BONUS: How government justifies treating you as a subject and extorting you and what you can do about it

Introduction.

Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”

Notwithstanding this guarantee, the current form of government found in “every State in this Union,” id., though seemingly republican in form, is ultimately municipal—because, as shown herein below, every such State (i.e., body politic, not geographic area) has been transmuted into a political subdivision of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, 16 Stat. 419, whose municipal law is Roman Civil Law.

Roman Civil Law equates to absolute, exclusive territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislative power (and executive and judicial jurisdiction) over residents of municipal territory.

The best symbol of Roman Civil Law is the badge of authority borne before Roman magistrates in ancient Rome, the fasces (Lat., from plural of fascis bundle)—a bundle of rods with an ax bound up in the middle and the blade projecting—as displayed on the Seal of the United States Senate, the wall behind the podium in the House of Representatives, reverse of the Mercury dime, National Guard Bureau insignia, Seal of the United States Tax Court, etc.

Americans who do not physically reside in the District of Columbia today nevertheless are treated as residents of that municipality for legal purposes based on certain unconstitutional stealth legislation.

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US attorney ignores all his material failures and asks for a contempt Order; Petitioner responds

Until his recent May 17, 2018, motion for an order to show cause why Petitioner should not be held in contempt for alleged violation of the Court’s September 13, 2017, Order, the last time the US attorney made an appearance was December 20, 2017—a span of 148 days.

During that period the US attorney failed to respond to any of Petitioner’s four case-dispositive (tending to dispose of) motions to dismiss with prejudice: a representation to the Court that United States of America does not oppose Petitioner’s requests for dismissal with prejudice of this alleged action in equity.

The respective essence of Petitioner’s four unopposed motions to dismiss with prejudice is as follows:

  • no constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction, exercise “The judicial Power of the United States” (Constitution, Art. III, § 1), or enter an Order against Petitioner in Harris County Texas (Document 30);
  • failure to allege a contractual duty of Petitioner or damage (actual or threatened) to non-governmental private-sector Internal Revenue Service, and therefore failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Document 32);
  • United States of America’s fraud on the Court (misrepresentation that non-governmental private-sector Internal Revenue Service is part of United States of America) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Document 36); and
  • United States of America’s lack of Article III-standing (no injury to United States of America, actual or threatened) to bring this alleged suit in equity (Document 41).

Petitioner on June 5, 2018, filed Petitioner’s response in opposition to United States of America’s motion for contempt of court.

The next day, June 6, 2018, Petitioner filed an objection for substitution of the real party in interest—private-sector businessman Secretary of the Treasury, a.k.a. and DBA “United States Treasury”—for alleged petitioner United States of America.

The day after that, June 7, 2018, Petitioner demanded disclosure of whether real-party-in-interest Secretary of the Treasury is (a) a government officer seeking to enforce government laws, or (b) a private-sector businessman seeking to enforce the terms of some private contract; the motion docket date (date by which any response from United States of America is due) of which is June 28, 2018.

The US attorney has previously demonstrated his inability to manage this case (see Document 16) and now to deal with any of Petitioner’s several motions to dismiss with prejudice without unfair (inequitable) assistance from the magistrate or judge or both.

The magistrate will make her recommendation/s to the judge regarding all the pending motions before the Court sometime after each party has had the opportunity to respond to each motion submitted by the other.

Whether the US attorney responds to the June 7 motion (demand for disclosure) by June 28 or not, Petitioner will be posting here again prior to that time.

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IRS attacks non-judicially; Petitioner punctures purported authority for said attack, issues warning to IRS

Background.

When IRS makes an assessment of tax allegedly due, such tax may be collected by levy or court proceeding, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun within 10 years after assessment of said tax liability, 26 U.S.C. § 6502.

If, however, a timely proceeding in court for the collection of said tax is commenced, the period during which such tax may be collected by levy is extended and does not expire until the liability for the tax—or judgment against the taxpayer arising from such liability—is satisfied, id.

Should an alleged taxpayer petition the U.S. Tax Court to challenge an assessment, all collection activity is suspended while the court proceeding is underway.

