The “Great Mystery” solved: seminal act of congressional, executive, and judicial fraud and treason

This post reveals the ultimate reason why, when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, in the Lufkin action at law demanded the constitutional authority that gives the court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, the United States attorney went silent on the subject and remained so for the duration of the case (which ended five and half months later), the magistrate gave his adverse recommendation, and the court accepted the recommendation and entered judgment against Petitioner by pretending that Petitioner had never made such demand, thereby concealing by way of deliberate omission from court process the United States attorney’s failure to respond to said demand or prove jurisdiction (despite burden to do so) or oppose Petitioner’s subsequent motion to dismiss.

This post also gives a remedy for the situation it reveals, as well as an application thereof in a new case filed against Petitioner for failure to produce books and records for an IRS summons.

Legislative power determines executive and judicial jurisdiction

The executive and judicial power of the new government implemented by the Constitution March 4, 1789, is co-extensive with the legislative power established by that instrument; officers of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have legislative power in a particular geographic area; to wit:

“It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the General Government . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793).  

“[I]t is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . .” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).

The Constitution confers upon Congress either limited or exclusive (general) legislative power, depending upon the geographic area; to wit:

“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).

Three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction

“Jurisdiction” is synonymous with “authority” and means, essentially, the geographic area in which a particular officer is authorized by law to discharge or perform his duties.

There are three and only three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction:

  • Territorial (over cases arising or those residing in a particular geographic area);
  • Personal (over someone’s rights); and
  • Subject-matter (over the nature of the case or type of relief sought).

Unilateral authority to exercise all three types of legislative power or executive or judicial jurisdiction in a particular geographic area is called “power of exclusive legislation” or “general jurisdiction”; anything less is called “limited legislative power” or “limited jurisdiction.”

The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:

  • power of subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over the subjects enumerated at Art, I, 8, cl. 1-16;
  • power of subject-matter and personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas and, in certain instances, residents thereof, over the types of cases and controversies enumerated at Art. III, 2;
  • power of personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over anyone accused of a criminal offense cognizable under authority of the government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, at Art. III, 2;
  • power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, 8, cl. 17; and
  • constructive (inferred) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.

Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union.

This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union.

“Territorial jurisdiction” is defined as follows:

—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.

Were Congress to be authorized to exercise territorial legislative power over the Union they would have absolute exclusive legislative control over the entire country and there would be no need for any Union-member legislature or the Constitution in its present form.

Blackletter law[1] confirms that no executive or judicial officer of the United States has territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing anywhere in the Union; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].” Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to . . . regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

[95 U.S. 723] [T]he exercise of this jurisdiction [over those domiciled within its limits] in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.”

“Every State,” Pennoyer, supra, possesses supreme and “exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty,” id., over property located and Americans residing within its borders, and there is no provision of the Constitution that gives Congress power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union or any executive or judicial officer of the United States the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction or direct the disposition of any property located or American residing there.

The “Great Mystery”

The “Great Mystery,” then, is how certain officers of the United States can—with a straight face and no hesitation, even when directly challenged—knowingly and willfully repudiate the provisions of the Constitution relating to the legislative power of Congress and the commensurate jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers of that certain government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, and usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union.

Such officers include the attorney general of the United States, assistant attorneys general of the United States, United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, United States marshals and deputy marshals, and other officers of the United States Department of Justice, Supreme Court justices, United States circuit judges, United States district judges, and United States magistrate judges, as well as personnel of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service.

A primary example of such usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by officers of the United States is the United States district judge in the Houston action at law ordering (a) Petitioner to vacate the premises of Petitioner’s home in Montgomery County, Texas, under threat of application of deadly force by the United States marshal, and (b) seizure and sale of said real property.

Other examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by executive or judicial officers of the United States, as facilitated by congressional legislation, against property located or Americans residing there, are:

  • IRS summonses
  • Lawsuits for failure to respond to an IRS summons
  • Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be compelled to obey an IRS summons
  • Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to produce books and records in response to an IRS summons
  • Judicial reduction of tax liens to judgment for purposes of foreclosure on real property
  • IRS summons hearings and audits
  • IRS seizure of funds in bank accounts by levy
  • IRS seizure / garnishment of wages by levy
  • Executive seizure of real or personal property
  • Judicial or executive enforcement of the USA PATRIOT ACT
  • Judicial or executive enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
  • Judicial or executive enforcement of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (e.g., orders issued by Department of Homeland Security personnel to travelers at airports for non-immigration or non-customs reasons; detention of such travelers)
  • Judicial or executive enforcement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
  • Judicial or executive enforcement of among others, the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution

Principal part of executive and judicial jurisdiction

Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2130.

The beginning of our tripartite system of government is the Constitution, ordained and established by the People September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, where Articles I, II, and III thereof establish, respectively, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The beginning of the authority for any elected official or officer of the United States to exercise the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the United States is Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which provides:

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

The beginning of all congressional legislation is Section 1 of Statute I, Chapter I, “An Act to regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths,” 1 Stat. 23, June 1, 1789, which provides the oath of office for the president of the Senate and all members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):

“Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [House of] [sic] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.’ The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days of the passing of this act . . .”

The beginning of authority for executive and judicial officers of the United States to exercise the executive or judicial power of the United States is Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 24; which provides (Underline emphasis added):

“Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take the same oath or affirmation [as provided in Section 1], which shall be administered by the person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective oaths of office ; and such officers shall incur the same penalties, in case of failure, as shall be imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.

Seminal act of congressional treason to the Constitution and American People

“The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the servant of the lender.” Proverbs 22:7.

Congress always has had other loyalties, bought and paid for by the highest bidder—in 1789 the Rothschild-run private Bank of England, world’s first state-sanctioned fractional-reserve “lender”[2] and future parent bank[3] of today’s Rothschild-run[4] private Federal Reserve,[5] sole “lender” (creditor) to today’s financially insatiable “borrower,” Congress.

Notwithstanding the clarity of Sections 1 and 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the oath of office to be taken by all executive and judicial “officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States,” supra, 1 Stat. 24, Congress 12 weeks later in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, September 24, 1789 (the “Judiciary Act”), repudiate the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, at 76 in Section 8 thereof and create a special oath or affirmation exclusively for judicial officers of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):

“Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, a do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as                        , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

The above oath, taken by the original Supreme Court justices and district judges differs materially from the oath mandated at Section 1 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 23, supra, and taken by the president of the Senate (vice president of the United States) and every member of the Senate and House of Representatives, in that it contains a religious test; to wit: “So help me God.”

Irrespective of how noble or virtuous said organic oath or affirmation for judicial officers may seem, said oath or affirmation and the ordinary act of Congress providing it are repugnant to Article VI, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as such species of oath or affirmation is expressly prohibited by the provisions of said article and clause, supra, and therefore, for purposes of accession to “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, void; to wit:

“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .

“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).

Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution tells us that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

The religious test required as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court or district judge in the oath or affirmation at Section 8 of the Judiciary Act taken by every such judicial officer means that no such justice or judge is authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

Every oath or affirmation taken by every justice or judge of the United States since September 24, 1789, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, circuit judge of the United States, United States district judge, or United States magistrate judge, the most modern of which is 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, December 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124, which provides (Underline emphasis added.):

“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

Whereas, any oath or affirmation that has a religious test as a qualification to any judicial office under the United States operates as an automatic bar to accession to authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, there has never been a justice or judge of the United States in the history of the Republic authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., for universal failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.[6]

No judge of the United States has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and no such judge has any business sitting on the bench of any United States district court anywhere in the Union—and each and every judge who does is a rogue judge.

Three species of court and judge

United States attorneys and district and magistrate judges and Supreme Court justices are constantly chirping about how federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; to wit:

“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).

However true said statement may be, federal courts of limited jurisdiction are devoid of federal judges per se—because those who haunt the corridors and chambers of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union are not federal judges per se but judges of a different species.

It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word “federal”; to wit:

“federal . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union between separate sovereign states . . .” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.

In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the “separate sovereign states” the members of the Union.[7]

As shown below, all official use of the term “federal judge” is specious and intended to deceive—because no such judge has ever existed.

The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:

  1. Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution—of which there has never been any such judge in American history.
  1. Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24, 1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (February 21, 1871).
  1. Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.

Bereft of authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of such justices and judges by way of the laws of the “United States” (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation), i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.

“Legal” tyranny

What distinguishes the Constitution from all other sovereign instruments of creation in the community of nations is the doctrine of separation of powers manifested in the tripartite system of government established by Articles I, II, and III thereof; to wit:

“separation of powers. The division of governmental authority into three branches of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — each with specified duties on which neither of the other branches can encroach; the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which the people are protected against tyranny.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s”), pp. 1369-1370.  

The political opposite of tyranny is liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

“LIBERTY (Lat. liber, free; libertas, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without.

“Civil liberty . . . . Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint . . .

Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men. . . .

“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law [*] . . . .” Bouvier’s, pp. 1964-1965.

* The essence of due course of law—also known as due process of law and the law of the land—is constitutional authority; to wit:

“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292 (1884).

The primary purpose of separation of powers in government is the preservation of liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added in all citations.):

“The framers of our political system had a full appreciation of the necessity of keeping separate and distinct the primary departments of the government. Mr. Hamilton, in the seventy-eighth number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the maxim of Montesquieu, that ‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).

This Court [Supreme Court] consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty. See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 -696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 . Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said: ‘No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.’ The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).’” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).

[488 U.S. 380-381] Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly. Separation of powers, he wrote, ‘d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but rather ‘that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’ The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442 , n. 5. . . .”

[488 U.S. 394] [W]e recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieu’s admonition: “‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul,’” The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting Montesquieu . . .”

“[A]fter stating that the judiciary is the weakest of the three departments of the government, and that though oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, he [Hamilton, in Federalist 78] says: ‘The general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the executive. For I agree that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . .” McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180-181 (1891).

