Lufkin magistrate recommends the Court grant United States’ motion for summary judgment; Petitioner responds

After five months of silence there is movement in the Lufkin Division.

A Lufkin Division actor has made a move to compensate for the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and facilitate theft of Petitioner’s real property under color of authority.

Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demanded the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority—and following the United States’ failure to respond thereto, on September 30, 2015, alleged lack of territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and demanded dismissal of the case, to which demand the United States never filed an opposition.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, unanswered demands signify that the Lufkin Court has no territorial or personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the United States is not entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of the case.

With no dismissal forthcoming, Petitioner on January 14, 2016, filed an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with the military and served the Lufkin Division actors with a copy, as well as a Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt and a Demand for Payment.

Whereupon, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on January 22, 2016, entered a Report and Recommendation on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the “Report and Recommendation”), hyperlinked below, in which he cherry-picks from the record of the Lufkin Division case certain facts, which he presents as conclusive “proof” that the United States is entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner’s real property—to the exclusion of all material facts and evidence in the same record from Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings, and the United States’ failure to respond thereto, that supersede and nullify those he uses as the basis of his recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin is applying the Government policy, “Never respond, confirm, or deny when confronted with a situation where anything you say will work against you,” and pretending that Petitioner never made the September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Magistrate Giblin is counting on his co-workers to go along with the ruse.

This convention has a name: culture of silence.

In an impartial judicial system such custom could never gain any footing.

Magistrate Giblin is gambling that the general appearance of his 11-page Report and Recommendation is so “official” and its contents so “thorough” and “authoritative” that the idea of verifying its conclusions and recommendation against the actual record of the case never crosses the reader’s mind.

Silence, fraud, and judicial fraud

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24
       “. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967).” United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).”

“‘Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit — and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) — includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .’”  Justice Stevens (dissenting) in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987), quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).

Ongoing silence on the part of the United States for the last five months, followed by the preposterous whitewash of the record by Magistrate Giblin, operates to confirm that Petitioner has correctly identified the ultimate Achilles’ heel of every de facto United States District Court throughout the Union: no constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction.

Magistrate Giblin’s employer, plaintiff United States, is too terrified to reply to Petitioner’s demands and put anything in writing, lest it be used as evidence of a crime—hence the stratagem of the Report and Recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin’s “solution” to his employer’s jurisdictional problem is to ignore the evidence, falsify the record, and recommend that the Lufkin Judge “authorize” the taking of Petitioner’s home in Tyler County, Texas, without constitutional authority—among numerous other offenses, a felony of the first degree under the Texas Penal Code.

The Report and Recommendation is a desperation attempt to stave off the inevitable.

General ignorance of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution is what has led to the disappearance of judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts and proliferation of legislative-branch Article IV territorial courts, called “United States District Courts” (28 U.S.C. 132(a)), of which the Lufkin Division court is one.

Anyone who can grasp pages 3–5 of Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, hyperlinked below, will know more about constitutional jurisdiction than any law professor (or at least what he teaches and will admit to).

That Government has been so successful at defrauding and swindling other Americans of their wealth over the last century or so without constitutional authority, is no reason that Petitioner has to go along with the charade, bend to pretended authority, and consent to the theft of his home under pretext of a judicial proceeding.

“Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur impune.   One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2134.

Lufkin Division actors who conspire to falsify the record, exercise jurisdiction out of their territory, and take Petitioner’s property without constitutional authority are whistling past the graveyard if they think they are going to do it with impunity.

Petitioner on February 16, 2016, filed the aforementioned Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with Angelina County, Texas, District Attorney Art Baureiess, who has authority to charge and prosecute Lufkin Division actors for violations of the Texas Penal Code.

The more that Lufkin Division actors struggle, the messier it is going to get.

“Semper necessitas probandi incumbit et qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove (the burden of proof lies on him).”  Id. at 2162.

“Qui tacet consentire videtur ubi tractatur de ejus commodo. A party who is silent is considered as assenting, when his advantage is debated.”  Id. at 2158.

“De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist.”  Id. at 2130.

“Idem est non probari et non esse ;  non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not proved and what does not exist, are the same ;  it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.”  Id. at 2136.

“Actore non probante, reus absolvitur. If the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is absolved.”  Id. at 2124.

“Omnia præsumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium. All things are presumed to be done legitimately until the contrary is proved.”  Id. at 2152. 

“Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.”  Id. at 2159.

“Facta sunt potentiora verbis. Facts are more powerful than words.”  Id. at 2134.

This situation is not going to go away and magically disappear just because Magistrate Giblin has decided to play make-believe with the record: Lufkin Division actors have no authority to take Petitioner’s home—and are liable to Petitioner in individual capacity if they do, for criminal offenses knowingly and willfully committed without the scope of their office or employment under color of authority. 

Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation

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