Should an alleged taxpayer lose in U.S. Tax Court, a new assessment is made and IRS and U.S. Department of Justice get a fresh 10-year period to levy or begin a court proceeding to collect.

Petitioner petitioned U.S. Tax Court re alleged tax liability for tax years 1994-1997, but shortly thereafter withdrew the petition; the USDOJ attorneys and judge, however, continued without Petitioner’s consent and spent some 18 months “holding a trial” with Petitioner in absentia, ultimately ruling for IRS (Commissioner of Internal Revenue).

After time was tacked on to the 26 U.S.C. § 6502 10-year collection period for “time spent” in U.S. Tax Court, the collection period was extended to January 16, 2014.

Nine days before expiration of said 10-year collection period, United States Department of Justice on January 7, 2014, began a court proceeding to enforce collection of the taxes allegedly due for tax years 1994-1997 in United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action 4:14-cv-0027 (the “Houston Division Civil Action”).

The judge in the Houston Division Civil Action, United States District Judge Lynn Nettleton Hughes, on May 23, 2014, entered an amended judgment against Petitioner.

Because the collection lawsuit was begun within the 10-year collection period, and plaintiff United States of America prevailed, the period during which said alleged tax liability may be collected by levy does not expire until the judgment is satisfied.

This story, however, is not over.

Recent events.

Petitioner recently received in the mail four IRS Forms CP504, “Notice of Intent to seize (levy) your property or rights to property,” dated April 2, 2018 (the “CP504s”), for alleged tax periods ending December 31, 1994-1997.

The CP504s give Petitioner till May 1, 2018, to pay the amount demanded, make arrangements to pay in installments, or submit an IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request or face immediate seizure of property or rights to property.

The alleged authority for the CP504s, upon which they ultimately depend for their authority, legitimacy, and enforceability, is the aforementioned judgment in the Houston Division Civil Action.

As shown in Petitioner’s IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request (hyperlinked below), however, the alleged judge in the Houston Division Civil Action, Lynn Nettleton Hughes, had no authority to take jurisdiction, exercise “The judicial Power of the United States” (Constitution, Art. III, § 1), or enter a judgment in Harris County, Texas.

The foregoing is not an insignificant statement.

If true, it also means that every judgment in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States district court throughout the Union is void for the respective judge’s lack of authority to take cognizance of the matter in question, a condition known as coram non judice; to wit:

“coram non judice . . . [Latin ‘not before a judge’] 1. Outside the presence of a judge. 2. Before a judge or court that is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., Bryan A. Garner, ed. in chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 338.

Petitioner’s Response to CP504s.

Petitioner followed the instructions provided in the CP504s and on April 26, 2018, sent an IRS Form 9423 Collection Appeal Request and attached to it a Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace and Affidavit of Mailing.

Petitioner subsequently revised said IRS Form 9423 and Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace and on April 30, 2018, sent IRS a replacement response.

The Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace educates IRS as to the invalidity of the alleged judgment upon which the alleged CP504s depend and tells IRS what Petitioner will do if IRS undertakes any act in respect of the CP504s that results in damage to Petitioner or Petitioner’s property or rights to property.

Because neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a commissioned officer of the United States but a private-sector businessman: (a) Neither of the organizations over which  they administer, i.e., Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service, respectively, is part of government but a private-sector business, (b) every employee thereof a private-sector worker, and (c) any criminal offense committed in Texas by any such private-sector employee properly a Texas, and not a Federal, matter.

Petitioner’s revised IRS Form 9423 and Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace spell out the penalties should IRS damage Petitioner via the alleged CP504s, as well as penalties for any retaliatory acts (e.g., criminal charges) taken against Petitioner should Petitioner enforce the penalties set forth therein against private-sector Department of the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service or their respective employees.

IRS summons-case update.

  • New motion to dismiss

Petitioner on April 11, 2018, filed a motion to dismiss for United States of America’s lack of constitutional (Article III) standing to.

The US attorney had until May 2, 2018, to respond, but stood mute.

