Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment update

Houston IRS summons case

In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9, 2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017, hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (click here for transcript of hearing).

Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents: (1) Response to Petition, (2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, and (3) Motion to Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause.

As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special statutory definition of “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.

Whereas, the “United States” of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court rather is “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).

The organic “United States” of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15).

Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).

Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (“So help me God.”) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none are officers under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia.

Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the District of Columbia.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of the Constitution, have the capacity to take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union (Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1–16).

The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have been because, in accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of them disqualifies him from holding an office under the “United States” of the Constitution.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419).

All of today’s executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) “United States” (the District of Columbia) impersonating federal officers under the “United States” of the Constitution—and rely on mass ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of “United States” to justify usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).

The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union—something about which we hear every day in the news for which there is no constitutional authority.

The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.

Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void

Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against Petitioner’s ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the “United States” of the Constitution or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1.

Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his response in opposition to Petitioner’s motion to vacate the final judgment, making various ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioner’s reply to counsel for plaintiff’s response in opposition, recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioner’s motion granted.

The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioner’s February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiff’s February 6, 2017, response to Petitioner’s January 23, 2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.

• Revision to previous post

Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items: the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five.

The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:

“The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:

  • “power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas at Art, I, § 8, cl. 1-16;
  • “power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, § 8, cl. 17; and
  • “constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the form of ‘Rules and Regulations,’ id., ‘respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,’ id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.

“Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union.”

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