Absent the faculty of liberty, as derived from Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution by way of institution of separation of the powers of government, there would be no substantial difference between the tyrannical sovereignty of Great Britain from which the American People originally freed themselves beginning in 1776, and the new government in America, with Congress as collective monarch and the People its subjects; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

“It will be sufficient to observe briefly that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. . . . The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.

“Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here, it rests with the people. . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793).

The judicial power’s jurisdictional equal: the executive power

We know that the judicial power is commensurate or co-extensive with the legislative power; the same is true for “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

Section 4 of Statute I, Chapter I cited supra, 1 Stat. 24, June 1, 1789, requires that all executive officers of the United States take the oath or affirmation provided in Section 1 thereof prior to exercising “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution, supra, and Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the requirement to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution free of a religious test, the organic act establishing the first “attorney-general for the United States,” 1 Stat. 93, i.e., the Judiciary Act, requires only that said executive officer be “sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office,” id.; no mention of the Constitution.

Today’s attorney general of the United States, Jeff Sessions, and every other officer of the United States Department of Justice takes what is known as the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit part A Oath of Office, which provides (Underline emphasis added.):

“I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.”

Every officer of the United States Department of Justice who takes the above oath of office self-disqualifies himself from acceding to “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1—and now we have our answer as to why in the Lufkin action at law the United States attorney goes silent when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against property in Tyler County, Texas, and the magistrate and district judge pretend in their court process and judgment that Petitioner never asked the question: None are authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” id., or “The judicial Power of the United States,” id. at Art. III, § 1 anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

Every executive and judicial officer of the United States in the history of the Republic is a legislative-branch officer under the absolute exclusive legislative control of Congress, a political alien to the executive or judicial power, and bereft of authority without the boundaries of federal territory.

Beginning with the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property[8] without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotums ensconced in the so-called United States Department of Justice and district courts—courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and there is no due process of law.

This means that in addition to the bulleted examples of usurpation of territorial jurisdiction cited supra, there is no authority for any such executive or judicial officer to exercise any form of jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, that every such act constitutes usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction and is an act of tyranny, and that the entire legal system is a fraud and hoax, with every United States district court a kangaroo court; to wit:

“kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s, p. 359.

It also means that every single Supreme Court decision and district court judgment since September 24, 1789, is void for every participating executive and judicial officer’s failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms with the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and every such officer’s culpability for betrayal of public trust, usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction within the Union, and treason to the Constitution; to wit:

“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).

New lawsuit to enforce IRS summons; Petitioner’s response

In June of 2016 a certain IRS revenue agent issued and personally served on Petitioner an administrative summons, Internal Revenue Manual 25.5.6.3.1.1, deceitfully entitled “Summons,” tacitly representing to be authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, and issue the summons against Petitioner.

Petitioner responded with a “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace” and heard nothing back for seven months when, on January 24, 2017, the same revenue agent personally served on Petitioner a petition instituted by the United States attorney in the local United States district court in behalf of the revenue agent and Internal Revenue Service, and accompanying Order to Show Cause, signed by the judge, as to why Petitioner “should not be ordered to comply with the Internal Revenue Service summons.

Notwithstanding that said petition only contemplates the need for an order for Petitioner to produce the documents described in the summons, which would be determined at the hearing, the Order to Show Cause nevertheless asserts its own preemptive order for Petitioner to bring to the hearing the documents enumerated in the IRS summons.

The judge wants Petitioner to suffer the object of the lawsuit—production of books and records—prior to having a fair hearing and determining the need for such an order, confirmation that there is no due process of law in any United States district court; to wit:

“due process. The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” Black’s, p. 516.

Also, the docket in the previous case, the Houston action at equity, now includes a new reference to the current IRS summons case, noting “Related Case: 4:16-mc-02878” (the IRS summons case)—which is unusual because that case was closed two months ago (December 5, 2016) and the subject matter of the two cases is unrelated; to wit: The previous case is an action at equity concerning a prior void judgment; the new case is about failure to respond to an IRS summons.

Wherefore, it is reasonable to presume that the judge in the new summons case is prejudiced against Petitioner, likely for steps taken by Petitioner against his co-worker, the judge in the said Houston action at equity—where Petitioner sued 47 defendants, the judge ruled against Petitioner, and Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the judge and then amended it (upon resolution of the “Great Mystery”)—and would be happy to be able to hold Petitioner in contempt and have Petitioner arrested and incarcerated and who knows what else.

In Petitioner’s response to the IRS summons petition, which incorporates the fruits of resolution of the “Great Mystery,” supra, Petitioner on February 8, 2017, sent to the court for filing February 9, 2017, and counsel for petitioner United States of America (and constructive petitioner Internal Revenue Service) a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be heard and decided before proceeding any further (Rule 12(i)).

Petitioner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion demonstrates that (a) the subject revenue agent has no authority to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, or take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, or issue said summons against Petitioner, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the summons is a legal nullity, thereby depriving the United States attorney of any evidence of any fact upon which a claim for relief could be granted.

The actual situation

As of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotum executive and judicial officers—in courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property are a fantasy—the essence of tyranny.

The raison d’être of the actors perpetrating the above organized treasonous conspiracy is the longevity of their sole “lender” (creditor), the Rothschild private Federal Reserve (see fns. 3-5)—for without wholesale extortion and retirement from circulation of a substantial amount of electronic digits in the paychecks and bank accounts of ordinary Americans the fraud of the banking system reveals itself through rampant inflation and higher and higher prices with no commensurate rise in wages.

Although Petitioner and those helping him, as well as the American People, are forced to cope in a legal context with the fraud and treason of those trusted with the custody of the law and its execution by the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution, the ultimate situation is not of a legal nature but rather political—a potential state of affairs for which the Founding Fathers presciently provided; to wit:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Id.

Same family of bankers pulling the strings today as in 1776

“[T]he policies of the monarch are always those of his creditors.” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1261.

The ultimate source of the policies of today’s stealth congressional, executive, and judicial tyranny is the same usurious family of fractional-reserve bankers and exclusive creditors to borrower-servant King George III: Rothschild.

Sen. Robert Latham Owen (D-Okla.), former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and Senate sponsor of the Glass-Owen Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, tries to make amends for supporting the Federal Reserve and on January 24, 1939, places into the Congressional Record the following historical account of Benjamin Franklin’s visit to England and events shortly thereafter (Benjamin Franklin’s words underlined); to wit:

“Benjamin Franklin, on being asked in Great Britain how he accounted for the prosperous condition of the Colonies, said:

“‘That is simple. It is only because in the Colonies we issue our own money. It is called colonial scrip[9], and we issue it in the proper proportion to the demand of trade and industry.’

“It was not very long until this information was brought to the Rothschilds’ bank, and they saw that here was a nation that was ready to be exploited; here was a nation that had been setting up an example that they could issue their own money in place of the money coming through the banks. So the Rothschild Bank caused a bill to be introduced in the English Parliament which provided that no colony of England could issue their own money. They had to use English money. Consequently the Colonies were compelled to discard their scrip and mortgage themselves to the Bank of England in order to get money. For the first time in the history . . . our money began to be based on debt.

“Benjamin Franklin stated that in 1 year from that date the streets of the Colonies were filled with the unemployed, because when England exchanged with them, she gave the Colonies only half as many units of payment in borrowed money from the Rothschild Bank as they had in scrip. In other words, their circulating medium was reduced 50 percent, and everyone became unemployed. The poor houses became filled, according to Benjamin Franklin’s own statement. . . .

“He said that this was the original cause of the Revolutionary War. In his own language:

“‘The Colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matter had it not been that England took away from the Colonies their money, which created unemployment and dissatisfaction.’” Benjamin Franklin, quoted in John R. Elsom, Lightning over the Treasury Building (Boston: Forum Press, 1941), pp. 29-30, quoted in Robert Latham Owen, National Economy and the Banking System of the United States: An Exposition of the Principles of Modern Monetary Science in their Relation to the National Economy and the Banking System of the United States, Senate Document No. 23, January 24, 1939, 76th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 98-99.

It took only about one percent of the American Colonists to defeat the Bank of England-financed British army and navy and 30,000 paid killers (Hessian mercenaries) and break free of Rothschild policies enforced by King George III.

There are today not near so many Rothschild quislings[[10]], grunts, or white-collar mercenaries in the District of Columbia or scattered around the Union (and globe).

PDF version (sans hyperlinks) of today’s post

______________________

[1] “blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 163.

[2] “[T]he Bank [of England] had the power to issue [i.e., create from thin-air and loan into circulation its own promissory] notes.

“It issued [created from thin-air and loaned] these [promissory notes] to an amount equal to the sum [of gold] advanced [loaned] to the Government [thereby doubling its wealth as to the value of the loan, every time it made a loan of gold to the government]. . . .” A. Andréadès, History of the Bank of England 1640 to 1903, Fourth Edition (Reprint), Christabel Meredith, Translator (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 85.

“It [Bank of England] coined, in short, its own credit into paper money.” Thorold Rogers, The First Nine Years of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1887), p. 9, quoted in Andréadès, supra, p. 82.

[3] The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild (1842–1918), director of the Bank of England (Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Staunton, Va.: Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization, 1992), p. 102), implemented via his straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg (id. at 128), a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose; later dubbed “Father of the Federal Reserve” by the New York Times. The private Federal Reserve, incorporated under aegis of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, is modeled by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after the private Bank of England.

[4] An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own 96% of all media worldwide) reveals unilateral Rothschild control of the American economy (via controlling interest in each of the New York Fed’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the Fed’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and Congress’ employer, the U.S. Government, and, by virtue of the Fed’s private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy); to wit, in pertinent part:

“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).

“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.

“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.”   AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[5] “Federal Reserve Banks . . . are not federal instrumentalities . . . but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.” Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.1982).

“The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[6] It will come as a shock for every officer of the uniformed services who has taken the oath at 5 U.S.C. § 3331 to learn that he or she and his or her compatriots are serving something other than the Republic or “their country”: the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (infra, under “Three species of court and judge”).

[7] These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C., which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):

Ҥ 297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states

“(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.

“(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection.”