Petitioner on May 3, 2018, filed with the Court a Notice of United States of America’s representation of no opposition to respondent’s April 11, 2018, case-dispositive motion to dismiss with prejudice and Request for dismissal with prejudice of the case.

The US attorney failed to respond to any of Petitioner’s last four motions to dismiss—a representation that he does not oppose what is requested in any of said motions (dismissal with prejudice).

The last time the US attorney filed anything in the Court was December 20, 2017—four and half months ago.

Under the rules of equity, the US attorney’s failure to prosecute or participate in the suit operates to imply that the IRS summons case should be dismissed with prejudice immediately, as requested by Petitioner.

  • “United States Treasury”

As you may know, the payee listed in every IRS request or demand for payment is “United States Treasury.”

Although Congress mention “United States Treasury” 14 times in Title 12 U.S.C. Banks and Banking, three times in Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code, and six times in Title 31 U.S.C. Money and Finance, there is no statute that expressly creates, establishes, or defines “United States Treasury.”

The closest thing to identifying how “United States Treasury” was created or what it is or means, is found in regulations written by non-officer of the United States, private-sector worker Secretary of the Treasury at 31 C.F.R. Money and Finance, Part 203 Payment of Federal Taxes and the Treasury Tax and Loan Program, Subpart A General Information, § 203.2 Definitions:

“Treasury General Account (TGA) means an account maintained in the name of the United States Treasury at an FRB [Federal Reserve Bank].”

There being no congressional statute that creates, establishes, or defines it, “United States Treasury” appears to be a fictitious name created by Secretary of the Treasury, in which certain private business bank accounts are maintained for his personal use, either directly as a signatory or by proxy (junior employee in private-sector Department of the Treasury).

If this is true, it means that ultimately every penny collected in so-called income tax goes not to anyone in government but rather the exclusive, unilateral control of non-governmental, non-officer of the United States, private-sector worker Secretary of the Treasury (see 31 U.S.C. § 321(d)(1) and (2) for verification of this point).[1]

It also would mean that governmental United States of America would have no constitutional standing to sue any alleged taxpayer in any United States District Court for alleged unpaid taxes for lack of a case or controversy between the litigants—because the actual party in interest is not governmental United States of America but private-sector businessman Secretary of the Treasury, via his DBA and alter ego “United States Treasury.”

And also that the instant civil action to compel Petitioner to produce books and records for the ultimate benefit of private-sector businessman Secretary of the Treasury, would have to be dismissed for United States of America’s lack of Article III standing (no case or controversy between the parties) to bring suit against Petitioner.

Presently, Petitioner is waiting for the Court to grant Petitioner’s motion for an order compelling the U.S. Secretary of State to produce for Petitioner’s inspection and copying, the commission, as an officer of the United States, of current Secretary of the Treasury Steven Terner Mnuchin (and former Commissioner of Internal Revenue John Andrew Koskinen).

When the U.S. Secretary of State is forced to comply with the subpoena (whether in the current IRS summons case or some other civil or criminal proceeding in the future) and has to produce the commission, as an officer of the United States, of the Secretary of the Treasury or, in the alternative, certify that there is no document in his custody responsive to the subpoena, there will be sufficient evidence on the table to resolve all disputes and rectify any discrepancy.

_______________________________

[1] This aligns with a previous official statement as to the nature of income tax; to wit:

“100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.       

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Petitioner files three new motions to dismiss for other fatal defects; US attorney silent for last three months

Following the judge’s February 5, 2018, Order referring the case to the magistrate to conduct all pretrial proceedings, Petitioner filed the following three separate motions to dismiss with prejudice (i.e., dismissal barring prosecution of any later suit based on the same claim), each with its own particular reason:

  1. THE COURT LACKS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

Every act of every government officer, state or federal, must be authorized by at least one provision of the Constitution; see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989); Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case of th [sic] Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813).

Petitioner on February 14, 2018, filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction or enter an order against Petitioner in Harris County, Texas.

The US attorney had 21 days from date of filing of said motion, i.e., till March 7, 2018, to file a response in opposition, but remained silent.

