature of the law in the nature of a corporation and, like a corporation, designated by a name written in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS (style of writing a proper noun for which the rules of English grammar make no provision).[21]

A corporation is a franchise; to wit:

“FRAN′CHISE, n. . . . A particular privilege or right granted by a prince or sovereign to an individual, or to a number of persons; as the right to be a body corporate with perpetual succession . . .” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (S. Converse: New York, 1828), Vol. I, s.v. “Franchise.”

“FRANCHISE. . . . A franchise is privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be exercised without legislative grant. To be a corporation is a franchise. The various powers conferred upon corporations are franchises.
“The word ‘franchise’ has various significations, both in a legal and popular sense. A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of a corporation, and the corporation, itself a franchise, may hold other franchises. So, also, the different powers of a corporation, such as the right to hold and dispose of property, are its franchises. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 515.

The right to receive Social Security retirement or survivor benefits and the right to vote for the president of the United States (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation) are political rights and franchises conferred by the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia: Congress, a.k.a. “Congress of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 3002(2), i.e., the Congress of a Federal corporation, id. at 3002(15), the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.

Nature of so-called individual income tax

“The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909) provided that every corporation for profit . . . engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying-on or doing business by such corporation . . . upon the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed in McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise on the doing of business and not a direct tax.
     “It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity throughout the United States . . . and that the tax is properly measured by the entire income of the companies subject to it . . .
     “. . . It [the corporation income tax] is an excise tax measured by the corporate income ; Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. —; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the corporation ; McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3229.

The only kind of income tax that is not a direct tax but an indirect tax and excise on the income, from whatever source derived, of a franchisee, is what modernly is known as “income tax.”

That the post-19th century Supreme Court has ruled that the personal income tax on American men and women is an excise is proof that Government treats of every American as an ALL-CAPITAL LETTER franchise, i.e., an individual: artificial person and creature of the law in the nature of a corporation who, like all franchises, exists by privilege conferred by the state (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation).

All so-called State (District of Columbia) tax codes draw substantially (almost exclusively) from the Internal Revenue Code for their respective provisions and deal strictly with franchisees, i.e. individuals (citizens of the United States, 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), i.e., residents of the District of Columbia, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45) and corporations.

For example, the California Revenue and Taxation Code provides, in pertinent part, that California is neither a statutory state nor part of the statutory geographical United States but a foreign country thereto—and the State of California Franchise Tax Board taxes only individuals who are residents of, or corporations who are organized or commercially domiciled in, “this state” (District of Columbia); to wit:

“17017. ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the states, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.  

“17018. ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.

“17019. ‘Foreign country’ means any jurisdiction other than one embraced within the United States.

“[Individuals] 17041. (a)(1) There shall be imposed for each taxable year upon the entire taxable income of every resident of this state . . .”

“[Corporations] 23101. (a) “Doing business” means actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit.
“(b) . . . a taxpayer is doing business in this state for a taxable year if . . . . [t]he taxpayer is organized or commercially domiciled in this state.”

For the meaning of the word “includes” in the above code citations, see Rule 6, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, of the rules of statutory construction, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6.

The 16th Amendment provides for an excise tax on franchisees

The Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of February 3, 1913, provides:

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

The 16th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to lay and collect an indirect tax, an excise, on incomes, from whatever source derived, of franchisees residing or doing business in one of the several statutory States of February 3, 1913: the District of Columbia, Porto Rico (changed to Puerto Rico in 1932), Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Midway Atoll, and the Panama Canal Zone and no other thing, id. at 8, paragraph 23.

M.O. of all Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys

Using the absurd, constitutionally opposite meaning of the definition of the novel statutory terms “State” and “United States” legislated by Congress in the United States Code as complete justification: Every Federal bench officer and attorney of the United States Department of Justice follows the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny” when confronted with the actual-but-fraudulent definition and meaning of said statutory terms and pretend by inference that such meanings are nonsensical (“frivolous”) and that “State” and “United States” mean what essentially every non-insider believes they mean, i.e., the several commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union (numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959), and prattle on about all the other statutes that authorize them to do what they are doing, lack of constitutional authority notwithstanding.

Using their “secret clubhouse” knowledge of the actual statutory meaning of “State” and “United States,” they casually toss these terms around like any other American would, but silently weave a web of statutory deceit so incomprehensible to unwitting victims and so matter-of-fact to the perpetrators, to be able to justify, with confidence, that their prey will never be able to understand what is happening, much less convince anyone else of the injustice.

In the Lufkin Division Civil Action, Petitioner conceded everything except jurisdiction in Petitioner’s answer to the complaint at the outset of the proceedings; to wit:

“Defendant hereby confesses the truth of the facts recited in the instant Complaint and admits the apparent truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and right of action . . .” Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s Amended Answer, Dkt. #10, p. 1.  

From the beginning Petitioner has addressed only the issue of jurisdiction.