[8] “Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .” Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).

[9] “scrip. . . . [U. S.] paper currency of a denomination less than a dollar: not now issued.” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 1606.

[10] “quisling , , , noun . . . a traitorous national who aids the invader of his country and often serves as chief agent or puppet governor.” Webster’s New Third International Dictionary, Unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1993), s.v. “Quisling.”

Standard

Errors in previous post and Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition of August 16, 2016

The post of January 16, 2017, and Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (posted September 14, 2016) contain certain errors.

Error in previous post of January 16, 2017

That Congress in the Act of December 1, 1990, Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124 alter materially by way of amendment the oath of office at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907 and relieve justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution.

The amended oath of December 1, 1990, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States had no material effect on the activities of justices or judges of the United States and should not have been the subject of a post.

Errors in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition

That none of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service, Department of the Treasury, or Internal Revenue Service are bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.

Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit take the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States and bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.

Officers of United States Department of Justice and United States Marshals Service bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution by what is called the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, such as that taken by the current Attorney General of the United States, Loretta Elizabeth Lynch.

The Secretary of the Treasury’s webpage says the Secretary of the Treasury takes the oath of office provided therein. The oath is identical in substance to the 5 U.S.C. § 3331 Oath of office, but not identical in form. Said webpage cites no source authority for said oath.

President Barrack Obama’s Executive Order of August 12, 2016, entitled “Providing an Order of Succession within the Department of the Treasury,” specifies that Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Deputy Under Secretaries of the Treasury, and Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury shall have taken an oath, but omits to identify which particular oath.

Though not mandated by act of Congress, it is believed that the oath taken by Under Secretaries of the Treasury and such others of the Department of the Treasury is the same oath as that taken by the Secretary of the Treasury (no source authority cited).

Internal Revenue Manual 6.300.1.4 (11-06-2009) Appointment Documents, Determinations, and Entitlements provides, in pertinent part of subsection 1: “OPM’s GPPA, Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, and the Job Aid specifies the required appointment documents. . . .”

The United States Office of Personnel Management’s “The Guide to Processing Personnel Actions,” Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, section 4-3, subsection c, implies that Internal Revenue Service employees take the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit part A Oath of Office; to wit:

“As part of the entry-on-duty process, the employee takes the oath of office. The Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, contains the oath of office (part A) required by 5 U.S.C. 3331 . . .”

Motions withdrawn and amended

Petitioner has withdrawn the three motions hyperlinked in the previous post of January 16, 2017, and replaced two of them with an amended version and filed with the Harris and Montgomery County, Texas, District Attorneys an Amended Affidavit of Information: Criminal Complaint for Public Notice Filing.

There are no errors in the amended versions.

Standard

Fatal defect in every federal case since March 1, 1991; all such decisions and judgments void

As shown herein below with conclusive evidence, the above headline is not an exaggeration but an accurate assessment of the situation.

“The judicial Power of the United States”

That certain constitution ordained and established September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “Constitution”), at Art. III, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and at § 2, cl. 1 thereof the limited types of cases and controversies to which the judicial power shall extend.

The Constitution at Art. VI, cl. 3 provides in pertinent part for the prevention of arbitrary exercise or abuse of “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., by way of requirement that all justices and judges of the United States be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution; to wit:

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; . . .”

Justices and Judges’ Oath of Office

In respect of the above requirement of Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Constitution, Congress on September 24, 1789, in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” 1 Stat. 73 (the “Judiciary Act”), at 76 supply the oath or affirmation needed for federal justices and judges to be authorized to exercise the judicial power of the United States; to wit:

“Sec. 8.  And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as                 , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

Congress 159 years later on June 25, 1948, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 62 Stat. 907, amend the language of the preamble to the oath provided in Section 8 of the Judiciary Act and, cosmetically, the text of said oath; to wit:

“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office : ‘I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _____ according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

For the next 42+ years justices and judges of the United States who take the 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, oath are “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,” Judiciary Act at 76 (just like all other federal jurists who came before them), and therefore authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, and discharge and perform the duties of their respective offices.

Congress Alter Materially the Oath of Justices and Judges

Congress on December 1, 1990, however, in Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124—effective 90 days later, March 1, 1991 (104 Stat. 5124 at § 407)—alter materially by way of amendment, the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, so as to relieve all justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution; to wit:

Sec. 404. Amendment to Oath of Justices and Judges.
“Section 453 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking out ‘according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to’ and inserting ‘under’”. Pub. L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5124, December 1, 1990.

Upon amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 104 Stat. 5124, provides:

“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’
“(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907; Pub. L. 101–650, title IV, § 404, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124.)”

The only duties incumbent upon justices and judges of the United States to discharge or perform are provided in the statutes of Congress, i.e., the laws of the United States; the Constitution provides none.

Because there is no provision of the Constitution that requires a justice or judge of the United States to discharge or perform any duties, there are no duties under the Constitution incumbent upon any such justice or judge to discharge or perform; meaning: Mention of the Constitution in the 1990 amended oath, 28 U.S.C. § 453, 104 Stat. 5124, supra, is superfluous and may be omitted from said oath without changing its meaning.

This is why, in the Lufkin Action at Law (infra), the United States Attorney went silent for the duration of the case (five and half months) when Petitioner demanded the provision of the Constitution that gives the Court (judge) the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment in Tyler County, Texas: There is no such constitutional authority and neither the Court nor the United States Attorney is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution (for the United States Attorney’s oath of office, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 80 Stat. 618; no mention of the word “Constitution,” contrary to the requirements of Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Constitution).

To prevent the fracturing of the federal judicial system were one set of justices and judges to discharge and perform their respective duties agreeably to the Constitution and the other not: Between December 1, 1990, and February 28, 1991, all sitting and newly commissioned justices and judges of the United States take the new oath of office, 104 Stat. 5124, leaving, on March 1, 1991, no justice or judge of the United States bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution—only the laws of the United States, i.e., the statutes of Congress.

“The emperor has no clothes”

The 1990 oath, 104 Stat. 5124, severs the connection between the federal judiciary and the Constitution; meaning: As of March 1, 1991, officers of the federal judiciary have no obligation to discharge or perform the duties of their respective offices “agreeably to the Constitution” (62 Stat. 907), and the former judicial-branch officers are now legislative-branch officers under the exclusive control of Congress.

“Plus peccat auctor quam actor. The instigator of a crime is worse than he who perpetrates it” (John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2153)—and the instigators of the takeover of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal judges masquerading as Article III judges and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction throughout the Union, are the Members of Congress.

The jurisdiction of federal courts of limited jurisdiction and the original (de jure) Department of Justice, 16 Stat. 162, is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress; to wit:

“Those who framed the constitution [sic], intended to establish a government complete for its own purposes, supreme within its sphere, and capable of acting by its own proper powers. They intended it to consist of three co-ordinate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. In the construction of such a government, it is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ [Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 414] The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . . [The Federalist, No. 80; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 384]” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).

Because Congress enjoy only limited legislative power (subject-matter legislative power only) throughout the Union, the federal courts and Department of Justice are authorized to exercise only limited jurisdiction (subject-matter jurisdiction only) throughout the Union; to wit:

“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).

The above is why Petitioner is so persistent: Justices and judges ensconced in federal courts of limited jurisdiction are usurping exercise of territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) and entering judgment against, directing the disposition of, and committing theft under color of authority of, Petitioner’s property in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas—geographic area in which Texas possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over property located there; to wit:

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

Notwithstanding that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Rasul, supra, they are populated by municipal judges of the so-called “United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), “a Federal corporation,” id., by the name of District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, who are usurping exercise of general jurisdiction in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas, and elsewhere throughout the Union.

Justices and judges of the United States have used their position of trust to betray their creators, the American People, by overriding their will as declared at Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, that all judicial officers of the United States shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and thereby legislating the Constitution out of the legal process; to wit:

“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.” Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

Bearing of the 1990 Oath on Every Federal Case since March 1, 1991

Whereas, as of March 1, 1991, no federal justice or judge is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution: As of that date, every justice and judge of the United States is barred by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution from exercising “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, or entering a decision or judgment in any federal court case.

There being no constitutional authority for any Supreme Court decision or civil or criminal judgment in any federal court: Every such decision or judgment since March 1, 1991, is void.

Due Process of Law and Void Judgments

The essence of due process of law is constitutional authority; to wit:

“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . .      “. . . Due process of law in the latter [the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

Any justice or judge of the United States who enters a decision or judgment in a federal case without the authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1—and this includes every Supreme Court decision and United States District Court judgment since March 1, 1991—does so without the authority of the Constitution and thereby denies the litigants due process of law and manufactures a void judgment.

A void judgment is an utter nullity, of no legal force or effect, and anyone who is concerned with the execution of a void judgment is considered in law as a trespasser; to wit:

“A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which . . . lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment . . . can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally . . .” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).

“Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.” Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 329 (1828).

“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982).” Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (1985).

“We believe that a judgment, whether in a civil or criminal case, reached without due process of law is without jurisdiction and void . . . because the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or property without due process of law, and its courts are included in this prohibition. . . .” Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 57, 94 L.Ed. 494 (1949).

“[I]f a ‘judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment.’ United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if ‘the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ Id. at 1316 (citations omitted) . . .” Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).

“[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.” Burrell v. Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).

Ironically, the above post-March 1, 1991, judgments addressing the subject of void judgments, are themselves void for failure of the judge entering his respective judgment to bind himself by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, as required by the Constitution at Art. III, § 1, a denial of due process of law.

Update on Three Cases Since Previous Post, September 14, 2016

  1. Action at equity: Petitioner sues 46 government-type defendants (trespassers) and one civilian defendant in a Texas court to recover Petitioner’s home stolen under color of authority by way of a previous void judgment in a federal court

Petitioner on August 11, 2016, files Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition in an action at equity in 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, Case No. 16-08-09232, for a constructive trust based on constructive fraud in a previous void judgment, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-0027 (the “Houston Action at Law”), which defendant United States of America on September 12, 2016, removes and files as United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-2747 (the “Houston Action at Equity”); the court on December 5, 2016, enters judgment against Petitioner (the plaintiff).