The reason the US attorney failed to oppose the above case-dispositive motion (i.e., a motion that is divestitive in nature and brings about the extinction of rights and disposes of the case) is that there is no provision of the Constitution that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction or enter an order against Petitioner in Harris County, Texas.

The Court (and United States Department of Justice) is operating in Harris County, Texas, without constitutional authority.

The US attorney’s failure to respond to said motion is the US attorney’s representation to the Court that he does not oppose it—is sufficient ground for the judge to grant Petitioner’s motion and dismiss with prejudice the case.

Upon the US attorney’s failure to respond to said motion, Petitioner on March 8, 2018, filed a notice of United States of America’s failure to oppose respondent’s case-dispositive motion to dismiss and request for dismissal with prejudice of the case.

Whereas, the judge has no capacity to take jurisdiction or enter an order against Petitioner in Harris County, Texas, there is nothing that the US attorney could have said in opposition without incriminating himself.

In this alleged equity proceeding, the “United States” district court is an instrumentality of the District of Columbia, a Federal municipal corporation (see 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15) for definition of “United States” in every civil or criminal proceeding regarding an alleged debt, such as alleged taxes, allegedly owed to the United States), and the judge is usurping exercise of jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the corporate charter of said municipal corporation, 16 Stat 419, which is limited to the territory within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.

  1. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE A PRIVATE-SECTOR BUSINESS WITH NO AUTHORITY OVER PETITIONER

Petitioner on February 27, 2018, filed an amended motion to dismiss with prejudice which asserts that, because neither the so-called Secretary of the Treasury nor his underling, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is a commissioned officer of the United States: (a) Neither is a government officer, (b) both are private-sector workers, (c) the organization over which each administers and which issued the subject IRS administrative summons, i.e., IRS, is not part of the government, (d) IRS is a private-sector organization (business), (e) the only cause of action a private-sector business such as IRS could bring against Petitioner is for breach of contract, (e) there is no evidence of any contract between IRS and Petitioner, and, therefore (f) the government’s case must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The US attorney had until March 20, 2018, to file a response in opposition to this motion, but remained silent, whereupon Petitioner on March 21, 2018, filed a notice of the US attorney’s failure to oppose said motion and request for dismissal with prejudice of the case.

The US attorney’s failure to respond to this case-dispositive motion is his representation that he does not oppose it and sufficient ground for dismissal with prejudice of the case.

Every justice and judge of the United States and every United States attorney knows that the Internal Revenue Service is part of the private Federal Reserve.

To provide evidence that IRS is not part of government, Petitioner on March 1, 2018, served United States Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson (custodian of the Great Seal of the United States) with two subpoenas commanding his production, at 10:00 A.M. on March 22, 2018, of the commission as an Officer of the United States, in effect as of May 30, 2017 (date IRS administrative summons was served on Petitioner)—bearing the signature of the President of the United States and Great Seal of the United States—of (1) current Secretary of the Treasury Steven Terner Mnuchin, and (2) former Commissioner of Internal Revenue John Andrew Koskinen.

The 10:00 A.M. March 22, 2018, deadline came and went, with no word from Secretary of State Tillerson.

No commission, as an officer of the United States, exists for either man because each is a private-sector businessman.

Because Secretary of State Tillerson failed to obey the subpoenas for production of documents, Petitioner on the afternoon of the same day, March 22, 2018, filed a motion to compel compliance with Subpoenas for the production of documents, and request for an order to show cause why non-party Rex W. Tillerson should not be held in contempt and submitted a proposed Order for the judge to sign.

Secretary of State Tillerson can avoid a contempt citation simply by providing Petitioner with written certification that there is no document in his custody responsive to either of the subpoenas.

  1. IRS NOT PART OF “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”—WHO HAS COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT

“Fraud on the court” is defined as follows:

“fraud on the court. A lawyer’s or party’s misconduct in a judicial proceeding so serious that it undermines or is intended to undermine the integrity of the proceeding, Examples are bribery of a juror and introduction of fabricated evidence.”   Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner, ed. in chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 671. 

The instant petition represents by inference that Internal Revenue Service is part of alleged “United States of America.”