Every slur, allegation, and denigration of Petitioner by the Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is contrived and fabricated—but bystanders reading the words of these officers would not know this unless they were to do an exhaustive inspection of the record and realize that Petitioner never argues about anything or makes any claim—rather only recites the law, presents the facts, refers to the evidence, and demands proof of jurisdiction or constitutional authority—and that such snide remarks are falsehoods.

Institutionalized crime

Every writing filed by the DOJ attorneys or entered by the Lufkin Judge, Lufkin Magistrate, or District of Columbia Judge is devoid of mention of the following material facts and failures: (1) Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, (2) United States’ failure to produce such authority despite blackletter-law obligation to do so, (3) allegation of the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority in Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or (4) United States’ failure to oppose said motion to dismiss.

The District of Columbia Judge, Beryl A. Howell, falsely declared that the Lufkin Judge “considered and rejected” the above material facts and material failures in her ruling against Petitioner—despite no evidence of either in the Lufkin Record; to wit:

“[T]he plaintiff’s [Petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s] Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 . . . . because the plaintiff’s present claim that the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s real property was considered and rejected in the prior action between the parties, in which the defendant [United States] prevailed . . .” United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2016, p. 3 (hyperlinked below).  

People who lie as a way of life cannot be respected or trusted with anything; their word is like garbage.

Congress is the most despised class in America for good reason[22]—and the Federal judiciary and United States Department of Justice, in connivance therewith, are populated in the former exclusively, and the latter almost exclusively, by active or latent pathological liars and marauders.

The Houston and Lufkin Records prove it.

The nature of their job (debt collectors working to ensure the longevity of the fraudulent private Federal Reserve) requires it.

Statute law vs. commercial law

What is actually going on in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is not law per se but commerce.

It only appears to be a legal proceeding.

The Lufkin Court is a for-profit District of Columbia commercial debt-collection forum.

The real party of interest is the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Treasury (non-U.S. Government employee, [19]) is the proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, ultimate party of interest / beneficiary.

Commercial principles underlie everything that is happening in the Lufkin Division Civil Action.

Commerce and the common law afford more effective ways to deal with a Federal summons and complaint than the filing of an answer, but these remedies must be undertaken at the outset, without joining the action. 

Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Counsel for the United States in the Lufkin Division Civil Action on March 14, 2016 (two and a half weeks prior to this post), filed United States’ Motion for Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, but the Lufkin Judge has yet to rule on it or even acknowledge that it has been filed.

Petitioner on March 28, 2016, sued the Lufkin Judge, Michael H. Schneider, in the District Court of Tyler County, Texas, to quiet the title to Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, and on March 29, 2016, served Mr. Schneider with the summons and complaint therefor.

Mr. Schneider has till Monday next following expiration of 20 days after date of service to answer the complaint (April 25, 2016).

Documents from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and District Court of Tyler County, Texas, follow below.

District of Columbia Minute Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 17, 2016

District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint

Petitioner’s Complaint against Lufkin Judge to Quiet Title, March 28, 2016

Return of Service of Process on Lufkin Judge, March 29, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the “District of Columbia,” by which name it is hereby constituted a body-corporate for municipal purposes . . . “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419].

[2] Id.; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

[3] (15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States [a Federal corporation]; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States [a Federal corporation]. 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Sec. 3002 Definitions.

[4] (h) [Location of United States.]
The United States is located in the District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307 Location of debtor.

[5] “United States™ Census Bureau,” official logo of the Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/us-census-bureau.

[6] “United States® Census 2010,” title of official hardcopy form used to collect 2010 census data; also logo of official online form, Form D-61 (1-15-2009): http://www.censusquestions.com/2010-us-census-form.pdf.

[7] The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[8] First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Township of Credit River, Minnesota, Martin V. Mahoney, Justice, Judgment and Decree, December 9, 1968: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/CreditRiver/1968-12-09judgmentanddecree.pdf (Minnesota State Law Library).

[9] Federal Reserve operatives have expended extraordinary effort to obliterate the effects of the Montgomery v. Daly case, but have failed to do so. For more details and a colorful account of the proceedings in the courtroom from a witness who was there that day, Minnesota Associate Justice of the Peace William Drexler, visit http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm.

[10] frivolous, adj. Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful <a frivolous claim>.   Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 677.

[11] For a simple depiction of the legislative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the remainder of government, see this one-page tabular display: Extent of Federal and State Legislative Power and Federal and State Jurisdiction.

[12] Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization: Staunton, Va., 1992), p. 102.

[13] Id. at 128.

[14] “According to Chernow [infra], Paul Warburg was the only person in America who understood how a central bank works. In 1912 and 1913, he drew up the basic plan for the Federal Reserve banking system, and he drafted the Federal Reserve Act. In December 1913 President Wilson signed the Act establishing the new central bank. If anyone can be called the father of the Federal Reserve Bank, the New York Times has rightly noted, it is Paul Warburg.” John Weir, Institute for Historical Review, “Powerful Jewish Family Profiled,” Review of Ron Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family (Random House: New York, 1993), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n5p33_Weir.html.

