The Union is the collective of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution, and the geographic area they occupy.
There is no provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union—only subject-matter legislation over certain things (Article 1 § 8(1-16)).
This means that Congress have no legislative power over property located anywhere within the Union or any American residing there, a limitation confirmed by the Supreme Court:
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State [of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
Notwithstanding that there is no provision of Article III of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to ordain and establish any court with power of territorial or personal jurisdiction anywhere in the Union (only jurisdiction to hear or decide certain controversies (Article 3 § 2(1)): The United States District Courts created by Congress (28 U.S.C. 132(a)) and doing business throughout the Union are usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction over property located there and Americans residing there.
Wherefore, despite the seeming impossibility of such a state of affairs, strictly legally speaking, every Federal bench officer, including, without limitation, every Supreme Court justice, is culpable for:
- criminal negligence of the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction, in respect of the legislative powers therein conferred upon Congress;
- violation of his oath of office to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . [and] bear true faith and allegiance to the same” (5 U.S.C. 3331); and
- Treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).
What separates Man from the beasts is the faculty of reason:
- “Ratio est radius divini luminis. Reason is a ray of the divine light.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 995.
- “Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis. Reason is the formal cause of custom.” Id.
- “Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. Reason is the soul of law ; the reason of law being changed, the law is also changed.” Id.
At implementation of the Constitution March 4, 1789, the soul of law in America was personal liberty under the common law; to wit:
“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.” William Blackstone and John Innes Clark Hare, cited in John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).
“Due course of law,” supra, is synonymous with “due process of law” and means process according to the law of the land, i.e., the Constitution, interpreted according to the principles of the common law; to wit:
“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . .” Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Id. at 535.
On June 30, 1864 (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, pp. 4-14), Congress invoked the sovereignty of the American People to override their will as declared in the Constitution, and changed, beginning with the revenue act of that date, the reason of law in America, from personal liberty under the common law to civil liberty under municipal (Roman civil) law, i.e., rules and regulations commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; to wit:
“Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint.” Ordronaux’s Constitutional Legislation, quoted in Bouvier’s, p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).
There is only one provision of the Constitution that expressly grants Congress power to make rules and regulations—Article 4 § 3(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”
All “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id. (which is enumerated at Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution), is extraneous to the Union.
Congress have no authority to legislate rules and regulations (statutes) for the 50 commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, or the Americans who reside there—and in such geographic area the Department of Justice and United States District Courts are bereft of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and execute or declare or enforce any such rule or regulation (statute) enacted by Congress.
The contents of this webpage reflect Petitioner’s efforts to dissolve unconstitutional, felonious, and treasonous attempts to impose Federal rules and regulations on Petitioner in order to justify seizure of Petitioner’s property.
“Est autem vis legem simulans. Violence may also put on the mask of law” (Black’s 1st, p. 433)—and Federal elements today, like an occupying army, usurp exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction and impose rules and regulations throughout the Union and deprive the Americans residing there of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, under municipal (Roman civil) law of the District of Columbia, in treason to the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the monstrousness of such organized outlawry, reason, not violence, is the answer.
It has taken all this time—roughly 100 years (since Federal actors first began enforcing provisions of the fraudulent Sixteenth and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution on Americans residing throughout the Union; see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 8)—for someone to divine the question that Federal aggressors are required by blackletter law to answer, but cannot without also incriminating themselves for treason to the Constitution.
Petitioner’s objective is the exact estimation of effort that gets Federal actors to honor their oath of office and bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and cease usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction without “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)).
For the first time in their professional life, upon receipt of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, objection to denial of due process of law and demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the Federal judges, magistrates, law clerk, attorneys general of the United States, and DOJ attorneys involved in that case hewed to the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and ceased attempting to defraud Petitioner and deprive Petitioner of Petitioner’s property under color of law, office, and authority.
Despite this positive sign, however, said actors cannot be trusted to resign their office or refrain from committing the same crimes against other Americans less knowledgeable in such matters than Petitioner, and therefore must be brought under control.
Wherefore, in accordance with provisions of the Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and as provided in 18 U.S.C. 4 Misprision of felony, Petitioner on December 30, 2015, filed by Priority Mail USPS Tracking with certain of the only Federal authorities who might be worthy of trust—65 senior officers in military authority—an affidavit of information (criminal complaint), upon probable cause of misdemeanor, felony, and treason supported by oath and particularly describing the persons to be seized, against every Federal actor in the Lufkin Division case, and a second affidavit of information limited to the Lufkin Judges and Magistrate Judges only.
Petitioner also lodged each Affidavit of Information with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—and sent each Lufkin Federal defendant his own copy.
“Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Bouvier’s, p. 2165—and every Federal Lufkin defendant is liable to Petitioner for damages for, among other things, denial of the constitutional right to due process of law—wherefore, Petitioner has remedies.
These criminal complaints are the first step on the path to obtaining remedy.
* * * *
 blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 163.
 mis-pri′sion, mis-prizh′un, n. . . . Law. . . . The concealment of a crime, especially of treason or felony. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p. 1133.