Being an organization whose senior executive is a non-governmental private-sector businessman, IRS cannot be part of any government—either the alleged “United States of America” (moribund since June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 306, sec. 182) or District of Columbia, a municipal corporation (16 Stat 419).

Whereas, only a duly commissioned officer of the United States can administer over a government organization, Internal Revenue Service cannot be part of government and alleged “United States of America” has made a false representation and committed fraud on the court.

Because alleged “United States of America” has no right to title or ownership of any alleged claim of a private business (IRS), alleged “United States of America” has failed to state a claim (of its own) upon which relief can be granted.

All the above monkey business is evidence of unclean hands on the part of alleged “United States of America,” a factor which, according to the rules of equity, deprives alleged “United States of America” of relief in this or any other such forum.

In respect of the foregoing, Petitioner on March 12, 2018, filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice, to which the US attorney has until April 2, 2018, to file a response in opposition or concede by omission that he does not oppose it.

Whereas, the last time we heard anything from the US attorney was December 20, 2017 (three months ago), and the likely reason for his failure to respond to either of the first two above motions to dismiss is fear of self-incrimination, it is not likely we will hear from him on the third.

SUMMARY   

The judge is an impartial referee whose job it is to help the litigants resolve their dispute.

When one litigant files a case-dispositive motion and the other fails to oppose it, the equitable thing for the judge to do is dismiss the case as requested by the movant.

Further, he who brings suit (in this instance alleged “United States of America”) has the responsibility to prosecute it, and failure to prosecute (called non prosequitur) is ground for judgment against him (and the US attorney seems to have disappeared).

Shortly after Petitioner provided evidence that IRS is engaging in evil practice against Petitioner in this case, the judge on February 5, 2018, brought in the magistrate for the purpose of producing reports and recommendations regarding all pending matters—and thereafter Petitioner filed the above three case-dispositive motions.

Whether the US attorney responds to the third above motion by April 2, 2018, or not, the magistrate will have at multiple sufficient reasons to recommend that alleged “United States of America” be denied relief in this court of equity for unclean hands and evil practice against Petitioner or that any one of Petitioner’s unresolved motions be granted and the case dismissed with prejudice.

Conversely, there appears to be no equitable reason why this case should be allowed to continue.

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After five weeks of silence, the judge makes a move

Petitioner on December 28, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the USDOJ attorney’s response to Petitioner’s motion demanding the taxing statute to which Petitioner allegedly is liable.

Because the judge’s deputy clerk removed three essential pages from Petitioner’s reply before entering it on the docket, if Petitioner wanted the complete document to appear on the record of the case Petitioner had to file another, “amended” version of the reply, which Petitioner did 11 days later on January 8, 2018 (the only difference in Petitioner’s original and amended reply is that the word “Amended” appears in the title of the latter version).

Both Petitioner’s reply and amended reply demonstrate that the Internal Revenue Service is engaged in evil practice against Petitioner in this equity action and not entitled to relief in any court of equity.

Upon the filing of Petitioner’s reply (December 28, 2017) the USDOJ attorney went silent and has remained so since then.

Because the USDOJ attorney does not know what to do to overcome the substance of Petitioner’s amended reply (showing that the Internal Revenue Service is engaged in evil practice against Petitioner) and the judge needed another participant to carry out his wishes for the case.

Five weeks after the initial filing, the judge on February, 5, 2018, broke silence by entering an Order bringing in the magistrate to make determinations on the matters pending in the case.

The judge knows everything and does not need the magistrate, Dena Hanovice Palermo, for anything and can disregard or supersede anything the magistrate may recommend (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).

The judge’s purpose in introducing the magistrate is to draw attention away from the failures of the USDOJ attorney and, as an “unbiased” figure, make recommendations as to how to solve “all the issues” before the Court.

In a previous such instance where Petitioner checkmated the USDOJ attorney, Petitioner had demanded the constitutional authority that gives the judge the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter an order in Tyler County, Texas and thereafter moved the court to dismiss, the USDOJ attorney went silent and remained so for the next five and half months until the judge appointed a magistrate to step in and make “recommendations” (dictated by the judge) that the judge could use to salvage the case for the government.