This was a high-intensity pre-trial proceeding, with 70 substantial docket entries over an 84-day span, which, combined with Petitioner’s two other ongoing federal cases, prevented Petitioner from being able to post anything until now.

Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace

Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition on pages iii–iv gives an extra-judicial (commercial) Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace to every actor concerned with the execution of the void judgment in the Houston Action at Law, as to the penalties should said case be removed to federal court and Petitioner be denied due process of law or foreclosed from adequate remedy.

Petitioner has been denied due process of law.

Irrespective of whether Petitioner realizes adequate remedy in this case or not: Every actor concerned with the void judgment in the Houston Action at Law (before, during, or after), which now also comprehends every actor involved in the Houston Action at Equity void judgment, is a trespasser and personally liable to Petitioner.

Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition evidently set off numerous alarms—because the deputy clerks, USDOJ attorneys, and judge, in concert, pulled every dirty (contrary to law or good morals) trick in the book to try to defeat Petitioner.

Any reader who tries to digest the docket or record (hyperlinked below) of this case, however, may have trouble understanding because there is contradictory data throughout, and seemingly two different proceedings underway—one prosecuted by Petitioner with factual contentions supported by conclusive evidence, and another being “defended” by counsel for defendants with factual contentions and denials of Petitioner’s allegations and claims, but with no or immaterial evidentiary support; a situation exacerbated by wholesale confusion in the docket intentionally manufactured by the deputy clerks, evidently in the hope of befuddling Petitioner (and anyone else who tries to make sense of things) and preventing Petitioner from keeping track of counsel for defendants’ multiple filings and possibly failing to respond timely to one or more and thereby losing by default.

The deputy clerks routinely and deliberately (a) so-misnamed filings or excluded part or all of the titles thereof, that Petitioner had to file in the record requests for the deputy clerks to correct the titles of docket entries, (b) withheld entering filings on the docket for days at a time (to give counsel for defendants an advantage), (c) split up a key filing into two separate docket numbers, 36 and 37, (d) entered items on the docket out of sequence, and (e) refused to enter on the docket seven of Petitioner’s filings, requiring that Petitioner file special requests of the clerk to enter on the docket the filings previously received.

Counsel for defendant United States (“a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)) and United States of America (a sovereign republic, Constitution)—the same attorney—filed a Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) motion to have the case dismissed with prejudice, but failed to present evidence that proved a single one of his allegations or claims, and likewise failed to disprove a single allegation or claim in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition.

Petitioner from time to time established on the record with evidence, certain facts and failures of defendants, and thereafter counsel for defendant United States and United States of America (same attorney) would file a document asserting other facts contradicting those established by Petitioner with evidence and treat of said failures as though they had never happened, but for which assertions said counsel provided no evidence in support.

For example, if a government-type defendant fails to answer or otherwise respond to a petition / complaint as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., within the statutory 60-day period, said defendant is in default and foreclosed from participating in the proceeding.

When Petitioner in Docket Nos. 36 and 37 (filing split up by deputy clerks for no reason) filed the return of service (process server’s certificate of service of summons and complaint on a defendant) for 44 defendants, establishing that 41 government-type defendants had failed to answer or otherwise respond to Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition within 60 days of service and were in default, counsel for defendant United States of America—with no evidentiary support—thereafter filed in Docket Nos. 41, 42, and 58, a purported notice of “entry of appearance and joinder” in the case for the same 41 defendants, a procedural impossibility.

Counsel for defendant United States and United States of America and the attorney representing the one civilian defendant collectively committed hundreds of violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for which, in any other case, they would have been subjected to an immediate order-to-show-cause hearing as to why they should not be sanctioned for such egregious acts.

Because everything in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition is true and supported with conclusive evidence, counsel for defendants could only present immaterial arguments and evidence propounding the supremacy of the Federal corporation known as the “United States” (28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)), falsely representing that it is the same thing as the sovereign republic of the United States of America (Constitution), and touting the “immunity” of all its corporate employees (judges of the United States, USDOJ attorneys, etc.) and private-sector workers of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service.

The record of the Houston Action at Equity is hyperlinked below, but Petitioner admonishes the reader that there is no meaningful knowledge to be gained from reading it; the filings of counsel for defendants are crafted to deceive; everything Petitioner has to say is presented in coherent form, supported by evidence, in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition.

The M.O. of United States Department of Justice attorneys is to ignore material facts and evidence presented by an adversary that work against their objective, and fabricate another scenario, irrespective of lack of evidence of facts and their failures to respond, that supports their position, which their co-worker municipal tag-team partner, the judge, then uses to paint a negative picture of the adversary and enter judgment against him.

False denigrations of a particular litigant by one judge are then repeated at every opportunity by subsequent judges and United States Department of Justice attorneys who happen to come in contact with the same litigant, building up by repetition a “history” of negative reports against the litigant which an innocent reader would be inclined to take as factual and conclusive.

“The judge doth protest too much, methinks”

“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one.” Bouvier’s, p. 2157.

In this instance, the judge’s Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70) paints an extremely nasty picture of Petitioner—evidently for having the audacity to exercise Petitioner’s right to property and report organized criminal activity among judges of the United States and officers of the United States Department of Justice—and purports to enjoin Petitioner from ever taking up the subject matter of the Houston Action at Law again in any other court, state or federal—unless, of course, Petitioner wants to file an appeal with the same appeal judges who conspired with another judge in the same courthouse in the Houston Action at Law and stole Petitioner’s home under color of authority, all of whom are defendants in this suit!

The judge in the Houston Action at Equity evidently apparently is terrified of taking the rap for letting Petitioner expose the ultimate Achilles’ heel of the organized criminal activity of justices and judges of the United States and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice (no authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 3) and hopes to silence Petitioner with his Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70).

Bottom line: The judge is a municipal judge of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, “a Federal corporation, ” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), doing business as “United States,” id., and under the exclusive control of Congress and knowingly and willfully usurping exercise of general jurisdiction outside his territory (the District of Columbia) and culpable for treason to the Constitution; to wit:

“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given [by the Constitution], than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. . . .” Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).

The Final Judgment and Preclusion Order is a void judgment.

Knowing that his Final Judgment and Preclusion Order is a void judgment, that Petitioner is authorized by law to move to have it vacated, and that it is an abuse of discretion for him to refuse to vacate a void judgment upon motion: The judge sought to prevent Petitioner from filing a motion to vacate the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order as void by ordering the clerk on page 7 of the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70), to return to Petitioner, unfiled, any further motions received from Petitioner.

In respect of the judge’s usurpation, by way of the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order, of “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, Petitioner on January 10, 2017, filed with the Montgomery County District Attorney and January 11, 2017, with the Harris County District Attorney, an Affidavit of Information: Criminal Complaint for Public Notice Filing, the subject of which is said judge.

Petitioner then on January 12, 2017, sent a note to the deputy clerk requesting delivery to said judge of a copy of the filed Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) and the original of Petitioner’s “Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Dkt. #70) as Void for Ewing Werlein, Jr.’s Lack of Authority to exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or enter Judgment in this Case,” hyperlinked infra.

Docket, Houston Action at Equity

Record, Houston Action at Equity (97 MB)

Note to Deputy Clerk, copy of Criminal Complaint (January 10, 2017), and Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and Preclusion Order as Void (January 12, 2017) (3 MB)

  1. Action at law: Plaintiff United States of America sues Petitioner in Lufkin action at law to foreclose tax liens against Petitioner’s property in Tyler County, Texas

Plaintiff United States of America on July 1, 2014 (two and a half years ago), files an action at law against Petitioner in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division Civil Action No. 9:14-CV-138 (the “Lufkin Action at Law”) to foreclose on federal tax liens against Petitioner’s ranch in Tyler County, Texas; judge rules against Petitioner March 3, 2016.

When Petitioner (the defendant in this particular case) on September 15, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that gives plaintiff United States of America to capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt in the geographic area occupied by the body politic of Tyler County, Texas (where Petitioner’s real property is located and Petitioner is a resident), counsel for plaintiff United States of America go silent (see post of October 28, 2015, infra) and remain so for the duration of the case, which ends March 3, 2016, five and half months thereafter.

Following entry of final judgment against Petitioner (the defendant), United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on April 21, 2016, enters his “Order of Sale and to Vacate Property (April 21, 2016)”; whereupon Petitioner on June 13, 2016, serves Petitioner’s extra-judicial (commercial) Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace on Keith F. Giblin and the other two federal judges and two United States Department of Justice attorneys involved in the Lufkin Action at Law.

After seven months of silence since his original Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on November 28, 2016, enters his “Amended Order of Sale and to Vacate Property.”

Petitioner’s ranch apparently is for sale at this writing—but Petitioner on January 13, 2017, files Petitioner’s “Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment (Dkt. #67-1) as Void for Michael H. Schneider’s Lack of Authority to Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or Enter Judgment in this Case,” hyperlinked infra.

Motion to Vacate Final Judgment as Void (January 13, 2017)

  1. Action at equity: Petitioner sues Lufkin Division judge who enters “Order of Sale and to Vacate Property” in Tyler County, Texas court to quiet title

Shortly after United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on April 21, 2016, enters his Order of Sale and to Vacate Property in the above Lufkin Action at Law, Petitioner on May 12, 2016, files an action at equity in 88th District Court of Tyler County, Texas, Case No. 23,967, against United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin, to quiet title to the real property that is the object of the Order of Sale and to Vacate Property in the Lufkin Action at Law, and defendant Keith F. Giblin on June 6, 2016, removes and files said case as United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division Civil Action No. 9:16-cv-00086 (the “Lufkin Action at Equity”).

With almost nothing happening for the last seven months, Petitioner on January 13, 2017, files in the Lufkin Action at Equity “Plaintiff’s Objection to this Proceeding for Marcia A. Crone’s Lack of Authority to Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or Enter Judgment in this Case; and Motion to Remand,” hyperlinked infra.