[15] The private Bank of England (joint-stock company), prior to arrival of the private Federal Reserve indisputably the most powerful political force ever known, is nationalized March 1, 1946, shortly after a conference attended by representatives of 44 different governments in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, and the founding of the so-called International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later to be called the World Bank, both of which private banks became operational in the District of Columbia in 1958.
The change in character of the Bank of England in 1946 has no practical effect on the personal fortune and political power amassed by the principals thereof up to this time—who are the same principals of the private Federal Reserve.
An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own or control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the private Federal Reserve’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and, by virtue of private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.”   AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[16] Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. . . . Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).

[17] Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2).

[18] Federal Reserve Notes are not negotiable as they do not contain a promise-to-pay nor may title thereto be transferred by delivery or indorsement, essential properties of a negotiable instrument.

[19] The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (f.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of which are domiciled in the District of Columbia.
“No person shall be entitled to receive any salary or other compensation from the United States for services as a Governor, executive director, councilor, alternate, or associate [of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank]. 22 U.S.C. 286a(d)(1) (Bretton Woods Agreements Act, P.L. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660, October 19, 1976; amended December 18, 2015)).
“The second part of the amendments prohibits the . . . [Secretary of the Treasury] from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government. . . . The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury receives no compensation for representing the United States.” Senate Report No. 94-1148 of Oct. 1, 1976, re amendment of Bretton Woods Agreements Act, supra, re Sec. 2 of House Report 13955 [p. 8], p. 5942.

[20] There is no difference in the nature of the lending policy (fractional-reserve banking) of the private Federal Reserve and that of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, only the degree to which it is practiced.
When the rate of inflation in Zimbabwe in 2008 passed the quadrillions of percent the government ceased tracking it (it ended up hitting 89.7 sextillion percent, 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, in November of that year).
For absolutely mind-blowing photos that show what can happen in a fractional-reserve banking system when the tax agency does not extort from the populace and retire from circulation a sufficient amount of digits in income tax to keep up with the rate of lending: http://www.financialjesus.com/financial-crisis/inflation-in-zimbabwe-pictures-2/.
“In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.” Alf Field, “Zimbabwe: A Fresh Start,” November 11, 2009, http://www.321gold.com/editorials/field/field111109.html.

[21] Generally the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS individual initially is created by the United States Social Security Administration upon assignment of a Social Security Account Number, but not all Americans have such a number. Any application for anything from a bank, corporation, or government agency, if granted, will be issued in the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME of the statutory individual, the corporately colored version of the full true name of the particular boy / girl / man / woman written in proper English.

[22] “Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.
“In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.
“Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . .” Los Angeles Times, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3.”

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Lufkin Judge awards judgment to United States; Petitioner files for temporary restraining order in District of Columbia

The Lufkin Judge on March 3, 2016, entered a memorandum order and final judgment (both hyperlinked below), denying Petitioner’s September 30, 2015, motion to dismiss with prejudice and granting United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, April 24, 2015, motion for summary judgement (11.5 MB).

There is, however, an automatic stay of 14 days before any execution may issue on a judgment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(a)).

On March 16, 2016, the 13th day following entry of the aforesaid memorandum order and final judgment, Petitioner filed, as plaintiff, against United States of America, as defendant, in United States District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 1:16-cv-00506 BAH, a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at equity (not law), under equity rules, in order obtain that court’s assistance in preventing an injustice to Petitioner.

In addition to the verified complaint, Petitioner also filed an application (motion) for a temporary restraining order and a memorandum in support of that application (each is hyperlinked below). A proposed temporary restraining order (for the judge to sign and issue) is attached to the memorandum in support.

To correct a technical error in the caption of the verified complaint, Petitioner on March 18, 2016, filed an Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (hyperlinked below).

Here is a brief introduction to the subject of equity:

“EQUITY. 1. In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men,—the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us ; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due.” Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jural,[1] and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals. It is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.
“2. In a more restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or claims are in conflict ; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except insofar as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies above mentioned, or apply it beyond the strict lines of positive law. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891 (“Black’s 1st), pp. 427–428.  