In that case, the magistrate (carrying out the dictates of the judge) ignored material facts on the record and material failures of the USDOJ attorney that were fatal to the government’s case (which should have caused the judge to dismiss the case for the government’s failure to object to Petitioner’s motion to dismiss) and cherry-picked from the record certain facts and pieced them together so as to support the false picture he contrived and upon which his recommendations were based.

The Internal Revenue Service is not entitled to relief in a court of equity (because it comes with unclean hands) and judge and magistrate and USDOJ attorney all know it.

What will the magistrate recommend?

We will have to wait to find out.

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Judge OKs lies, denies motion; Petitioner shows that IRS’s evil practice deprives it of the right to relief in a court of equity

As expected, the judge on November 22, 2017, entered his Memorandum & Order denying Petitioner’s October 3, 2017, motion for a grant of immunity for testimony.

Notwithstanding that the USDOJ attorney is the point man in this proceeding, as in virtually every other so-called “federal” (municipal) case, the judge is running the show and in this one intends to see that Petitioner ends up behind bars; the USDOJ attorney is just along for the ride to provide what the judge needs to accomplish his objective.

When the USDOJ attorney failed to respond to Petitioner’s motion for a grant of immunity and give the judge the tool he needed to rule against and deny Petitioner’s motion for immunity, he threw a monkey wrench in the judge’s plans and—having demonstrated insufficient intellect to pull it off on his own—had to be bypassed and an alternative plan devised to reopen the matter, so the judge would have the justification he needed to deny Petitioner’s motion for immunity.

The process was effectuated by the judge who, by way of proxy, caused the USDOJ attorney to sign and file certain documents which opened the door for the judge to get involved again—based on a point so lame it would not support the weight of a dust mote: that the USDOJ attorney was unaware that a request is a motion, even though the clerk knew it and docketed it as the same (Document 24) and evidently knows more about the law than the USDOJ attorney, and “motion” is defined as a request and taught as such on the first day of law school.

The USDOJ attorney’s failure to respond to Petitioner’s motion for immunity is a major black mark on his record as a government lackey and he did exactly as he was told and filed the documents that were given to him; the judge thereafter, in his Memorandum & Order, denied Petitioner’s motion for immunity.

Following the judge’s November 22, 2017, denial of Petitioner’s motion for grant of immunity, Petitioner on November 29, 2017, filed Petitioner’s amended motion demanding disclosure of the taxing statute that makes Petitioner liable to tax, or dismissal with prejudice of the case.

Twenty-one days later, on December 20, 2017, the very last day in which to file a response to said motion, the USDOJ attorney filed his feeble Response in Opposition to the new demand (motion) for taxing statute (the USDOJ attorney is not doing so well since his flub).

A week later, on December 28, 2017, Petitioner filed his Reply to Response in Opposition to Motion—and 11 days after that, on January 8, 2018, his Amended Reply to Response in Opposition to Motion, which filing was necessitated upon discovery that the initial Reply on file in the Court was missing three of its 12 pages (8, 10, and 11)—easily crushing the two points raised by the USDOJ attorney in his Response in Opposition.

More importantly, however, said Amended Reply shows that no matter what statutes may authorize Internal Revenue Service to sue Petitioner, based on its own evil practice and wrongdoing in this case, it is disqualified from using the Court any further; specifically: It is deprived of any right to relief in a court of equity to which it previously may have been entitled—meaning the case is essentially done.

Petitioner is unaware of any previous case where the Internal Revenue Service was barred from using the court as a consequence of its evil practice toward its target.

This development does not fit into the judge’s plans.

We shall see what he decides to do about it.

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Motion denied; summons enforced; audit conducted; motion for immunity; no response, then lies; busted

Please note: For the sake of consistency, in this website, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is always the “Petitioner” (capital “P”), a practice first adopted when this webpage was opened after Petitioner’s filing of a petition in the Supreme Court in 2014.  In the current IRS summons case, however, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. is the “respondent” (lower-case “r”) and IRS is the “petitioner” (lower-case “p”).