Docket, Lufkin Action at Equity

Record, Lufkin Action at Equity (13 MB)

Objection to Proceeding and Motion to Remand (January 13, 2017)


Conclusion

The judicial system of the United States is populated by justices and judges who despise or would prefer to eliminate the Constitution from their brand of jurisprudence (municipal law); e.g.:

“‘I see absolutely no value to a judge of spending decades, years, months, weeks, day, hours, minutes, or seconds studying the Constitution, the history of its enactment, its amendments, and its implementation (across the centuries — well, just a little more than two centuries, and of course less for many of the amendments),’ he wrote. . . .” The Washington Times, quoting United States Circuit Judge Richard Posner in “Judge Richard Posner: ‘No value’ in studying the U.S. Constitution,” June 27, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/27/richard-posner-no-value-in-studying-us-constitutio/ (accessed August 4, 2016).

The reason Judge Posner can get away with such apparently treasonous remarks about the Constitution without risking impeachment is that he neither is bound by oath or affirmation to support it nor has any duties under it to discharge or perform nor has any duty to preserve, protect, support, or defend it—only to carry out the duties assigned to him by his for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), doing business as “United States,” id., and managed by the Congress of the (corporate) “United States.”

Anyone who has taken an oath or affirmation to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,” Texas Constitution, Article 16, Section 1, or “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” 5 U.S.C. § 3331, has a duty to protect and defend the Constitution against domestic enemies who, not being bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, usurp exercise of “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, in a federal court of limited jurisdiction.

Irrespective of the myriad other discrepancies with justices and judges of the United States documented by Petitioner in the above-referenced cases over the last 35 months, the most fundamental of all is the lack of authority of any such justice or judge to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., or enter a decision or judgment in any case in any federal court of limited jurisdiction for failure to have bound himself by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, as required by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The task before the American People is to demand and bring about restoration of an exclusively republican, not municipal, form of government throughout the Union, where Texas and every other member thereof is free from usurpation of exercise of territorial or personal jurisdiction within its territory by municipal justices or judges of the United States or officers of the United States Department of Justice, as contemplated by the Framers and established at Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Standard

Petitioner sues six Federal judges and 41 others to recover home stolen two years ago under color of authority

The subject of this post is a comprehensive suit at equity (see post of March 18, 2016, infra, for the principles of equity) for a constructive trust based on constructive fraud, filed with the 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, August 11, 2016, and amended August 16, 2016.

The root word of “constructive” is construe (not construct):

“con׳strue . . . to determine the meaning of ; interpret ; explain, as to construe a foreign language (into English) ; to construe one’s conduct ; to construe a clause or a law.”  A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903) (hereinafter “Funk & Wagnalls”), p. 404.

“constructive, adj. Legally imputed; having an effect in law though not necessarily in fact. ● Courts usu. give something a constructive effect for equitable reasons <the court held that the shift supervisor had constructive knowledge of the machine’s failure even though he did not actually know until two days later>.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul Minn., 1999), p. 309.

A constructive trust is not an actual trust per se but an equitable remedy imposed by the court to redress wrongs and prevent unjust enrichment resulting from, among other things, constructive fraud; to wit:

“constructive trust . . . a trust set up by a court to deal with property that has been acquired by fraud or by inequitable means; specifically : a trust so formed to distribute property where distribution and enjoyment under the original transaction was against the principles of equity.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 2000), s.v. “Constructive trust.”

“Constructive fraud occurs when there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests . . . . An example of constructive, as opposed to actual, fraud involves the failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to make a disclosure. . . .” William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide, Vol. 4, Ch. 55 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.: New York, 2016) (“Dorsaneo”), p. 55-5.

“The most important and common type of constructive fraud supporting the imposition of constructive trusts involves the breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship . . . . When an abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is alleged, the burden of proof is on the fiduciary to establish the fairness of the transaction, that there was full disclosure of all facts and circumstances, and that there was good faith and the absence of pressure or influence on the part of the fiduciary . . . .”  Id. at 55-8.

“Fiduciary relationships are those that, as a matter of law, are relationships of trust and confidence. . . .”  Id. at 55-9.

Every judge is a fiduciary toward the public, of which Petitioner is a part; to wit:

“  ‘Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit — and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) — includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .’ ” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371–372 (1987), quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).

United States District Judge Lynn Nettleton Hughes of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division had an equitable duty to disclose certain material facts and information to Petitioner, but failed to do so, even when expressly requested of him.

Further, Defendant Hughes failed to discharge / perform a certain legal duty imposed by law (this same legal duty applies in every Federal civil case in every Federal court throughout the Union), which resulted in Petitioner’s loss of, among other things, beneficial use of Petitioner’s real property (Petitioner’s home) for the last 27 months and permanent loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in personal property (in law, called “personalty”). 

“A constructive trust may be imposed on anyone who knowingly participates in another’s breach of a fiduciary duty or knowingly benefits from the breach. The remedy ‘reaches all those who are actually concerned in the fraud, all who directly and knowingly participate in its fruits, and all those who derive title from them voluntarily or with notice.’ ”  Dorsaneo, p. 55-14.

There are 46 other Defendants who knowingly participated in Defendant Hughes’ breach of fiduciary duty, one of whom is JPMRRE, LLC, who acquired title to Petitioner’s home in Porter, Texas (the “Porter Property”)—not at a public auction as ordered by Defendant Hughes in his May 23, 2014, Order of Sale and Vacature, but privately and secretly and at less than 75 percent of its fair market value on date of sale, August 25, 2014.

Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is not entitled to retain the Porter Property; to wit:

“A third party who obtains property as a result of the defendant’s [Defendant Hughes’] fraud or other wrongdoing is not entitled to retain that property . . . . The key is whether the recipient is unjustly enriched. A bona fide purchaser for full value would not be unjustly enriched by being allowed to retain the property; instead, the constructive trust is imposed on the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the wrongdoer . . . . In contrast, those who benefit from another’s wrongdoing and do not pay full value for the property may be forced to accept a constructive trust on the property they have received. . . .”  Dorsaneo, p. 55-21.  

Normal Federal solution: Remove case to Federal court

What normally happens in cases like this when someone sues the Federal government or a Federal officer in a state court, is that an officer of the United States Department of Justice simply gives notice to the state court that he is removing the case to a Federal court under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or 1442 and thereafter opens a new case in the closest United States District Court.

Any application to remove this Texas case to a Federal court is unauthorized, fraudulent, and willful—because the only species of court to which the aforementioned statutes authorize removal—a limited-jurisdiction District Court of the United Statesno longer exists, rendering lawful removal impossible.

Typically, Federal actors just bulldoze over anyone and everyone in their path to achieve their objective; in this instance, removal of the Texas case to a Federal court.

The commercial liability that accrues to each defendant personally / organizationally for unlawful removal of this case, however, is far more extreme than the few millions of dollars in damages owed as a consequence of Defendant Hughes’ constructive fraud and theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority and the 46 other defendants’ participation therein.

The penalty for such removal is spelled out in Petitioner’s “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace,”  which appears at the top of Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition (hyperlinked below).

Petitioner on (a) August 11, 2016, filed the original petition; (b) August 15, 2016, a “Notice of Lis Pendens”  (lis means controversy or dispute or suit at law or equity; pendens means pending) against Petitioner’s stolen home; and (c) August 16, 2016, an amended original petition.

The amended original petition was served on Defendants either by personal delivery or USPS Certified Mail, return receipt requested, beginning August 25, 2016.

In the process of conspiring criminally and committing theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority, Defendants committed collectively between 10,000 and 15,000 felonies—each of which has a substantial monetary value and for which every Defendant, beginning as of his respective initial date of participation in the purported case employed to defraud Petitioner of his home, would be personally liable to Petitioner should any Defendant purport to remove said Montgomery County, Texas, case to a purported United States District Court without statutory or constitutional authority.

A description of the two files hyperlinked below:

  • “Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB)”  (a) dissolves any confusion the reader may have developed over his life as to the exact nature of what he mistakenly believes is the United States, Department of the Treasury, Secretary of the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of Justice, Office of the Clerk of Court (of any Federal court), United States District Courts, United States Marshals Service, United States Courts of Appeals, United States Treasury, and Federal Reserve—intentionally manufactured by Congress (and actors within the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation and these organizations) over the last 152 years, in order to defraud Americans of their birthright and deprive them of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, (b) documents the constructive fraud of the trial-court judge, Defendant Lynn Nettleton Hughes, and connivance with Defendant Hughes on the part of the five circuit judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, (c) demonstrates that (i) no Defendant individual is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, (ii) every United States District Court is a municipal court of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation; and (iii) other than Defendant United States of America, no Defendant organization is part of the organic general government of the de jure Republic of March 4, 1789, (d) itemizes the dollar-value of the constructive fraud and various types of damages resulting therefrom, and (e) demands judgment decreeing, among other things, a constructive trust on the Porter Property, with Defendant JPMRRE, LLC as constructive trustee for the benefit of Petitioner, and ordering Defendant JPMRRE, LLC to convey to Petitioner within 20 days free and clear of all encumbrances the entire interest held by Defendant JPMRRE, LLC in the Porter Property;
  • The “Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016,”  filed four days after the original petition, one day before the amended original petition, in the Official Public Records of Montgomery County, Texas, against the Porter Property warns potential buyers that the title thereto presently held in the name of Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is in litigation and that, should someone purchase Defendant JPMRRE, LLC’s claim to the Porter Property, he is in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment.

Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB) *

Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016

* Note: This document has numerous references to the United States Statutes at Large. In this context, the phrase “at large”  means “Not included within particular limitations; in general; for all; as, a Congressman at large (Funk & Wagnalls, p. 1003, s.v. “Large”). For example, 104 Stat. 4935 means the 104th volume of the Statutes at Large, page 4935. Using the following link the reader can verify for himself the accuracy of any reference herein to the Statutes at Large: http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935#. When the page comes up, simply insert the number of the desired volume and page in the appropriate box and click “Get Document”  and that particular page of that particular volume of the Statutes at Large will appear. From there the reader can click to go to the next sequential page or prior page or insert new numbers and go to an entirely different volume or page.