“EQUITY. . . .
“. . . Rules and maxims. In the administration of the jurisdiction, there are certain rules and maxims which are of special significance.
“First. Equity having once had jurisdiction of a subject-matter because there was no remedy at law, or because the remedy is inadequate, does not lose the jurisdiction merely because the courts of law afterwards give the same or a similar relief.
“Second. Equity follows the law. This is true as a general maxim. Equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief because the rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in the particular case.
“Third. Between equal equities the law must prevail. . . .
“Fourth. Equality is equity . . .
“Fifth.   He who seeks equity must do equity. A party cannot claim the interposition of the court for relief unless he will do what it is equitable should be done by him as a condition precedent to that relief. See the eleventh maxim, infra.
“Sixth. Equity considers that as done which ought to have been done. . . .
“Seventh. Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy.
“Eighth. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
“Ninth. Where equities are equal the first in time prevails—qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.
“Tenth. Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation.
“ Eleventh. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . .
“Twelfth. It is to the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights, that Equity leads assistance—vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subvenit. . . .
“Thirteenth. Equity acts in personam[2] and not in rem.[3] As a result of this principle, jurisdiction of the person gives power to affect by the decree property outside the jurisdiction
. . . .
“Fourteenth. Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.”  [Emphasis in original.]  John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), pp. 1057, 1062–1063.

“. . . In America, the federal courts have equity powers under the constitution, where an adequate remedy at law does not exist. . . . The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same as that of the former court of chancery in England, is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the states . . .
“In the administration of that jurisdiction the federal courts are not to ‘look only to the statutes of congress. The principles of equity exist independently of, and anterior to, all congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases ; U. S. v. Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 20 Sup. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499 . . .’”  Id., pp. 1064–1065.

Two of the remedies available at equity are injunction and declaratory judgment:

“injunction (in-jəngk-shən), n. A court order commanding or preventing an action. ● To get an injunction a complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. . . .”  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (“Black’s 7th), p. 788.

“DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.”  “Black’s 1st, p. 340.

Petitioner initially seeks a type of injunction called an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction.

“ex parte[4] injunction. A preliminary injunction issued after the court has heard from only the moving party.”  Black’s 7th, p. 788. 

“RESTRAINING ORDER. An order in the nature of an injunction. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1036.

“temporary restraining order. A court order preserving the status quo until a litigant’s application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard. ● A temporary restraining order may sometimes be granted without notifying the opposing party in advance. — Abbr. TRO. — Often shortened to restraining order.”  Id. at 1477.   

“—Preliminary injunction. An injunction granted at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1910), p. 627.

“—Permanent injunction. One intended to remain in force until the final termination of the particular suit.”  Id.

“—Perpetual injunction. . . . An injunction which finally disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point in time.”  Id.  

As the reader will discover: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the only de jure[5] United States District Court in North America and the only one with the jurisdiction necessary to decide the controversy set forth in the amended complaint; every other purported United States District Court is a de facto[6]  “court” which has no lawful existence under the Constitution.

As of this post, March 18, 2016, a file-stamped copy of court filings is not available.

The legal and equitable process involved in this action at equity is as follows:

Lufkin Court’s Memorandum Order, March 3, 2016

Lufkin Court’s Final Judgment, March 3, 2016

Petitioner’s Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 18, 2016

Petitioner’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] JURAL. Founded in law ; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recognition and protection of rights. . . .  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 661.

[2] In personam (in pər-soh-nam), adj. [Latin “against a person”] Involving or determining the personal rights and interests of the parties. — Also termed personal. . . .  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 795.

[3] In rem (in rem), adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing. — Also termed impersonal. . . .  Id. at 797.

[4] ex parte [(eks pahr-tee)], adj. Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested <an ex parte hearing> <an ex parte injunction> .  Black’s 7th, p. 597.

[5] DE JURE.  Of right ; legitimate ; lawful.  In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . .  Black’s 1st, p. 328.

[6] DE FACTO.  In fact, in deed, actually.  This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate.  In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . .  Id. at 325.

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Lufkin Division DOJ attorneys reappear after 174 days, falsify the record; Federal-jurisdiction Achilles’ heel confirmed

After almost six months of silence (since September 2, 2015), counsel for plaintiff United States file on February 23, 2016, a response (hyperlinked below) to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection to the magistrate judge’s January 22, 2016, report and recommendation.

Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation because it omitted mention of Petitioner’s unresolved September 14, 2015, challenge of the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and September 30, 2015, demand for dismissal for lack of constitutional authority.

All United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges work for the same for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, a.k.a. “United States” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the Lufkin Court is just another legislative-branch corporate debt-collection forum (28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure) masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations are fatal to this and every other Federal lawsuit within the Union.

United States’ solution to the contents of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

Like the magistrate’s report and recommendation, United States’ February 23, 2016, response is devoid of mention of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Three stages of truth

“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.”[1]  Arthur Schopenhauer, 1818.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees have long since ceased ridiculing what Petitioner has to say.

They are too terrified of it to mention it.

By Schopenhauer’s standard, this matter is now at opposition-stage.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees are opposing the contents of Petitioner’s filings by refusing to admit of their existence and attempting to denigrate the source thereof, i.e., Petitioner, with ad hominem attacks consisting of falsehoods that paint Petitioner as a lunatic, in the hope that such “official” statements will dissuade the reader from choosing to investigate the matter personally and reconcile the condemnations of Petitioner with the actual record of the case.

Such fabrications are easily invalidated because they have no basis in fact.

