Houston Judge a no-show on appointed hearing-date

The Houston Division case is the initial case and the one that Petitioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit and, thereafter, the Supreme Court.

When the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit, who affirmed the judgment in the Houston Division, Petitioner returned to the Houston Court and filed a motion to vacate the original Judgment and Order (Houston Dkt. #82), as void for multiple reasons.

The hearing date for the motion was set for September 30, 2015.

On September 29, 2015, the Houston Judge made a ruling and entered an Order (Houston Dkt. #83) denying the motion.

A month later, on October 28, 2015, Petitioner filed in the Houston Division case, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate the Court’s May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment (Dkt. #53) and Order of Sale and Vacature (Dkt. #54) as Void for (a) Lack of Constitutional Authority that gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Harris County, Texas, and (b) Denial of Due Process of Law (the “October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate”) (hyperlinked below).

The contents of the October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate are substantially identical to those of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Lufkin Division Objection and Demand—in response to which the Lufkin Judge and plaintiff United States disappeared and declined to participate any further.

The October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate was docketed and a hearing set for November 18, 2015 (Houston Dkt. #84).

November 18, 2015, however, came and went with no word from the Houston Judge.

The Houston Court (as every other United States District Court in America) is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction with authority only in the District of Columbia (for proof of this fact, see Houston Division Record, Fifth Circuit Record, Supreme Court Record, or Lufkin Division Record), masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court of limited jurisdiction (of which, since no later than June 25, 1948, there are no more: see 28 U.S.C. 132 and parenthesized legislative history thereunder).

In every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court in America, “United States” means a Federal Corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the supreme Federal corporation, over all other Federal corporations and other Federal entities of any kind, is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (inc. February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419).

Every United States District Court in America, such as the Houston Court, is a District of Columbia Municipal Corporation tribunal, expounding and enforcing municipal (Roman civil) law, beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2): “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”—such as the District of Columbia.

Neither Harris County, Texas (in the Houston Division case), nor Tyler County, Texas (in the Lufkin Division case), is situate within “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”

The only geographic area in which any United States District Court anywhere in America is authorized to hear and decide cases is the District of Columbia—and every such “court” is a kangaroo court[1], operating under color[2] of law, office, and authority, deceiving and extorting the American People, with no constitutional authority to be doing business in any county, parish , or borough in America.

When cornered, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation legislative-branch officers—e.g., Federal judges, magistrates, and DOJ officers—routinely fall back on the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

This approach, however, will not work under these circumstances for all Federal officers.

Whereas, the Lufkin DOJ attorneys can disregard with impunity Petitioner’s Demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and walk away from the case; the Lufkin Judge enjoys no such luxury: He cannot ignore his responsibility to attend to and conclude the case and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or (h)(3) or failure to prosecute under 41(b), without violating his oath of office; to wit:

“I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” [Underline emphasis added.] 5 U.S.C. 3331 Oath of office.

There is, however, a bigger situation:

  • The most important policy—over all others—in the Federal judicial system is to maintain the appearance of impartiality (not impartiality per se, only the appearance thereof);
  • No one in government has come forward with the constitutional authority that gives any United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)), in any county, parish, or borough in America;
  • The reason no one in government has come forward is that there exists no such constitutional authority[3];
  • It is not possible to have a fair proceeding in a kangaroo court;
  • Every United States District Court in America is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area;
  • Every United States District Court in America is a kangaroo court;
  • The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer; and
  • The appearance of impartiality is crumbling under the weight of fraud and treason to the Constitution.

The reason the Houston Judge failed to rule on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate (hyperlinked below) as appointed on November 18, 2015, in Houston Dkt. #84, is that anything he may say that actually addresses the issue set forth in the motion—either for or against Petitioner—will amount to a confession of fraud and treason to the Constitution.

But as with the Lufkin Judge, the Houston Judge’s oath of office requires that he make a ruling on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, motion within a reasonable time—or be in violation thereof.

The Lufkin Division case is over in substance, DOJ attorneys having abandoned the case and the Lufkin Judge having violated his of oath of office (70 days of silence, despite the duty to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to prosecute, within a reasonable time).

The clock is ticking in the Houston Division.

Having been defrauded and deprived of Petitioner’s real and personal property in the Houston Division case under color of law, office, and authority, by way of complicity among the Houston Judge, Fifth Circuit Judges, and Supreme Court Justices, Petitioner is active in rectifying matters and will report all developments on this webpage as they occur.  

Houston Motion To Vacate, October 28, 2015

*  *  *

Bonus:

Jeff Rense interviews John Trowbridge on RenseRadio.com (Nov. 16, 2015)

*  *  *

[1] kangaroo court. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 359.

[2] COLOR. An appearance, semblance, or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence a deceptive appearance ;  a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality ;  a guise or pretext. . . .  Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 222.

[3] Idem est non probari et non esse ; non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not proved and what does not exist, are the same ;  it is not the defect of the law, but of proof.  John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2136.

    De non apparentibus et non existntibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist. Id. at 2130.

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