Standard

DC Judge rubber-stamps Lufkin judgment; Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Petitioner requested of United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, among other things, a temporary restraining order on enforcement of the Lufkin Judge’s final judgment and presented the following controversy for resolution: “Whether the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress or extends to Tyler County, Texas.”

The correct answer to this question signals the end of the legislative tribunals known as United States District Courts—except for the only three de jure United States District Courts in existence: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

For Judge Howell to cop to the indisputable legislative fact that the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress (Federal territory only) and does not extend into the Union, would be to invalidate the Lufkin Judge’s decision—but more importantly, would undo over 150 years of legislative-branch mischief and lead, ultimately, to the demise of the most elaborately constructed monolith of institutionalized crime in world history: the contemporary so-called Federal Government, i.e., the terrain of the District of Columbia,[1] i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation,[2] i.e., the “United States,”[3] located in the District of Columbia[4] and doing business as “United States™”[5] and “United States®.”[6]

A weighty burden for Ms. Howell to bear, we all can agree.

Another sobering influence on Judge Howell’s handling of Petitioner’s filing would be the fate of the last bench officer to rule against the nature and interests of the private Federal Reserve,[7] Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney in the Credit River Township Case,[8] Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968: Mahoney was poisoned and thereafter died of a complication, aspiration of vomitus, August 22, 1969, at the age of 54.[9]

Since 1969, no more such adverse judgments.

It is easy to see that the Honorable Beryl A. Howell had ample motivation to deny Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, evade settling the controversy submitted by Petitioner, falsify the record, and dismiss Petitioner’s complaint (entries hyperlinked below).

Judge Howell must have been concerned about Petitioner, however—because she tipped her hand and divulged the ultimate-but-frivolous[10] rationalization used by the Federal judiciary and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice to justify usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction throughout the Union in their joint efforts to exact what is called “income tax” from the American People; a theory best described as “subject-matter jurisdiction conveys territorial jurisdiction.”

Judge Howell propounds on page 4, paragraph 2 of her Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (hyperlinked below) by way of circumlocution and inference, that the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, is Article 1 § 8(1).

If it were that simple, it seems like the Lufkin Judge and Lufkin Magistrate would have said the same thing instead of going silent and stonewalling the matter for six months.

For the benefit of anyone who might be duped into believing such a patently absurd argument, let us identify the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and the extent to which they obtain.

Jurisdiction 101

The American People on September 17, 1787, ordain and establish the Constitution and Congress on March 4, 1789, implement it.

The Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers of legislation in certain geographic areas.

Those powers of legislation give executive-branch and judicial-branch officers the capacity to take jurisdiction in those geographic areas and execute and declare, respectively, the laws enacted by Congress.

It is not too complicated.[11]

But the loyalty of congressmen goes to the highest bidder—and until arrival of the private Federal Reserve in 1913, the principals of its parent bank, the private Bank of England (inc. July 27, 1694; first government-sanctioned fractional-reserve-banking institution), circa mid-19th century secure controlling interest in Congress and begin dictating legislation, which is drafted in the City of London (municipal corporation after which the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation is modeled), and the nature of jurisdiction is cunningly perverted in form through stealth redefinition of a key common noun and proper noun in the Constitution, “State” and “United States,” so as to give each a constitutionally opposite statutory meaning.

The Federal Reserve Act (H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913) is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild[12] (1842–1918), director of the private Bank of England.

The Federal Reserve Act is implemented by Baron Rothschild’s straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg,[13] a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose (the New York Times dubs Warburg “Father of the Federal Reserve”[14]).

Each of the 12 private regional Federal Reserve banks is a private joint-stock company instituted under aegis of the novel District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, inc. February 21, 1871 (fns. 1 and 2), and patterned by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after its parent bank, the private Bank of England.[15]

The elephant in the room

  • “A tax is a demand of sovereignty . . . State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall (U. S.) 278, 21 L. Ed. 146.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 3220.

The sovereign authority throughout the Union is the American People[16]; the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress.[17]

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, is providing legislation for the laying and collection of tax (income tax) without the territory over which they are sovereign, in geographic area occupied by another sovereign, the American People.

That Congress appear to be demanding income tax of the American People, joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419, 472 (1793), residing throughout the Union means either that Congress is usurping exercise of territorial and personal legislation outside their territory or what we know as “income tax” is not actually a tax or both.

  • “A tax is not a debt . . . New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 ; and has none of the incidents of a debt ; 21 Harv L. Rev. 283 ; technically it is not a debt . . .” Id.

All alleged Federal income-tax liability is classified as debt, 28 U.S.C. 3002(3), and all Federal income-tax cases, civil and criminal, are prosecuted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

What is called “income tax” ultimately is not a tax per se but a commercial penalty for the use of private property of the Federal Reserve Bank known as Federal Reserve Notes[18] (“FRNs”).

The alleged income-tax liability generated from multiple transactions involving the same FRN (called velocity of money) will exceed the face value of the FRN after a few transactions.

  • “No tax is valid which is not laid for a public purpose ; Citizens’ S. & L. Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, where it was said that there are limitations on the power of the three branches of government which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist, and among these is that taxation must be for a public purpose ; such are (according to Cooley, Tax. 18) to preserve the public order ; to make compensation to public officers, etc. ; to erect, etc. public buildings ; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws, etc. ; also, to provide secular instruction ; Colley, Tax. 2d ed. 119–124 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 81, 26 L. Ed. 658 . . .” Id. at 3221.

No collection of what is called income tax goes toward a public purpose; all collections of income tax are used for a private purpose, i.e., to pay interest on the so-called national debt incurred by Congress and owed to a private bank, the Federal Reserve; to wit:

“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.

Banks do not pay income tax; to wit:

“Sec. 7. . . . Tax exemption. Federal reserve banks, including the capital stock and surplus therein, and the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate.”   Federal Reserve Act, H. R. 7837, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913. 

All collections of income tax paid to the private Federal Reserve are retired from circulation the same way they are created by banks in the so-called loan process—by computer-keypad keystroke, in exchange for the borrower’s promise-to-pay; to wit:

“What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction [checking or credit-card] accounts.” Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994, pp. 3–6.

“If it [a bank] makes loans, it will simply credit the checking accounts of the borrowers. . . . [N]ew money, in the form of additional checkable deposits, will be “created.” The Federal Reserve Today: Fed Funds Rate, Discount Rate, 11th ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1994, p. 21.

“[M]oney exists simply as a bookkeeping entry at a bank . . .” The Story of Money, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p. 17.

“[W]hen a bank makes a loan, it simply adds to the borrower’s deposit account in the bank by the amount of the loan. This money is not taken from anyone else’s deposit; it was not previously paid in to the bank by anyone. It’s new money, created by the bank for the use of the borrower.” Robert B. Anderson, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, “How Much Will Your Dollar Buy – Interview with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson,” August 31, 1959, pp. 68–69.

The purpose of income tax is to remove from circulation a substantial portion of the digits of credit “loaned” into circulation by banks by bookkeeping entry in the so-called loan process.

“The Federal Reserve is a fount of credit, not of capital. . . .” New York Times, “Stabilizing Money Rates,” Section 3, Editorial Section, January 18, 1920, p. 33.

Unless a significant amount of the digits “loaned” into circulation by the banks are collected by the IRS in the form of FRNs from (1) payments of income tax, (2) seizure and sale of real and personal property, and (3) seizure of bank accounts and paychecks and thereafter gifted or bequeathed (31 U.S.C. 321(d)(1) and (2)) to a non-U.S. Government employee and proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury,[19] for transmittal to the private Federal Reserve as payments of interest on the national debt and thereupon retired from circulation, inflation skyrockets, prices go through the roof, and the fraudulent nature of the fractional-reserve banking system of the private Federal Reserve can be concealed no longer.[20]

Hence, the need to screen and select and vet and test and groom and own and control every single United States District Judge, Magistrate Judge, and Appeals Judge and Supreme Court Justice and United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney.

Only two kinds of taxes: direct and indirect

Article 1 § 8(1) of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”

This division of taxation into two classes, i.e., (1) direct taxes, called taxes, and (2) indirect taxes, called duties, imposts and excises, is recognized throughout the Constitution, Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481.

“Taxes are classified as direct, which includes ‘those which are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc. of those who pay them ; and indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity.’ Cooley, Tax. 61. The latter includes duties, imposts and excises ; Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3220, s.v. “Tax.”

There is nothing wrong with direct taxes per se, so long as they are apportioned, i.e., divided and assigned in proportion, as provided in pertinent part of Article 1 § 2(3) of the Constitution; to wit:

“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . .”

Income tax, which is not apportioned, to any reasonable man clearly is a direct tax on the supreme political authority in America, the American People (fn. 15), and therefore unconstitutional; yet today income tax is regarded by government as an excise, or indirect tax, without the need to be apportioned, and therefore constitutional.

The only way such absurdities can come to pass is by ownership and control of those making, declaring, and executing the law.

All the chaos arrived with the Federal Reserve Act.

Congress transmute Americans into corporately colored franchisees

The only Americans who allegedly are liable to income tax are called individuals (26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals), a.k.a. taxpayers.

The statutory term “individual” is defined at 5 U.S.C. 552a Records maintained on individuals as follows:

“(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
“. . . (2) the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;”

The phrase “citizen of the United States” means resident of the District of Columbia (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45).

The phrase “alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means American non-resident of the District of Columbia who appears to have made an election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia (id. at 15–17, paragraphs 46–51).

The statutory so-called individual is an artificial person, a creature of the law in the nature of a corporation and, like a corporation, designated by a name written in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS (style of writing a proper noun for which the rules of English grammar make no provision).[21]

A corporation is a franchise; to wit:

“FRAN′CHISE, n. . . . A particular privilege or right granted by a prince or sovereign to an individual, or to a number of persons; as the right to be a body corporate with perpetual succession . . .” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (S. Converse: New York, 1828), Vol. I, s.v. “Franchise.”

