Petitioner has frozen United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States district and magistrate judges in their tracks numerous times.
When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:
“Generally, a plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).
“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).
Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.
District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.
The M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.
This is called lying by omission.
It is also constructive fraud.
It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).
This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.
Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.
This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.
Only municipal judges in United States district courts
Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.
In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.
Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.
Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.
As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.
The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.
A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation
What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.
The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.
Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.
Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.
After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.
You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.
Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.
Houston IRS summons case
Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of authority in simple terms.
- Motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (in the presence of a person not a judge)
- Counsel for IRS’s response in opposition to motion to dismiss
- Reply to counsel for IRS’s response in opposition to motion to dismiss
- Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause
- Counsel for IRS’s response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
- Reply to counsel for IRS’s response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States’ opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.