Beginning of the end of the Hoax of Federal Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction

Sorry, but that crack they see there in the dam, is not going to go away by pretending it does not exist.

Whatever happens in this case will only accelerate the inevitable.

The genie is out of the bottle.

And he is not going back in.

It is only a matter of time.

Too bad none of the principals in the San Bernardino-Apple iPhone case know the right question[2] to ask.

Notwithstanding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a reply to United States’ February 23, 2016, response to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2) provides that the Lufkin Court must take judicial notice of certain facts if Petitioner requests it and supplies the necessary information—which Petitioner has done.

United States’ Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, February 23, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 24, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 25, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenry, The Harper Book of Quotations, 3rd ed. (HarperCollins Publishers: New York, 1993), p. 451, quoted in Garson O’Toole, PhD, Quote Investigator, “In a Time of Universal Deceit — Telling the Truth Is a Revolutionary Act,” www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/.

[2] “What is the constitutional authority that gives this Federal court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over property located in San Bernardino County, California?”

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Lufkin magistrate recommends the Court grant United States’ motion for summary judgment; Petitioner responds

After five months of silence there is movement in the Lufkin Division.

A Lufkin Division actor has made a move to compensate for the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and facilitate theft of Petitioner’s real property under color of authority.

Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demanded the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority—and following the United States’ failure to respond thereto, on September 30, 2015, alleged lack of territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and demanded dismissal of the case, to which demand the United States never filed an opposition.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, unanswered demands signify that the Lufkin Court has no territorial or personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the United States is not entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of the case.

With no dismissal forthcoming, Petitioner on January 14, 2016, filed an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with the military and served the Lufkin Division actors with a copy, as well as a Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt and a Demand for Payment.

Whereupon, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on January 22, 2016, entered a Report and Recommendation on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the “Report and Recommendation”), hyperlinked below, in which he cherry-picks from the record of the Lufkin Division case certain facts, which he presents as conclusive “proof” that the United States is entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner’s real property—to the exclusion of all material facts and evidence in the same record from Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings, and the United States’ failure to respond thereto, that supersede and nullify those he uses as the basis of his recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin is applying the Government policy, “Never respond, confirm, or deny when confronted with a situation where anything you say will work against you,” and pretending that Petitioner never made the September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Magistrate Giblin is counting on his co-workers to go along with the ruse.

This convention has a name: culture of silence.

In an impartial judicial system such custom could never gain any footing.

Magistrate Giblin is gambling that the general appearance of his 11-page Report and Recommendation is so “official” and its contents so “thorough” and “authoritative” that the idea of verifying its conclusions and recommendation against the actual record of the case never crosses the reader’s mind.

Silence, fraud, and judicial fraud

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24
       “. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967).” United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).”

“‘Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit — and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) — includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .’”  Justice Stevens (dissenting) in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987), quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).

Ongoing silence on the part of the United States for the last five months, followed by the preposterous whitewash of the record by Magistrate Giblin, operates to confirm that Petitioner has correctly identified the ultimate Achilles’ heel of every de facto United States District Court throughout the Union: no constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction.

Magistrate Giblin’s employer, plaintiff United States, is too terrified to reply to Petitioner’s demands and put anything in writing, lest it be used as evidence of a crime—hence the stratagem of the Report and Recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin’s “solution” to his employer’s jurisdictional problem is to ignore the evidence, falsify the record, and recommend that the Lufkin Judge “authorize” the taking of Petitioner’s home in Tyler County, Texas, without constitutional authority—among numerous other offenses, a felony of the first degree under the Texas Penal Code.

The Report and Recommendation is a desperation attempt to stave off the inevitable.

General ignorance of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution is what has led to the disappearance of judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts and proliferation of legislative-branch Article IV territorial courts, called “United States District Courts” (28 U.S.C. 132(a)), of which the Lufkin Division court is one.

Anyone who can grasp pages 3–5 of Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, hyperlinked below, will know more about constitutional jurisdiction than any law professor (or at least what he teaches and will admit to).

That Government has been so successful at defrauding and swindling other Americans of their wealth over the last century or so without constitutional authority, is no reason that Petitioner has to go along with the charade, bend to pretended authority, and consent to the theft of his home under pretext of a judicial proceeding.

“Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur impune.   One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2134.

Lufkin Division actors who conspire to falsify the record, exercise jurisdiction out of their territory, and take Petitioner’s property without constitutional authority are whistling past the graveyard if they think they are going to do it with impunity.

Petitioner on February 16, 2016, filed the aforementioned Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with Angelina County, Texas, District Attorney Art Baureiess, who has authority to charge and prosecute Lufkin Division actors for violations of the Texas Penal Code.

The more that Lufkin Division actors struggle, the messier it is going to get.

“Semper necessitas probandi incumbit et qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove (the burden of proof lies on him).”  Id. at 2162.