“FRANCHISE. . . . A franchise is privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be exercised without legislative grant. To be a corporation is a franchise. The various powers conferred upon corporations are franchises.
“The word ‘franchise’ has various significations, both in a legal and popular sense. A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of a corporation, and the corporation, itself a franchise, may hold other franchises. So, also, the different powers of a corporation, such as the right to hold and dispose of property, are its franchises. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 515.

The right to receive Social Security retirement or survivor benefits and the right to vote for the president of the United States (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation) are political rights and franchises conferred by the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia: Congress, a.k.a. “Congress of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 3002(2), i.e., the Congress of a Federal corporation, id. at 3002(15), the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.

Nature of so-called individual income tax

“The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909) provided that every corporation for profit . . . engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying-on or doing business by such corporation . . . upon the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed in McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise on the doing of business and not a direct tax.
     “It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity throughout the United States . . . and that the tax is properly measured by the entire income of the companies subject to it . . .
     “. . . It [the corporation income tax] is an excise tax measured by the corporate income ; Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. —; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the corporation ; McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3229.

The only kind of income tax that is not a direct tax but an indirect tax and excise on the income, from whatever source derived, of a franchisee, is what modernly is known as “income tax.”

That the post-19th century Supreme Court has ruled that the personal income tax on American men and women is an excise is proof that Government treats of every American as an ALL-CAPITAL LETTER franchise, i.e., an individual: artificial person and creature of the law in the nature of a corporation who, like all franchises, exists by privilege conferred by the state (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation).

All so-called State (District of Columbia) tax codes draw substantially (almost exclusively) from the Internal Revenue Code for their respective provisions and deal strictly with franchisees, i.e. individuals (citizens of the United States, 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), i.e., residents of the District of Columbia, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45) and corporations.

For example, the California Revenue and Taxation Code provides, in pertinent part, that California is neither a statutory state nor part of the statutory geographical United States but a foreign country thereto—and the State of California Franchise Tax Board taxes only individuals who are residents of, or corporations who are organized or commercially domiciled in, “this state” (District of Columbia); to wit:

“17017. ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the states, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.  

“17018. ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.

“17019. ‘Foreign country’ means any jurisdiction other than one embraced within the United States.

“[Individuals] 17041. (a)(1) There shall be imposed for each taxable year upon the entire taxable income of every resident of this state . . .”

“[Corporations] 23101. (a) “Doing business” means actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit.
“(b) . . . a taxpayer is doing business in this state for a taxable year if . . . . [t]he taxpayer is organized or commercially domiciled in this state.”

For the meaning of the word “includes” in the above code citations, see Rule 6, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, of the rules of statutory construction, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6.

The 16th Amendment provides for an excise tax on franchisees

The Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of February 3, 1913, provides:

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

The 16th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to lay and collect an indirect tax, an excise, on incomes, from whatever source derived, of franchisees residing or doing business in one of the several statutory States of February 3, 1913: the District of Columbia, Porto Rico (changed to Puerto Rico in 1932), Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Midway Atoll, and the Panama Canal Zone and no other thing, id. at 8, paragraph 23.

M.O. of all Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys

Using the absurd, constitutionally opposite meaning of the definition of the novel statutory terms “State” and “United States” legislated by Congress in the United States Code as complete justification: Every Federal bench officer and attorney of the United States Department of Justice follows the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny” when confronted with the actual-but-fraudulent definition and meaning of said statutory terms and pretend by inference that such meanings are nonsensical (“frivolous”) and that “State” and “United States” mean what essentially every non-insider believes they mean, i.e., the several commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union (numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959), and prattle on about all the other statutes that authorize them to do what they are doing, lack of constitutional authority notwithstanding.

Using their “secret clubhouse” knowledge of the actual statutory meaning of “State” and “United States,” they casually toss these terms around like any other American would, but silently weave a web of statutory deceit so incomprehensible to unwitting victims and so matter-of-fact to the perpetrators, to be able to justify, with confidence, that their prey will never be able to understand what is happening, much less convince anyone else of the injustice.

In the Lufkin Division Civil Action, Petitioner conceded everything except jurisdiction in Petitioner’s answer to the complaint at the outset of the proceedings; to wit:

“Defendant hereby confesses the truth of the facts recited in the instant Complaint and admits the apparent truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and right of action . . .” Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s Amended Answer, Dkt. #10, p. 1.  

From the beginning Petitioner has addressed only the issue of jurisdiction.

Every slur, allegation, and denigration of Petitioner by the Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is contrived and fabricated—but bystanders reading the words of these officers would not know this unless they were to do an exhaustive inspection of the record and realize that Petitioner never argues about anything or makes any claim—rather only recites the law, presents the facts, refers to the evidence, and demands proof of jurisdiction or constitutional authority—and that such snide remarks are falsehoods.

Institutionalized crime

Every writing filed by the DOJ attorneys or entered by the Lufkin Judge, Lufkin Magistrate, or District of Columbia Judge is devoid of mention of the following material facts and failures: (1) Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, (2) United States’ failure to produce such authority despite blackletter-law obligation to do so, (3) allegation of the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority in Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or (4) United States’ failure to oppose said motion to dismiss.

The District of Columbia Judge, Beryl A. Howell, falsely declared that the Lufkin Judge “considered and rejected” the above material facts and material failures in her ruling against Petitioner—despite no evidence of either in the Lufkin Record; to wit:

“[T]he plaintiff’s [Petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s] Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 . . . . because the plaintiff’s present claim that the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s real property was considered and rejected in the prior action between the parties, in which the defendant [United States] prevailed . . .” United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2016, p. 3 (hyperlinked below).  

People who lie as a way of life cannot be respected or trusted with anything; their word is like garbage.

Congress is the most despised class in America for good reason[22]—and the Federal judiciary and United States Department of Justice, in connivance therewith, are populated in the former exclusively, and the latter almost exclusively, by active or latent pathological liars and marauders.

The Houston and Lufkin Records prove it.

The nature of their job (debt collectors working to ensure the longevity of the fraudulent private Federal Reserve) requires it.

Statute law vs. commercial law

What is actually going on in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is not law per se but commerce.

It only appears to be a legal proceeding.

The Lufkin Court is a for-profit District of Columbia commercial debt-collection forum.

The real party of interest is the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Treasury (non-U.S. Government employee, [19]) is the proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, ultimate party of interest / beneficiary.

Commercial principles underlie everything that is happening in the Lufkin Division Civil Action.

Commerce and the common law afford more effective ways to deal with a Federal summons and complaint than the filing of an answer, but these remedies must be undertaken at the outset, without joining the action. 

Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Counsel for the United States in the Lufkin Division Civil Action on March 14, 2016 (two and a half weeks prior to this post), filed United States’ Motion for Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, but the Lufkin Judge has yet to rule on it or even acknowledge that it has been filed.

Petitioner on March 28, 2016, sued the Lufkin Judge, Michael H. Schneider, in the District Court of Tyler County, Texas, to quiet the title to Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, and on March 29, 2016, served Mr. Schneider with the summons and complaint therefor.

Mr. Schneider has till Monday next following expiration of 20 days after date of service to answer the complaint (April 25, 2016).

Documents from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and District Court of Tyler County, Texas, follow below.

District of Columbia Minute Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 17, 2016

District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint

Petitioner’s Complaint against Lufkin Judge to Quiet Title, March 28, 2016

Return of Service of Process on Lufkin Judge, March 29, 2016

*  *  *  *

[1] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the “District of Columbia,” by which name it is hereby constituted a body-corporate for municipal purposes . . . “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419].

[2] Id.; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

[3] (15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States [a Federal corporation]; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States [a Federal corporation]. 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Sec. 3002 Definitions.

[4] (h) [Location of United States.]
The United States is located in the District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307 Location of debtor.

[5] “United States™ Census Bureau,” official logo of the Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/us-census-bureau.

[6] “United States® Census 2010,” title of official hardcopy form used to collect 2010 census data; also logo of official online form, Form D-61 (1-15-2009): http://www.censusquestions.com/2010-us-census-form.pdf.

[7] The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[8] First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Township of Credit River, Minnesota, Martin V. Mahoney, Justice, Judgment and Decree, December 9, 1968: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/CreditRiver/1968-12-09judgmentanddecree.pdf (Minnesota State Law Library).

[9] Federal Reserve operatives have expended extraordinary effort to obliterate the effects of the Montgomery v. Daly case, but have failed to do so. For more details and a colorful account of the proceedings in the courtroom from a witness who was there that day, Minnesota Associate Justice of the Peace William Drexler, visit http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm.

[10] frivolous, adj. Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful <a frivolous claim>.   Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 677.

[11] For a simple depiction of the legislative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the remainder of government, see this one-page tabular display: Extent of Federal and State Legislative Power and Federal and State Jurisdiction.

[12] Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization: Staunton, Va., 1992), p. 102.

[13] Id. at 128.

[14] “According to Chernow [infra], Paul Warburg was the only person in America who understood how a central bank works. In 1912 and 1913, he drew up the basic plan for the Federal Reserve banking system, and he drafted the Federal Reserve Act. In December 1913 President Wilson signed the Act establishing the new central bank. If anyone can be called the father of the Federal Reserve Bank, the New York Times has rightly noted, it is Paul Warburg.” John Weir, Institute for Historical Review, “Powerful Jewish Family Profiled,” Review of Ron Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family (Random House: New York, 1993), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n5p33_Weir.html.

[15] The private Bank of England (joint-stock company), prior to arrival of the private Federal Reserve indisputably the most powerful political force ever known, is nationalized March 1, 1946, shortly after a conference attended by representatives of 44 different governments in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, and the founding of the so-called International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later to be called the World Bank, both of which private banks became operational in the District of Columbia in 1958.
The change in character of the Bank of England in 1946 has no practical effect on the personal fortune and political power amassed by the principals thereof up to this time—who are the same principals of the private Federal Reserve.
An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own or control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the private Federal Reserve’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and, by virtue of private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.”   AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[16] Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. . . . Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).