After the judge on September 13, 2017, enters his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, files a Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from said Order as void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Harris County, Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Despite no lawful authority to continue the charade, the judge the next day, September 26, 2017, declares the usual false generalities in his denial of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and subsequent Order compelling Petitioner’s appearance at the October 2, 2017, examination (the “Examination”).

Petitioner appears as appointed at the Examination accompanied by a Certified Shorthand Reporter (C.S.R.) (who produces a transcript of the Examination) and submits to questioning.

At the Examination, the United States Department of Justice attorney representing the IRS notifies Petitioner that if Petitioner does not cooperate and answer questions and produce documents that he will file a motion with the Court to have Petitioner held in contempt.

Petitioner answers certain of the IRS’s questions, but declines to answer others or produce any documents.

Knowing that the USDOJ attorney representing the (private-sector) IRS was not pleased with Petitioner’s aforementioned abstentions, Petitioner the following day, October 3, 2017, files in the Court Respondent’s Notice of Readiness to Comply with the Orders of the Court (Documents 11 and 13) and Request for Grant of Immunity against Potential Self-Incrimination (the “Notice and Request”).

Local Rule 7.4 gives the USDOJ attorney 21 days to file a response in opposition to the Notice and Request, but he neither files a response in opposition nor a motion to have Petitioner held in contempt; instead: Silence.

What this means is that the USDOJ attorney did not know what to do.

Why would the USDOJ attorney not know what to do?

It is a simple motion to oppose the Notice and Request or for an order holding Petitioner in contempt.

The reason Petitioner’s October 3, 2017, Notice and Request stultifies the USDOJ attorney is that the USDOJ attorney ultimately is not interested in answers to questions and production of documents which would allow the IRS to calculate Petitioner’s alleged tax liability (as falsely propounded by the USDOJ attorney at the Examination).

The USDOJ attorney wants to set the stage so Petitioner can be charged with “willful failure to file” and tried, convicted, and imprisoned—and a response in opposition or a motion to have Petitioner held in contempt would throw a wrinkle in that process (the USDOJ attorney wants Petitioner to volunteer testimony and records without a grant of immunity).

So, upon receipt of the October 3, 2017, Notice and Request the USDOJ attorney goes deer-in-the-headlights, freezes in his tracks, and misses the opportunity for a timely filing of a response in opposition.

Evidently, the next move comes from above (as does the intent to bring criminal charges against Petitioner), because the USDOJ attorney evidently is not crafty enough to figure out how to orchestrate the witch hunt within 21 days of the filing of the Notice and Request.

On the tenth day after lapse of the deadline, the USDOJ attorney files in the Court a motion to file, out of time, a response to Petitioner’s Notice and Request.

The reason, says the USDOJ attorney, as to why he failed to file a response within the 21 days, is that he was “confused” by the title of Petitioner’s Notice and Request: He thought it was only a “notice” and not a motion—even though a request and a motion are the same thing (a legal fact which is taught the first day of law school) and the clerk labeled the filing on the docket as a motion—and wants, therefore, to be granted relief, based on “excusable neglect,” to file, out-of-time (late), a response.

A sworn declaration as to the veracity of such factual contentions is an essential element of such filing, but the USDOJ attorney omits to include such evidence (declaration) or even an explanation as to an alleged sequence of events that would support his factual contentions and, apparently, just wants the Court to take his (unsworn) word for it and rubber-stamp his motion.

The language of the USDOJ attorney’s motion to file a response out-of-time is all “sweetness and light,” i.e., exudes utter innocence as to any wrongdoing and seemingly is written by a babe-in-the-woods attorney.

Accompanying the USDOJ attorney’s out-of-time motion is the object thereof, his proposed response to Petitioner’s Notice and Request, which is couched in terms, however, that are anything but innocent and evidently written by a seasoned government attorney, experienced in bringing down his prey.

To the USDOJ attorney’s two aforementioned filings, Petitioner responds with an exposé of the USDOJ attorney’s guile:

    1. A Response to IRS’s motion to be allowed to file, out of time, a response to the Notice and Request; and
    2. A Reply to IRS’s proposed response to the Notice and Request.

 

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