“Qui tacet consentire videtur ubi tractatur de ejus commodo. A party who is silent is considered as assenting, when his advantage is debated.”  Id. at 2158.

“De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist.”  Id. at 2130.

“Idem est non probari et non esse ;  non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not proved and what does not exist, are the same ;  it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.”  Id. at 2136.

“Actore non probante, reus absolvitur. If the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is absolved.”  Id. at 2124.

“Omnia præsumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium. All things are presumed to be done legitimately until the contrary is proved.”  Id. at 2152. 

“Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.”  Id. at 2159.

“Facta sunt potentiora verbis. Facts are more powerful than words.”  Id. at 2134.

This situation is not going to go away and magically disappear just because Magistrate Giblin has decided to play make-believe with the record: Lufkin Division actors have no authority to take Petitioner’s home—and are liable to Petitioner in individual capacity if they do, for criminal offenses knowingly and willfully committed without the scope of their office or employment under color of authority. 

Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

*   *   *   *

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Damages of $37,822,100 demanded of 31 Federal actors in the Houston case; criminal complaint filed with military

In the original Houston Division case, 31 Federal actors in the United States District Court, United States Department of Justice, and United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, taken collectively, committed over 10,000 felonies while perpetrating the theft of Petitioner’s house in Montgomery County, Texas.

This is known as “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity” (Texas Penal Code Sec. 71.02).

Presently, United States District Courts located throughout the Union purport to have territorial and personal jurisdiction, over property located and people residing there.

Success of such United States District Courts, in tandem with the United States Department of Justice, in defrauding and depriving the American People of life, liberty, and property, depends utterly on concealment of the fact that the Constitution authorizes Government to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction only in geographic area in which Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation.

There is no provision of the Constitution that confers upon Congress the power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union.

Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation (two of the three aspects of exclusive legislation, the other being subject-matter) only as expressly provided in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution.

The geographic area in which the Constitution grants Congress power of territorial and personal legislation is “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), e.g., the District of Columbia and the territories.

There really is nothing more to the Federal con than that simple fact.

Government is usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area throughout the Union, and engaging in organized criminal activity in doing so.

Every such act is an instance of usurpation, constituting breach of oath of office and treason to the Constitution.[1]

Petitioner is in the process of effectuating remedy in the Houston Division case, for the unlawful taking of Petitioner’s home without constitutional authority (theft), and the below-hyperlinked instruments represent the first step toward that end.

The below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information was filed with the same 65 senior officers in military authority as previous criminal complaints.

Letter to 65 senior officers in military authority, January 28, 2016 (10.3 MB)

Affidavit of Information, Purported Houston Litigation, January 28, 2016

Demand for Payment (of Damages), 31 Federal actors, January 28, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. . . .  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

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Petitioner files superseding Lufkin criminal complaint; demands payment of debt totaling $195,988,000

“[T]he germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the federal judiciary; an irresponsible body, (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow) working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little to-day & a little tomorrow, and advancing it’s noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the states, & the government of all be consolidated into one. to this I am opposed; because whenever all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated. . . .”  Thomas Jefferson, quoted in “From Thomas Jefferson to C. Hammond, 18 August 1821,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-2260 [last update: 2015-12-30]).

In today’s Federal criminal justice system, offenses carry a debt, a commercial term, misleadingly also called a fine, a governmental term.

All Federal civil and criminal proceedings are commercial debt-collection exercises conducted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

In Federal debt-collection proceedings, there is no geographical United States—only a corporate United States; to wit:

“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (15) “United States” means—
   “(A) a Federal corporation;
   “(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or
   “(C) an instrumentality of the United States.”  Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section 3002(15).

The meaning of the definition of “United States” in subsections (15)(B) and (C) of 28 U.S.C. 3002 being indeterminable without application thereto of the definition in subsection (15)(A): Subsection (15)(A) is the controlling definition of “United States” in Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure—and in all Federal civil and criminal proceedings “United States” means a Federal corporation; and the supreme parent Federal corporation, over all other Federal corporations and all other Federal entities of any kind, is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.[1]
As demonstrated in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint), United States District Courts located throughout the Union are debt-collection mills, extorting those who come before them under false pretenses, in behalf of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and depriving them of the “unalienable Rights” (The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, Preamble) of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (id.), i.e., life, liberty, and property,[2] without due process of law, i.e., process according to the law of the land,[3] the Constitution.