[17] Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2).

[18] Federal Reserve Notes are not negotiable as they do not contain a promise-to-pay nor may title thereto be transferred by delivery or indorsement, essential properties of a negotiable instrument.

[19] The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (f.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of which are domiciled in the District of Columbia.
“No person shall be entitled to receive any salary or other compensation from the United States for services as a Governor, executive director, councilor, alternate, or associate [of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank]. 22 U.S.C. 286a(d)(1) (Bretton Woods Agreements Act, P.L. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660, October 19, 1976; amended December 18, 2015)).
“The second part of the amendments prohibits the . . . [Secretary of the Treasury] from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government. . . . The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury receives no compensation for representing the United States.” Senate Report No. 94-1148 of Oct. 1, 1976, re amendment of Bretton Woods Agreements Act, supra, re Sec. 2 of House Report 13955 [p. 8], p. 5942.

[20] There is no difference in the nature of the lending policy (fractional-reserve banking) of the private Federal Reserve and that of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, only the degree to which it is practiced.
When the rate of inflation in Zimbabwe in 2008 passed the quadrillions of percent the government ceased tracking it (it ended up hitting 89.7 sextillion percent, 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, in November of that year).
For absolutely mind-blowing photos that show what can happen in a fractional-reserve banking system when the tax agency does not extort from the populace and retire from circulation a sufficient amount of digits in income tax to keep up with the rate of lending: http://www.financialjesus.com/financial-crisis/inflation-in-zimbabwe-pictures-2/.
“In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.” Alf Field, “Zimbabwe: A Fresh Start,” November 11, 2009, http://www.321gold.com/editorials/field/field111109.html.

[21] Generally the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS individual initially is created by the United States Social Security Administration upon assignment of a Social Security Account Number, but not all Americans have such a number. Any application for anything from a bank, corporation, or government agency, if granted, will be issued in the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME of the statutory individual, the corporately colored version of the full true name of the particular boy / girl / man / woman written in proper English.

[22] “Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.
“In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.
“Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . .” Los Angeles Times, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3.”

Standard

Lufkin Judge awards judgment to United States; Petitioner files for temporary restraining order in District of Columbia

The Lufkin Judge on March 3, 2016, entered a memorandum order and final judgment (both hyperlinked below), denying Petitioner’s September 30, 2015, motion to dismiss with prejudice and granting United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, April 24, 2015, motion for summary judgement (11.5 MB).

There is, however, an automatic stay of 14 days before any execution may issue on a judgment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(a)).

On March 16, 2016, the 13th day following entry of the aforesaid memorandum order and final judgment, Petitioner filed, as plaintiff, against United States of America, as defendant, in United States District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 1:16-cv-00506 BAH, a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at equity (not law), under equity rules, in order obtain that court’s assistance in preventing an injustice to Petitioner.

In addition to the verified complaint, Petitioner also filed an application (motion) for a temporary restraining order and a memorandum in support of that application (each is hyperlinked below). A proposed temporary restraining order (for the judge to sign and issue) is attached to the memorandum in support.

To correct a technical error in the caption of the verified complaint, Petitioner on March 18, 2016, filed an Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (hyperlinked below).

Here is a brief introduction to the subject of equity:

“EQUITY. 1. In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men,—the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us ; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due.” Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jural,[1] and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals. It is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.
“2. In a more restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or claims are in conflict ; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except insofar as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies above mentioned, or apply it beyond the strict lines of positive law. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891 (“Black’s 1st), pp. 427–428.  

“EQUITY. . . .
“. . . Rules and maxims. In the administration of the jurisdiction, there are certain rules and maxims which are of special significance.
“First. Equity having once had jurisdiction of a subject-matter because there was no remedy at law, or because the remedy is inadequate, does not lose the jurisdiction merely because the courts of law afterwards give the same or a similar relief.
“Second. Equity follows the law. This is true as a general maxim. Equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief because the rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in the particular case.
“Third. Between equal equities the law must prevail. . . .
“Fourth. Equality is equity . . .
“Fifth.   He who seeks equity must do equity. A party cannot claim the interposition of the court for relief unless he will do what it is equitable should be done by him as a condition precedent to that relief. See the eleventh maxim, infra.
“Sixth. Equity considers that as done which ought to have been done. . . .
“Seventh. Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy.
“Eighth. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
“Ninth. Where equities are equal the first in time prevails—qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.
“Tenth. Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation.
“ Eleventh. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . .
“Twelfth. It is to the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights, that Equity leads assistance—vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subvenit. . . .
“Thirteenth. Equity acts in personam[2] and not in rem.[3] As a result of this principle, jurisdiction of the person gives power to affect by the decree property outside the jurisdiction
. . . .
“Fourteenth. Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.”  [Emphasis in original.]  John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), pp. 1057, 1062–1063.

“. . . In America, the federal courts have equity powers under the constitution, where an adequate remedy at law does not exist. . . . The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same as that of the former court of chancery in England, is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the states . . .
“In the administration of that jurisdiction the federal courts are not to ‘look only to the statutes of congress. The principles of equity exist independently of, and anterior to, all congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases ; U. S. v. Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 20 Sup. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499 . . .’”  Id., pp. 1064–1065.

Two of the remedies available at equity are injunction and declaratory judgment:

“injunction (in-jəngk-shən), n. A court order commanding or preventing an action. ● To get an injunction a complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. . . .”  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (“Black’s 7th), p. 788.

“DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.”  “Black’s 1st, p. 340.

Petitioner initially seeks a type of injunction called an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction.

“ex parte[4] injunction. A preliminary injunction issued after the court has heard from only the moving party.”  Black’s 7th, p. 788. 

“RESTRAINING ORDER. An order in the nature of an injunction. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1036.

“temporary restraining order. A court order preserving the status quo until a litigant’s application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard. ● A temporary restraining order may sometimes be granted without notifying the opposing party in advance. — Abbr. TRO. — Often shortened to restraining order.”  Id. at 1477.   

“—Preliminary injunction. An injunction granted at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. . . .”  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1910), p. 627.

“—Permanent injunction. One intended to remain in force until the final termination of the particular suit.”  Id.

“—Perpetual injunction. . . . An injunction which finally disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point in time.”  Id.  

As the reader will discover: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the only de jure[5] United States District Court in North America and the only one with the jurisdiction necessary to decide the controversy set forth in the amended complaint; every other purported United States District Court is a de facto[6]  “court” which has no lawful existence under the Constitution.

As of this post, March 18, 2016, a file-stamped copy of court filings is not available.

The legal and equitable process involved in this action at equity is as follows:

Lufkin Court’s Memorandum Order, March 3, 2016

Lufkin Court’s Final Judgment, March 3, 2016

Petitioner’s Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 18, 2016

Petitioner’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016

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[1] JURAL. Founded in law ; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recognition and protection of rights. . . .  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 661.

[2] In personam (in pər-soh-nam), adj. [Latin “against a person”] Involving or determining the personal rights and interests of the parties. — Also termed personal. . . .  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 795.

[3] In rem (in rem), adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing. — Also termed impersonal. . . .  Id. at 797.

[4] ex parte [(eks pahr-tee)], adj. Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested <an ex parte hearing> <an ex parte injunction> .  Black’s 7th, p. 597.

[5] DE JURE.  Of right ; legitimate ; lawful.  In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . .  Black’s 1st, p. 328.

[6] DE FACTO.  In fact, in deed, actually.  This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate.  In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . .  Id. at 325.

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Lufkin Division DOJ attorneys reappear after 174 days, falsify the record; Federal-jurisdiction Achilles’ heel confirmed

After almost six months of silence (since September 2, 2015), counsel for plaintiff United States file on February 23, 2016, a response (hyperlinked below) to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection to the magistrate judge’s January 22, 2016, report and recommendation.

Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation because it omitted mention of Petitioner’s unresolved September 14, 2015, challenge of the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and September 30, 2015, demand for dismissal for lack of constitutional authority.

All United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges work for the same for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, a.k.a. “United States” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the Lufkin Court is just another legislative-branch corporate debt-collection forum (28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure) masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations are fatal to this and every other Federal lawsuit within the Union.

United States’ solution to the contents of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

Like the magistrate’s report and recommendation, United States’ February 23, 2016, response is devoid of mention of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Three stages of truth

“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.”[1]  Arthur Schopenhauer, 1818.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees have long since ceased ridiculing what Petitioner has to say.

They are too terrified of it to mention it.

By Schopenhauer’s standard, this matter is now at opposition-stage.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees are opposing the contents of Petitioner’s filings by refusing to admit of their existence and attempting to denigrate the source thereof, i.e., Petitioner, with ad hominem attacks consisting of falsehoods that paint Petitioner as a lunatic, in the hope that such “official” statements will dissuade the reader from choosing to investigate the matter personally and reconcile the condemnations of Petitioner with the actual record of the case.

Such fabrications are easily invalidated because they have no basis in fact.

Beginning of the end of the Hoax of Federal Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction

Sorry, but that crack they see there in the dam, is not going to go away by pretending it does not exist.

Whatever happens in this case will only accelerate the inevitable.

The genie is out of the bottle.

And he is not going back in.

It is only a matter of time.

Too bad none of the principals in the San Bernardino-Apple iPhone case know the right question[2] to ask.

Notwithstanding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a reply to United States’ February 23, 2016, response to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2) provides that the Lufkin Court must take judicial notice of certain facts if Petitioner requests it and supplies the necessary information—which Petitioner has done.

United States’ Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, February 23, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 24, 2016

Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 25, 2016

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[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenry, The Harper Book of Quotations, 3rd ed. (HarperCollins Publishers: New York, 1993), p. 451, quoted in Garson O’Toole, PhD, Quote Investigator, “In a Time of Universal Deceit — Telling the Truth Is a Revolutionary Act,” www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/.

[2] “What is the constitutional authority that gives this Federal court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over property located in San Bernardino County, California?”

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