Whereas: Judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts of limited jurisdiction no longer exist—only de facto[4] legislative-branch Article IV District of Columbia Municipal Corporation territorial courts of general jurisdiction, called “United States District Courts,” specially created by Congress in name only at 28 U.S.C. 132(a), outside the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 451, which enumerates all de jure[5] courts of the United States, such as the nonexistent Article III “district court” and “district court of the United States,” which courts are defined expressly but also deceitfully—as no such court has physical existence; and

Whereas: There is no constitutional authority that gives any United States District Court the capacity to hear and decide civil and criminal proceedings in any county, parish, or borough in America; and

Whereas: United States District Judges and United States Magistrate Judges operating in nominal so-called United States District Courts, as constituted at 28 U.S.C. 132(a) and located within the Union, are positions or offices which have no lawful existence under the Constitution; and

Whereas: Every United States District Court located within the Union is a pretended court whose United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges participate in a combination with other Federal actors from the United States Department of Justice, deprive every Union-member resident with whom they come in pretended official contact, of one or more of the rights to life, liberty, and property, and either conspire to commit or commit one or more of the following offenses in the course of performing their pretended official duties every time pretended official contact is made, including, without limitation: breach of the peace; false personation; simulating legal process; false search warrant; searches without warrant; transportation, sale, or receipt of stolen vehicles, vessels, livestock, goods, securities, or moneys; false arrest warrant; false arrest; false information and hoaxes; fraud and related activity in connection with obtaining confidential phone records information; harassment; stalking; conspiracy against unalienable rights; deprivation of unalienable rights under color of law; public disturbance involving acts of violence; solicitation to commit a crime of violence; carrying concealed firearm while personating a law enforcement officer; false imprisonment; impersonating public servant; abuse of official capacity; murder; capital murder; manslaughter; mayhem; extortion by officers or employees of the United States; robbery; aggravated robbery; unlawful discharge of firearm; burglary; embezzlement; unlawful request for subpoena of bank records; theft; kidnapping; aggravated kidnapping; assault; aggravated assault; mail fraud; perjury; aggravated perjury; racketeering; terrorism; torture; war crimes; unlawful interception, use, or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications; unlawful access to stored communications; illegal divulgence of public communications; and fraudulent use or possession of identifying information; and

Whereas: There exists no judicial-branch Article III constitutional court of limited jurisdiction, as contemplated by the Framers and provided in the Constitution, to which Petitioner can resort for redress or compensation for violations of Petitioner’s right to property and due process of law, committed by officers of the United States District Courts and United States Department of Justice; and

Whereas: Conclusive (indisputable) legal evidence of the offenses enumerated in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information lies in the purported record of the purported United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, purported Tyler and Lufkin Divisions; and

Whereas: Federal bench officers and courts that hear appeals of decisions in civil and criminal causes originating in a United States District Court, are aiding and abetting the Federal actors therein involved and augmenting organized criminal activity and therefore cannot be trusted; and

Whereas: As augured by Jefferson 195 years ago, supra, all “State” (District of Columbia) courts are District of Columbia Municipal Corporation legislative tribunals enforcing the rules and regulations of District of Columbia municipal law, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong, a power authorized by the Constitution only at Article 4 § 3(2) and only in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id.; and

Whereas: It is reasonable (and equitable) that Federal actors establishing, maintaining, and participating in organized criminal activity are personally liable for the same respective amount of debt associated with the same offenses for which individual Americans are held liable, under color of law, office, and authority, in purported civil and criminal proceedings in purported courts called “United States District Courts”; and

Whereas: It is unreasonable to believe that Petitioner can obtain remedy with the help of other members of the same organized criminal activity (United States Department of Justice and United States District Courts) as those who committed the offenses specified and sworn to in the below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information; and

Whereas: There exists no public forum to which Petitioner can repair for remedy of violations of Petitioner’s unalienable Right to “the pursuit of Happiness” (The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, Preamble), i.e., the right to property (see Slaughterhouse Cases, fn. 2, infra), and the right to due process of law (Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution), perpetrated in organized criminal activity by the aforesaid Federal actors,[6]

Wherefore: Petitioner has no option but to pursue remedy privately.

Affidavit of Information, Pretended Lufkin Litigation, January 14, 2016

Demand for Payment, January 14, 2016

Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt, January 14, 2016

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[1]An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419]; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

[2] Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .  Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).

[3] Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . .
. . . Due process of law in the latter [the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .  Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

[4] DE FACTO.  In fact, in deed, actually.  This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate.  In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . . .  Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul Minn., 1890), p. 325.

[5] DE JURE.  Of right ; legitimate ; lawful.  In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . .  Id. at 328.

[6] The same 65 senior military officers notified in the previous Affidavits of Information (post of December 30, 2015, infra), as well as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have been sent an original of the instant Affidavit of Information.

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Criminal complaint filed with military authorities against all Lufkin Federal actors

The Union is the collective of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution, and the geographic area they occupy.

There is no provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union—only subject-matter legislation over certain things (Article 1 § 8(1-16)).

This means that Congress have no legislative power over property located anywhere within the Union or any American residing there, a limitation confirmed by the Supreme Court:

The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State [of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .”  [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

Notwithstanding that there is no provision of Article III of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to ordain and establish any court with power of territorial or personal jurisdiction anywhere in the Union (only jurisdiction to hear or decide certain controversies (Article 3 § 2(1)): The United States District Courts created by Congress (28 U.S.C. 132(a)) and doing business throughout the Union are usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction over property located there and Americans residing there.

Wherefore, despite the seeming impossibility of such a state of affairs, strictly legally speaking, every Federal bench officer, including, without limitation, every Supreme Court justice, is culpable for:

  • criminal negligence of the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction, in respect of the legislative powers therein conferred upon Congress;
  • violation of his oath of office to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . [and] bear true faith and allegiance to the same”  (5 U.S.C. 3331); and
  • Treason to the Constitution; to wit:

“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

What separates Man from the beasts is the faculty of reason:

  • “Ratio est radius divini luminis. Reason is a ray of the divine light.”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st), p. 995.
  • “Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis. Reason is the formal cause of custom.”  Id.
  • “Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. Reason is the soul of law ;  the reason of law being changed, the law is also changed.”  Id.

At implementation of the Constitution March 4, 1789, the soul of law in America was personal liberty under the common law; to wit:

“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.”  William Blackstone and John Innes Clark Hare, cited in John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).

“Due course of law,” supra, is synonymous with “due process of law” and means process according to the law of the land, i.e., the Constitution, interpreted according to the principles of the common law; to wit: 

“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . .”  Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .”  Id. at 535.

On June 30, 1864 (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, pp. 4-14), Congress invoked the sovereignty of the American People to override their will as declared in the Constitution, and changed, beginning with the revenue act of that date, the reason of law in America, from personal liberty under the common law to civil liberty under municipal (Roman civil) law, i.e., rules and regulations commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; to wit:

“Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint.”  Ordronaux’s Constitutional Legislation, quoted in Bouvier’s, p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).

There is only one provision of the Constitution that expressly grants Congress power to make rules and regulations—Article 4 § 3(2), which provides, in pertinent part:

“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”

All “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,”  id. (which is enumerated at Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution), is extraneous to the Union.

Congress have no authority to legislate rules and regulations (statutes) for the 50 commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, or the Americans who reside there—and in such geographic area the Department of Justice and United States District Courts are bereft of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and execute or declare or enforce any such rule or regulation (statute) enacted by Congress.

The contents of this webpage reflect Petitioner’s efforts to dissolve unconstitutional, felonious, and treasonous attempts to impose Federal rules and regulations on Petitioner in order to justify seizure of Petitioner’s property.

“Est autem vis legem simulans. Violence may also put on the mask of law” (Black’s 1st, p. 433)—and Federal elements today, like an occupying army, usurp exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction and impose rules and regulations throughout the Union and deprive the Americans residing there of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, under municipal (Roman civil) law of the District of Columbia, in treason to the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the monstrousness of such organized outlawry, reason, not violence, is the answer.

It has taken all this time—roughly 100 years (since Federal actors first began enforcing provisions of the fraudulent Sixteenth and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution on Americans residing throughout the Union; see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 8)—for someone to divine the question that Federal aggressors are required by blackletter law[1] to answer, but cannot without also incriminating themselves for treason to the Constitution.

Petitioner’s objective is the exact estimation of effort that gets Federal actors to honor their oath of office and bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and cease usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction without “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”  (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)).

For the first time in their professional life, upon receipt of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, objection to denial of due process of law and demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the Federal judges, magistrates, law clerk, attorneys general of the United States, and DOJ attorneys involved in that case hewed to the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and ceased attempting to defraud Petitioner and deprive Petitioner of Petitioner’s property under color of law, office, and authority.

Despite this positive sign, however, said actors cannot be trusted to resign their office or refrain from committing the same crimes against other Americans less knowledgeable in such matters than Petitioner, and therefore must be brought under control.

Wherefore, in accordance with provisions of the Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and as provided in 18 U.S.C. 4 Misprision[2] of felony, Petitioner on December 30, 2015, filed by Priority Mail USPS Tracking with certain of the only Federal authorities who might be worthy of trust—65 senior officers in military authority—an affidavit of information (criminal complaint), upon probable cause of misdemeanor, felony, and treason supported by oath and particularly describing the persons to be seized, against every Federal actor in the Lufkin Division case, and a second affidavit of information limited to the Lufkin Judges and Magistrate Judges only.

Petitioner also lodged each Affidavit of Information with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—and sent each Lufkin Federal defendant his own copy.

“Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy,”  Bouvier’s, p. 2165—and every Federal Lufkin defendant is liable to Petitioner for damages for, among other things, denial of the constitutional right to due process of law—wherefore, Petitioner has remedies.

These criminal complaints are the first step on the path to obtaining remedy.

Affidavit of Information No. 1 – all Federal actors, Lufkin Division

Affidavit of Information No. 2 – Lufkin Division judges only

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[1] blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law.  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 163.

[2] mis-pri′sion,  mis-prizh′un, n. . . . Law. . . . The concealment of a crime, especially of treason or felony. . . .   A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p. 1133.

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